

Jordan University College

THE REFLECTION MEDIUM

AFRICA TOMORROW

Inculturation is a difficult and delicate task, since it raises the question of the Church's fidelity to the Gospel and the Apostolic Tradition amidst the constant evolution of cultures.

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Editorial

Dear Readers, we are pleased to present to you issue number 23 of *Africa Tomorrow* after an unintended hiatus. We are living at a serious juncture in the history of the world when two Middle Eastern societies, attempting to conceal themselves under the blanket of moral righteousness, seem intent on inflicting lethal damage on each other even to the extent of steadily accelerating the suffering and death of innocent people living within a not-so-concealed closet of distress, uncertainty and a frightful degree of hunger, thirst and illness.

The state of Israel, for example, has surrounded a parish in Gaza that carries the name Holy Family. The people inside are disabled, hungry, thirsty... they are not in the presence of armed warriors. Indeed they have Mother Teresa's Sisters to accompany them. They are all innocent victims in grave need of food, water and medical supplies but they are not allowed to leave the church building. If they try to do so they will be shot (it is reported that three innocent people have already been shot when they tried to leave the building).

The nations of the world have invited Israel to consider with a wisdom of which its leaders are highly capable, the available options for securing an order that they would deem just for their own nation with a compassionate regard for the innocent people trapped within Gaza. Leaders of African nations, such as those of Gambia and Zambia, together with Middle Eastern countries who have pledged to play a neutral role (Qatar is an example) and have shown themselves to be trustworthy have urged Pope Francis to speak with unmitigated forthrightness about the moral values at stake in the conflict and the necessity to curb the violence perpetrated against innocent people.

By speaking with a voice that resonates with the cry of the poor, a bold and forthright proclamation of Pope Francis together with the voices of these African nations would make it clear that Jesus Christ intends his Church to stand for the inviolable defence of the innocent. Pope Francis would be assisting people from all walks of life and all political persuasions to prepare for the Final Moment when Jesus says to the protectors of the innocent, "Whatever you

did to the least one, the one who is my brother, the one who is my sister, you did it to me.”

Pope Francis would be serving the Church and the world as a “voice for the voiceless”. If Pope Francis were to accept this invitation and speak on behalf of the suffering people of Gaza, the entire world would benefit from his moral leadership. The focus would no longer be on the attempts of some people to use the Catholic Church to justify their own self-centred, sensual, gravely sinful lifestyle.

It is hoped that the Pope will accept the invitation to make such a proclamation on behalf of the innocent poor in the next few days.

Meanwhile the Russia-Ukraine war continues to exacerbate the suffering of innocent people in that part of the world.

As if that were not enough, the scourge of abortion that takes the lives of the most vulnerable among us, the unborn children, continues to put into a state of suspicion the human heart’s capability to love selflessly.

There are those who have offered intelligent appraisals of our current situation during the last several years with a view of opening the eyes of the public to the tragic possibility that too many people – swayed by the apparent possibilities that today’s technology offers – have attempted to “modify” God’s intentions for the human being. What can one say about the divine intentions?

God has created the human person to act with responsible freedom and moral dignity. The moral integrity of the human person is entirely cradled within the divine will. Hence a primordial ability for the human being is that of listening, obeying, and submitting oneself to the Will of the Creator; to the divine Plan for the salvation of the last, the least and the lost; to the workings of Divine Providence that with the stature of the Good Shepherd reaches out to the most hard-hearted, self-indulgent and disdainful of people no matter what the culture or society to which they belong.

No human being is meant to be the innocent victim of the arrogance, anger, resentment, or disdain of another human being no matter how justified the perpetrator may feel himself or herself to be. Human beings are not meant to acquiesce to the whims and caprices of persons who control the levers of war, or the pills and

instruments of those who would deem a zygote or a human embryo unworthy of a future as a living human being.

Once conception signals that a new being is in the process that will identify her someday as irreplaceable, indispensable, unrepeatable, irreducible and unique, no one has a mandate from God to destroy that new being. Indeed it is quite the opposite. God is no friend to those who would destroy an already-conceived male or female member of the human family. The same moral logic applies to all the innocent trapped within the crossfire of projectiles of hatred and indifference. Those who begin or prolong armed conflicts are no friends of God.

The callous orientation towards innocent human life that too many people seem to have adopted begins in hearts that are oriented towards themselves. Tragic though it may seem, one can only imagine that there are many powerful and influential people, both those of religious bent and those that are unabashedly secular, that continue to seem quite successful in their stratagems to create for themselves an identity that settles the question once and for all, "Who am I – really?" These are the ones who choose to ignore the plight of their brothers and sisters in humanity.

These are the same individuals who may still be struggling for a peaceful night's sleep within their unanticipated luxury, their pleasure-enhancing devices, their multi-faceted medications and the ever-absorbing, inescapable complication that all of this is going to come to an end.

Within this violent milieu that wars, abortion and the insidious ploys of the human heart have fashioned for the world, there is yet another phenomenon that seeks to undermine the inestimable value of the human person. Rather than accepting the person as God has created him, as God has created her, there are cultures, societies and nations that have made it an overriding distraction to allow people to "re-design" themselves as if their somatic, physiological and psychological constitution could be of their own making according to their own emotional preferences in contrast to what God gave them in the very act of creating them.

What is phenomenal about all this is the intuition on the part of some that every person no matter what identity he or she has

created for the self should be allowed to live with that identity regardless of God's eternal intention for that person.

It is a formation of the self according to one's desire and preference. In the process the person forsakes his or her origin within God's loving Providence.

In the year 2007, a Canadian mastermind of social psychology, Charles Taylor, offered the world an extensive analysis of what has happened by publishing a text through Harvard University where he showed amazing intellectual insight into the fact that the push to be recognized as a person with an identity that is self-created and self-given is superseding the notion that a person is most authentically a person when she or he is ready to come to the aid of those who are unloved, unwanted, ignored, abandoned and rejected.

The identity one fabricates for oneself becomes a matter of social taste. She or he is so exclusively focused on the self and the drive to be authentic that she or he remains oblivious to the innocent person who suffers an untimely death as a victim of the injustice, the indifference, and the intemperance of those who pay attention exclusively to themselves. The label one attaches to this group that seems to have usurped the rights of the Creator in their fanatic quest to construct their own identity is that of the LGBTQ+.

To prevent any misunderstanding I simply cite the words that come to us from the Harvard University press. Charles Taylor is the author:

I want to speak of "social imaginary" here, rather than social theory, because there are important differences between the two. There are in fact, several differences. I speak of "imaginary" (i) because I'm talking about the way ordinary people "imagine" their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, it is carried in images, stories, legends, and so forth. But it is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding which makes possible common practices, and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.

To demonstrate how the social imaginary functions: I am not living with a particular commitment to a theory that explains how the world works. I am not living within academic interests and intellectual systems. I am living, rather, intuitively in harmony with my social surroundings. In a culture where people are growing to accept the notion of a “self-created” identity – not as an elaborate understanding of the nature of gender and its relationship to the biology of a person’s sexual make-up but instead as an intuitive, common sense idea that a person should be allowed to live as he or she wishes to live without fear of reprisal from others – the social imaginary would tend to leave the ordinary people of that culture with the idea that one should not hurt someone by refusing to affirm that person in his or her chosen identity however strange that chosen identity would seem to people of other cultures or other generations.

If society is not attentive, there can be hidden within the social imaginary a place of privilege occupied by technology that ought to belong to God. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, that sex outside of monogamous heterosexual marriage has always occurred... until recently it was considered taboo. It violated divine moral law. With the advent of cheap and efficient condoms and contraceptives, however, it has become easier to have sex outside of marriage.

Hence there is a pattern: first, there is a form of behaviour acknowledged to be promiscuous. Next, there is a technology to facilitate it in the form of contraception and antibiotics. Because the technology enables the sexually promiscuous to avoid the natural consequences of their actions, namely, unwanted pregnancies and disease, the rationales that justify the behaviour become more plausible and the arguments advanced to discourage the behaviour become less tenable. The behaviour itself becomes more acceptable and no longer finds a foothold in God-given moral norms. The social imaginary has shifted; and entire societies may be living unwittingly in their new social imaginary.

Who or what is the source of moral norms? To address this question, in *A Secular Age* and in his other major work, *Sources of the Self*, Taylor offers another concept that connects with that of the social imaginary. Taylor presents a distinction that groups

together those who accept God as the one who governs day-to-day events and those who consider themselves to be the author of those events. The distinction is between *mimesis* and *poiesis*.

The mimetic point of view accepts the world as one with a given order and a given meaning. It is the task of human beings to discover that meaning and adapt themselves to it. The poietic point of view perceives the world as raw material that gives the human being the opportunity to create out of it both meaning and purpose.

Taylor suggests – insightfully – that society has shifted from a view of the world as intrinsically meaningful where the human person has a specific given end – an end coming forth from God as a gift. From the poietic perspective, Christianity’s notion that earthly life for human beings is to be regulated by the fact that the human person’s ultimate destiny is eternal communion with God gives way to a self-creation that engages the person in choosing his or her own destiny and thereby creating for the self an ethics with the purpose of making the self transparently authentic according to the person’s own self-evaluation. Those who live by the poietic point of view often lapse into the mode of intuition that declares, “What feels right – what makes me feel good about myself – is the proper life project for me.”

It is entirely psychosocial in perspective without any connection to a divine Being who gives both existence and purpose to the human person.

If I were living in medieval Europe, my skill and success as a farmer would seem to depend entirely on factors beyond my control: geography, the seasons, the weather, the condition of the soil... ultimately the life or death of my loved ones and myself. The created order would possess an authority that extended well beyond whatever control I or any other human being might be able to exercise over the environment.

More advanced agricultural technology, however, provokes a shift from the mimetic to the poietic lifestyle. Irrigation systems mean that water can be moved or stored; intellectual apprehension of soil science, fertilizers, and pesticides means that the land can be manipulated in a way never before imagined so that it can produce better crops. Genetics allows the production of foods that

are immune to conditions or parasites that would ordinarily be unhealthy.

For us, in other words, the world has lost its authority to control our destinies. We are able to manipulate it as raw material to serve our purposes – apparently without the need to entrust ourselves to Divine Providence.

The shift to the poietic point of view even seems to change our experience of the meaning inherent in the states of sickness and health. Certain diseases in the past were untreatable because the technology was not available to impede their lethal intrusions into the physical integrity of the human being. Whether one lived or whether one died, all this depended on God.

Our current experience, however, is quite different: infections that formerly were deadly may now be dispatched with antibiotics. The complications of childbirth that often clouded the joy of bringing a child into the world with the sudden sadness of the mother's death occasioned by unanticipated problems with the child's delivery have now given way to the many avenues of medical expertise that can save the mother once she has given birth to her child.

Medical technology, in other words, seems to have drained the natural world of its propensity to enshroud human life in mystery and has made oblivious the invitation to the human person to entrust all authority for his or her life to the Creator and Saviour. Instead the shift to the poietic point of view seems to have given human beings the sense that no matter how challenging a health issue may be, it does not have to be the final word for a person's destiny here on earth. It seems to be the right thing to do, to subscribe to the social imaginary that implies that what is needed is the right expert to apply her or his skills to provide an effective resolution to any crisis.

We offer another example of the social imaginary that is not necessarily axiological in nature. One hundred fifty years ago if someone asked me if I was satisfied with my job, I might answer, "My job gives me what I need to feed my family and clothe them... so, yes, I am satisfied with my job." My sense of self, in other words, emerged from my sense of my responsibility for my family.

Because the social imaginary has changed, very few people would see meeting basic needs as the criterion for job satisfaction or the sense of self-worth that one can derive from her or his job. Today one might be more prone to say, “My job as a teacher gives me a sense of personal fulfilment especially when a student learns a new idea or becomes excited about some concept as a result of my classes.” My description of job satisfaction, in other words, would be more closely derived from the psychological state that I experience with my job.

The fluctuation in the social imaginary occasioned by technology cannot be overestimated. Geographical space no longer has the authority to govern the breakup of family ties. Two hundred years ago a trip between a major city in Nigeria and Zanzibar was not imagined as a possibility – indeed a trip between the localities where Lagos and Abuja now exist within Nigeria would have taken well more than a month not to mention all the precautions one would have to take in order to eat the right foods, drink potable water, and keep one safe from wild animals and hostile bugs and insects. Now a trip from Zanzibar to Lagos takes less than eight hours by air.

In the year 1900, a person leaving from Africa to go to the United States may never see her family again. Now she can see her loved ones in a video phone call by WhatsApp and plan future meetings when money becomes available.

What bridges social imaginaries? What style of reasoning and of day-to-day living maintains us within all the practical possibilities that technology offers when used uprightly, and at the same time within God’s purposes and plans for our destinies both as individuals and as a vast human family?

In *A Secular Age*, Taylor describes the difference between these two points of view as a shift from a *transcendent* to an *immanent* frame of reference. On page 543, Taylor describes it this way:

At first, the social order is seen as offering us a blueprint for how things, in the human realm, can hang together to our mutual benefit, and this is identified with the plan of Providence, what God asks us to realize. But it is in the nature of a self-sufficient immanent order that it can be envisaged without reference to God; and very soon the proper blueprint is attributed to Nature.

In this scenario the idea of God becomes an unnecessary hypothesis. In the transcendent frame of reference, ethical codes are rooted in a sacred order, and cultures are defined by that which they forbid and that which they allow. In the immanent frame of reference, however, cultures do not build their moral order on a sacred order.

Alasdair MacIntyre dovetails with Charles Taylor and speaks of emotivism, which indeed coincides with what Taylor calls expressivism. Both authors make keen observations about the immanent frame of reference. Here is MacIntyre's manner of discussing emotivism in his book *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Ducksworth 1985, 11–12):

Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.

One may concede that few people are going to accept emotivism as a moral theory: who is going to argue that their moral values are based simply on emotional preferences? Yet it is not a stretch of the imagination to consider that emotivism is a social theory. In other words, emotivism offers a good method for understanding how most people actually live their lives. “It just feels right.” “I know in my heart it is a good thing.” “We know we are in love with each other and should get married because we feel so in tune with each other.” The divine plan for what is right, for what is good, for marriage is entirely absent from the picture.

What bridges social imaginaries? St. Thomas More, a voice for truth, justice and reconciliation in a government that seemed to ignore truth, justice and reconciliation gives a profoundly meaningful reply to our question. His words come down to us vis-à-vis a letter he wrote to his daughter Margaret when he was awaiting the verdict that would eventuate his execution: **Nothing can come but that which God wills. And I make myself very sure that whatever that be, seem it ever so bad in our sight, it shall indeed be best.** No matter how sophisticated we may think we are in our reasoning and choice-making, God is still the One we need so that we may recognize what is true and what is just, and

reconcile with our enemies according to his divine will. The sacred order is the one that corresponds to reality if the human being is willing to accept divine input for his or her understanding of what is real.

The articles we present to you in this issue present many currents of the social imaginary that operate in our cultures. These same articles present what may seem to be on the side of mimesis where we depend on no one except God, but at the same time on the creative side of poesis, where we accept God's invitation to be "co-thinkers" with him. I suggest that we may read these articles while asking ourselves, how can I/we become a people that indeed are innocent, pure of heart, thoughtful, and ready to be compassionately responsible for the ability of our brothers and sisters to be truly happy? How can we be "co-thinkers" with God?

Thomas Marwa Monchena offers a systematic analysis of what happens with moral systems when they clash with the purposes and methods of those who govern. Perhaps there are responsible people who establish what they call realism within their formulations and hypotheses; perhaps there are practitioners who try to fit their moral convictions in a way that is realistic into the actual purposes and possibilities of governance in its current mode of functioning. In any event some may choose either to design politics according to moral means and ends or design morality according to one's preferred political ideals, goals and methods. Marwa is thoughtfully careful with all the distinctions that are necessary in order to understand how the significant people in the morality-politics debate are situating themselves.

Eugenia Wandela offers insights into pedagogical methods that coincide with the discussion of social imaginaries. There are moments in any culture where a child learns by means of a process of formation: the ones responsible for this formation are family members, principally the parents and grandparents, and teachers. When this formation process introduces the child into experiential learning and the methodologies involved in investigations into new areas of knowledge, processes for asking the relevant questions, for finding the answers to those questions, reaching the point of truly understanding what one has come to know and of affirming that what one knows indeed exists as it is known – this experiential

learning opens the child to new horizons that a more passive learning approach may be inclined to overlook.

George Ndemo introduces a topic that locates us squarely in the sacred frame of reference in contradistinction to the immanent frame of reference. Among the mimetic elements of the cultural experience of the Abagusii of Southwestern Kenya is that of the evil-eye (Ebibiriria).

The evil-eye is a real phenomenon that is preternatural in scope. As such it falls into a mimetic social imaginary. As we have explained above, mimesis shifts the person or culture from the domain where the human person is “lord” of his or her life, i.e., a self-creator who can shape or design his or her life according to the “raw material” that the physical and social environment offer, to a domain that lies within the mystery of Divine Providence, where science reaches an impasse.

It is noteworthy that the evil-eye phenomenon exceeds the scope of science and so enters a transcendent frame of reference that science cannot apprehend. As a phenomenon that may hurt people, even lethally, and often gathers momentum through the envy of one person towards another, it cannot find an entryway into the supernatural. It remains on the level of the preternatural.

God teaches the human mind to lift itself beyond material and spiritual realities in order to understand who He, God, is (cf. St. Augustine, *Tractate on the Gospel of John*, 24, 1). God is the “Higher Power” who does miracles: a supernatural act takes place when the potentiality of the forces of nature is actuated by divine intervention which extends this potential beyond the sphere of its normal capacity of operation (cf. St. John Paul II, General Audience on Miracles, 13 January 1988).

Ndemo’s article opens our eyes to our need for a mimetic social imaginary with a sacred frame of reference where each of us finds our personal freedom, our confidence and our self-definition in the supernatural workings of Divine Providence.

John Gibson and Lois Mwamzanya present to us a pilot study form of research that examines the relationship between the style of parenting that young adults perceive their parents to have exercised when they were younger and the degree of psychological well-being that these same young adults now perceive themselves

to be enjoying. Even with the small sample, there were remarkable results that do not coincide with what researchers may expect.

No matter what parenting pattern the parents may have followed in their manner of raising their children, all respondents manifested a very healthy degree of psychological well-being. All the respondents perceived their social imaginary as they were growing up to be within a sacred frame of reference where Divine Providence was central to everyone's belief system. Even if the young adults may have suffered from their parents' style, all seemed to carry a reverence for God that did not give way to disappointment because of parental behaviour.

Philemon Kamanga and Naomi Mwaikambo introduce us to the stark reality that ensues when certain individuals attempt to forsake the sacred frame of reference and substitute for it their own immanent frame of reference where their social imaginary tends to neglect in one way or another the suffering sister, the suffering brother. The specific pain that they address is that brought upon the small and medium business enterprises when they face seemingly insuperable difficulties in getting the credit they need to make a livelihood with their businesses.

At the heart of this present issue of *Africa Tomorrow* is Bernard Witek's historical survey of the origins of Jordan University College as it exists today. The University College is sacred in its purpose and simultaneously an opportunity with many boulevards for those who wish to integrate their life purpose with noble pursuits that are both secular and sacred in scope. There is one person who is responsible for elevating the University College to the level of an institution that both seeks to know the truth of all that is concealed within today's political and apolitical events and intends to contribute to purifying the motives, means and aspirations of all who live, work, study and do their research here. That person is Jesus Christ.

Marcel Mukadi presents a more than worthy conclusion to this issue. His discussion draws from the wisdom of Optatus of Milevis to demonstrate exactly what a sacrament is. It is Jesus Christ's way of lifting all of us from all our social imaginaries to the vestibule of eternal life. Amen.

The Editor

PHILOSOPHY & HUMAN SCIENCE

Politics without Morality? How Politics and Morality Are Related to Each Other: Part One¹

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Preface

The problem of the relationship between morality and politics has a long and varied history. Since ancient times, philosophers, theologians and politicians have reflected on the relationship between morality and politics. It is common for theorists interested in the history of the problem to trace its origin to a point long before the advent of Plato and Aristotle. According to Vittorio Hösle, the fact that the founder of ethics, namely, Socrates was killed by his own state for offenses connected with his activity as a moralist² was symptomatic of the emerging opposition between politics and morality.³

We also find in Plato's *Republic* a philosophical statement that the rulers (guardians) of the ideal state are exempted from one of

¹ This is Part One of a two-part article. Part Two appears in the next issue of *Africa Tomorrow*.

² Throughout this work we make no distinction between the term "ethics" and "morality". The term "ethics" comes from the Greek *ethos*, *ethous*, meaning use, custom, way of behaving, character. It corresponds to the term "morality" which comes from Latin "mos", "moris". Thus, we retained them as synonymous.

³ V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, translated by Steven Rendall, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2004, 10.

the basic moral prohibitions, that of lying. The guardians are required to deceive the enemies of the state, and even its own citizens for the sake of security, stability and the good of the polity.

Even though Plato does not consider telling lies as permissible for an individual, and regards a liar as one worthy of punishment, he believes that the ruler of the society has to have a willingness to tell lies.⁴ Yet in Plato's political philosophy, this provision is an exception rather than the rule; other precepts of morality are to be upheld by all.

In this paper we are not attempting a full historical survey of the problem of the relationship between morality and politics. Our interest is to show the principal paradigms that have found their way into the history of this theme of the relationship between political and moral philosophy. Therefore, in our treatment of this topic, we have selected philosophers and tenets that we think will stand as representative of specifiable positions concerning the problem of how moral and political philosophy are related to each other.

One example that comes to mind is that of *Aristotelianism*. Aristotle held the conviction that moral philosophy and political philosophy are two distinct dimensions of a single science. Many subscribed to this position, but we would not be able to investigate all the protagonists of this particular viewpoint.

Under the section entitled *Political Realism*, we shall investigate some representatives of the paradigm and associated tenets that hold ethics and politics to be distinct, separate, and opposed in a way that cannot be reconciled without either of them

⁴ PLATO, *Republic*, 389b. In Book III of *Republic*, Plato discusses the selection and education of the rulers (the guardians). Plato argues that, to secure the interest of the community there must be chosen among the guardians, those who appear to be most likely to devote their lives to doing what they judge to be in the interest of the community (412d-e). He goes on to say that for the same reason (securing the interest of the community), rulers must be willing to lie and, in particular, to deceive the populace into thinking that they (the rulers) were born to rule (415aff). This text clearly shows Plato's belief that even in an ideal world, the genuine political ends will require a willingness to tell a lie. See: S. Mendus, *Politics and Morality*, Cambridge: Polity Press 2009, 3–4.

losing its basic characteristic. We shall trace the origins of this view to Machiavelli, whose entire political theory was motivated by the need to liberate politics from ethics and religion. We shall also be demonstrating that Michael Walzer's theory of the problem of 'dirty hands' amounts to a kind of political realism.

We intend to offer brief highlights of the prominent representatives of *Liberalism* and their main political and moral doctrines. Within the section devoted to liberalism, we shall consider a number of arguments that basically lead to the conclusion that morality is a personal issue because each person is free so long as he or she does not interfere with the freedom of others. Corresponding to these notions of self-defined morality and freedom, we will examine the following arguments: autonomy of the political sphere, the deficiency theory of authority, the neutrality of the state, and respect of individual freedom.

Another tenet regarding the relationship between morality and politics has its origin in *Totalitarianism*. This is a view which holds that ethics is or should be subjugated to politics and that fundamentally it is the totalitarian political regime that determines the ethical code for the entire community. According to totalitarianism, the personal conscience must conform to the demands of the collectivity. Consequently, ethics becomes an instrument that serves the political interests of the regime;⁵ and the end becomes, in a way, an absolute Machiavellianism. An analysis of the various forms of totalitarian systems will place a proper spotlight on this point of view.

We should note that the whole investigation in this section of the essay is but a preparation for our inquiry into the problem of practical knowledge and the interplay of moral and political philosophy in the thought of Yves R. Simon. We undertake this inquiry in the subsequent sections of the essay.

⁵ Cf. A. VENDEMIATI, *Universalismo e Relativismo nell'etica contemporanea*, Marietti 1820, Genova-Milano 2007, p. 109. "*Il positivismo etico riconosce come fonte unica dei valori e delle norme la volontà di un legislatore, e pertanto professa una sola virtù: l'obbedienza alla legge.*"

1. Aristotle: Ethics and Politics as Two Dimensions of a Single Inquiry

Aristotle is convinced that ethics and politics are two dimensions of a single inquiry about the well-being of whoever is human. The essential position of this paradigm is that both ethics and politics are in quest of rendering secure the flourishing of human beings, either as individuals or as a community. The individual in private life is the same person as in his social life. Hence ethics and politics cannot conflict with or oppose each other.

This tenet holds that among the roles and functions of politics are the spiritual nourishment of the citizens, cultivating them to be sociable, teaching them how to relate with others in their community, and to observe the rights of others.

As we have said above, in holding this view, Aristotle is not alone. For example, Plato did not conceive of ethics as a separate branch of philosophy, and did not distinguish ethics from politics.⁶ In fact, as Vittorio Hösle observes, for Plato there is a correspondence between the soul and the state, and consequently “individual ethics” corresponds to “political ethics”. It is eminently Platonic to say that the “the virtue of the state proceeds from the virtue of its citizens”. Hösle continues:

According to Plato the classes in the ideal state should correspond to the parts of the soul, and even the degenerate forms taken by the state, which are investigated in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, are each correlated with a specific human

⁶ Cf. F. COPLESTON, *A History of Philosophy: Vol. I Greece and Rome, Part I*, Image Books Edition, New York 1962, p. 249. After having indicated in a previous chapter that Plato’s ethics is directed towards the attainment of the human being’s highest good (*Summum Bonum*), Frederick Copleston tells us that Plato’s political theory was developed in close connection with his ethics. In ancient Greece, life was essentially a communal life lived out in the City-State. It was unthinkable that anyone could live a flourishing life apart from the City. It would not occur to any genuine Greek that someone could be a good person if he stood entirely apart from the State, since it is only in and through Society that the good life becomes possible for the human being. Society meant the City-State.

type. [...]. The soul and the state not only correspond to each other, they are also in harmony with the cosmos.⁷

For Plato, the foundation of the political state is human nature. The human being is spontaneously a social being; and given the differentiation of individuals and their division of work, there arises the need, in society, to ensure justice in mutual relations. Now, since the human person is social by nature, it follows that the state is not a result of convention, but a natural association with a moral purpose of securing justice. Thus, politics is intimately connected with morality: governing the state should not be a game ruled by the interests of the few, nor the violent domination by one person, but should be for the well-being of all. Plato and Aristotle are in agreement concerning the unity of politics and morality.

We choose Aristotle as a representative of the paradigm that depicts the view that morality and politics are two parts of a single philosophical inquiry. The rationale for arguing for the oneness of morality and politics rests with the fact that in Aristotle's philosophy the problem of the relationship between morality and politics is treated with clarity for the first time in systematic philosophy. In fact, Aristotle is the first to think of these two fields as distinct domains of practical knowledge.

However, it would be misleading to argue that because Aristotle wrote two separate treatises on politics and ethics, the two subjects have nothing to do with each other. For Aristotle, ethics and politics together constitute what he calls practical knowledge ('science').⁸ The relatedness between ethics and politics as

⁷ V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, trans. by Steven Rendall, South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press 2004, 13.

⁸ See R. KRAUT, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press 2002, 16. "Aristotle himself makes a distinction between politics and ethics – although he never doubts that the subject they investigate must be studied together." See Also: R. BODEUS, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics*, trans. Jan Edward Garrett, New York: State University of New York Press 1993, 24. "For, neither misinterpreting nor of course denying the significance possessed by the mere material existence of two separate 'writings', we must refrain from overstressing this distinction of subject-matters at the expense of the unity of intention which governed the two groups of investigations."

practical knowledge is foundational for the view that both ethics and politics are parts of a single inquiry.

1.1 Politics and Ethics as Practical Knowledge

For Aristotle, knowledge is a cognitive quality of persons engaged in thinking. He divides knowledge in accordance with different modes or dispositions of the intellect which include understanding, art, science (capacity to demonstrate), and philosophical wisdom. Aristotle believed that the causes and principles of distinct things are distinct. We know this because we have experiences and reflect on these experiences. For Aristotle, this means that there are different kinds of human knowledge, that is, distinct modes of thought or distinct intellectual dispositions. These distinct ‘sciences’ are distinguished by the activities performed by each mode of thought.⁹

For Aristotle knowledge is divided into: theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, and productive knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is subdivided into first philosophy, physics, and mathematics. Practical knowledge is subdivided into ethics, politics, and a number of other fields of endeavour. These sciences refer to the human dispositions or intellectual orientations towards something specifiable, be it the production of something (e.g., in arts), the determination of some action (e.g., in politics and ethics), or the contemplation of something (e.g., metaphysics, physics, and mathematics). The knowledge pursued for the sake of contemplation is theoretical; the knowledge pursued for the sake of

⁹ “Science”, in Aristotle’s sense, does not only refer to the cognition of a single or an organic whole of known or knowable objects, but also to a perfection of the knowing subject—the subject’s consistent way of thinking about the elements of one single domain. For Aristotle each science has its own first principles or premises. One science is different from another if their principles do not belong to the same genus or if the principles of the one are not derived from the principles of the other. See ARISTOTLE, *Posterior Analytics* I. 28, 87a38–87b3, in the *Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984.

action is practical; and the knowledge pursued for the sake of making or producing something is productive.¹⁰

By calling ethics and politics practical, Aristotle means that we do ethics and politics properly and reasonably, if and only if we are questioning and speculating in order to act—that is, in order to conduct and regulate our lives rightly and reasonably for the attainment of our well-being. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that ethics and politics constitute practical sciences in the sense that they give rise to knowledge about what the human being should be, since the moral life and political life do not consist only in doing in the strict sense of conduct, but in the orientation of all our activities in a determined way, towards a determined human ideal.

Ethics and politics as practical 'sciences' are not sciences in a platonic sense, that is, as knowledge of unchanging universals, the forms. For Plato, there is no true scientific knowledge (*epistēmē*) of the world of change, no knowledge of things that can be otherwise, i.e., of constituents of the world of becoming.¹¹

Another criterion of distinguishing between practical and theoretical knowledge according to Aristotle is the level of precision or exactness that can be attained when studying them. Political and moral knowledge both lack the precision, exactness or certainty that is proper to mathematics. In a sense practical science (politics and ethics) suffer the imprecision, the inexactness and the uncertainty of scientific knowledge. This fact is vindicated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle says:

Our discussion will be adequate if we make things perspicuous enough to accord with the subject matter; for we would not seek the same degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike, any more than in the products of different crafts. Now, fine and just things, which political science examines, differ and vary so much

¹⁰ ARISTOTLE, *Topics*, Book VI.6, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984.

¹¹ To find knowledge that is something more than opinion, we must, according to Plato, ascend to the world of numbers and Ideas or Forms. Since the physical world is one of movement and change, our knowledge of it is only opinion. See. Y. R. SIMON, *Definition of Moral Virtue*, 64.

as to seem to rest on convention only, not on nature. [...]. And so, since this is our subject and these are our premises, we shall be satisfied to indicate the truth roughly and in outline; since our subject and our premises are things that hold good usually, we shall be satisfied to draw conclusions of the same sort.¹²

This means that political and ethical knowledge is not meant to give us a fixed set of rules to be followed when ethical and political decisions are to be made. This is the position held by D. J. Allan who says that “Aristotle seldom preaches, and it is no part of his view to suppose that ethics will give men rules directing them how to behave in detail.”¹³ This is so because practical sciences deal with what is probable, or what is true for the most part, in changing, contingent circumstances in which human beings live and develop in accord with the evolving character that each displays.

Aristotle argues that the right course of action depends on many factors, which can only be estimated by intuition. These factors include the time and the circumstances that occasion the action, and the personality of the agent. Aristotle says that the mode of thinking or reasoning that is engaged when we study ethics and politics is of a practical kind, prudence (*phronēsis*).¹⁴ It aims at deeds rather than the necessary and demonstrable truth. The ethical life, for example, is about doing what is upright and is concerned, not with necessary and invariable things, but with matters of conduct that admit of change and variation, that is, actions in relation to particular things that are good and bad for human beings.¹⁵

¹² ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.3.

¹³ D. J. ALLAN, *The Philosophy of Aristotle*, 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press 1970, 125. In fact, Aristotle does not give such fixed rules. Instead he tries to make his students the kind of men who, when confronted with any particular ethical or political decision, will know the correct thing to do, will understand why it is the correct choice, and will choose to do it. Such a man will know the general rules to be followed, but will also know when and why one may or should deviate from those rules.

¹⁴ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI.5

¹⁵ In this sense, as a practical science, an ‘inexact’ science, ethics studies human character (*ēthos*) with the aim of discovering the extent to which humans are not simply passive entities, merely responding to natural forces or biological instincts. It tries to discover the boundaries of the sphere of responsible agency where humans are able to act on and in their world.

Having shown that politics and ethics are both practical 'sciences' – for they are pursued for the sake of action – Aristotle goes on to argue that there cannot be a strict separation between practical sciences in their subject matter (i.e., between ethics and politics) such as is characteristic of the theoretical sciences (first philosophy, physics, and mathematics). This is so, because the rule that there is a science for each genus does not apply to habits, actions, and institutions, which cannot be separated and defined according to the substances and motions that physics studies. This means that ethics and politics are not separate sciences treating of independent subject matters, but are dialectically distinct approaches to common problems. In each approach the interactive effect of the other must be taken into account. They both belong to practical knowledge, that is, they pursue knowledge for the sake of activity.

For Aristotle, ethics and politics as practical sciences have a common methodology. Dialectic, which is the method of analysing the consistency of plausible arguments in general, is the method appropriate to the discussions of questions in the domains of ethics and politics.¹⁶ Dialectic is a mode of reasoning by means of which human beings may be trained to engage in the critical and constructive study of common beliefs, proposed definitions, and patterns of experience; and its aim is to prove, as plausible and 'true for the most part', the content of those beliefs, definitions and patterns.

This analytic method begins by discussing the commonly accepted, currently held, reputable opinions, in an attempt to test them for non-contradiction. Aristotle implies the same thing when he says:

But the truth in questions about action is judged from what we do and how we live, since it is there that the final decision lies. Hence we ought to examine what has been said by applying it to what we do and how we live; and if it harmonizes with what we

¹⁶ See ARISTOTLE, *Rhetoric* 1358a12, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984.

do, we should accept it, but if it conflicts we should count it mere words.¹⁷

Aristotle applies dialectical analysis in his ethical and political writings especially in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*; and he thinks that, with the help of dialectical analyses of various accepted and plausible premises, we can arrive at true opinions.

1.2 The relation between *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*

The connection between morality and politics in Aristotle is apparent in the relationship between Aristotle's most famous ethical and political writings – the *Nicomachean Ethics* (in Greek: *Ēthikōn Nikomacheiōn*) and the *Politics* (*Politikōn*). These works are thought to be two parts of a single inquiry in quest of ensuring the flourishing of human beings. Aristotle recognizes that happiness is the ultimate good – all other goods are intermediate, i.e., they are pursued to achieve happiness. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle discusses the question of how to achieve happiness. After a dialectical analysis of various possible motivations for actions, he concludes that virtue is the means to happiness, and hence the purpose of human existence. Thus, the *Nicomachean Ethics* deals with two related topics: people's dispositions of character and the practical thinking in which they engage in order to choose means to the end of particular right actions. The *Ethics* deals with moral virtues (justice, bravery, temperance, and prudence) and the intellectual virtues (theoretical wisdom – *Sophia* – and practical wisdom – *phronesis*).¹⁸

It is worth noting that at the conclusion of the *Ethics* Aristotle discusses the highest form of happiness. He says that a life of

¹⁷ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X.8 (1179a)

¹⁸ While practical wisdom (*phronesis*) consists in knowledge of general rules, and the intuitive ability to apply such rules to given situations or cases, theoretical wisdom is concerned only with permanent truths, which the human person is powerless to change. Moral virtues, according to Aristotle, are essentially correct character dispositions, produced by training or habituation begun in early youth. They consist not in knowledge of true principles, but in habits of liking and aversion.

contemplation is the most excellent virtue and therefore the highest or the perfect form of happiness (*eudaimonia*).

He discusses five modes of thinking or states of mind by which the mind is able to arrive at truth. His list of five modes of thought include: productive art, prudence (*saggezza*), intelligence, epistemic (demonstrative) science, and wisdom (*sapienza*). According to Aristotle our capacity to exercise these intellectual virtues as various states of mind is not a consequence of any legislator or any constitution. However, for such a contemplative life there is need for an appropriate socio-political environment, which in turn, needs an appropriate government.

According to Enrico Berti, one of the most famous political theories of Aristotle is his view that a political state is necessary for a good life – for living well – and is the highest form of happiness for the human being.¹⁹ Janet Coleman accepts this argument and gives vigour to it when she says in *A History of Political Thought*:

Wherever a human is, so long he is in some community, he can think productively, demonstratively, prudentially, intuitively. But as we shall see, certain polities give him the opportunity to engage and perfect certain of these intellectual capacities better than do others. Certain polities enable a man to integrate his morality and the kind of being he is.²⁰

From Aristotle's point of view, an appropriate government proves necessary because these intellectual virtues develop, not through habituation, but rather through experience and instruction. As humans we are born with the relevant capacities, that is to say, with the abilities to learn to think in "recognizably" human ways;

¹⁹ Cf., E. BERTI, *Nuovi studi Aristotelici, III, filosofia pratica*, Editrice Morcelliana, Brescia 2008, p. 13-14. "Ma i mezzi a cui Aristotele allude non sono solo le tecniche, cioè le scienze poietiche, cioè in quanto produttive dei beni materiali, bensì anche le scienze pratiche, cioè l'etica e la politica, da lui ugualmente subordinate all'esercizio della pura teoria. [...] l'attività politica, consistente nel promulgare le leggi e governare gli Stati, la quale pertanto viene presentata come mezzo in vista della pura teoria."

²⁰ J. COLEMAN, *A History of Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity*, Blackwell Publishers, London 2000, 181.

but for Aristotle, it is only through instruction and experience that we actualize the potential to think in different ways.

We have already alluded to the fact that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle discusses the nature of the human being's happiness or well-being; he argues that all human activities aim at some good and that some goods are subordinate to others. The science of the good for man, however, is politics.²¹ In the *Politics* Aristotle considers the state as one of the chief means through which the individual attains the good life. By his famous declaration in the *Politics*, that "man is by nature a political animal" Aristotle means that it is only within a political community (city-state) that a human being can be himself, and live "the good life". Politics is, therefore, an ethical activity concerned ultimately with creating a "just society" in the sense of a harmonious, ordered society in which the citizens have the possibility of realizing their natural potentiality.

Ultimately, the end of *Nicomachean Ethics* provides a perfect flow into the *Politics* reasserting the close relationship between ethics and politics. The nature of the relationship between *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* is such that while the *Ethics* deals with the good life as it may be realized by a plurality of good men who share ways of evaluating and discussing the good life in a worthy city or 'state', *Politics* deals with those constitutive principles of the good city or 'state' itself as a social environment necessary for the attainment of happiness or of the good life. Here is what Aristotle states in the introductory discussion to *Politics*:

When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.²²

In other words, in *Politics* Aristotle treats the conditions by which men, with certain dispositions of character (virtues), choose means to their end in order to flourish, to be happy. Hence, the question is how individual beings acquire a good political society, ruled by a good government in order to attain happiness. If we are

²¹ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.1.

²² ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, Book I.2 (1252b).

correct, it means Aristotle is aware of the interplay between his ethical and political theory. In his investigation into Aristotle's political philosophy, Richard Kraut recognizes that Aristotle's political thought depends crucially on his ethical theory.

Kraut contends that Aristotle conceives of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* as following a logical progression: the *Ethics* establishes the foundation of politics and *Politics* provides details in depth that allow his examination of human well-being to be put into practice.²³ This means that one cannot determine what makes for a good state unless one first has some idea of what human beings need and of what they are capable.

One needs to know first what a good human life lived in common with others would look like, as well as the kind of character disposition a man needs to acquire in order to flourish and exercise his practical reasoning together with others. Aristotle is deeply aware of this interdependence between ethics and politics.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that since politics is the science that controls all other practical disciplines, its proper concern it is to carry out an investigation of human well-being (happiness, or flourishing), and to regulate human affairs in the light of what it discovers.²⁴ Although Aristotle speaks of politics as the science that controls all other disciplines in the practical order, his criterion is the use of knowledge to direct action. But on the level of analysis of the practical order,²⁵ that is to say, the level concerned with universal principles, definitions and, analyses of end and means, politics is subordinate to ethics.

From this perspective, political life is considered to be the consummation of the ethical life because political activities are necessary for human fulfilment and happiness. But for Aristotle, the attainment of happiness requires virtue of character which is acquired by moral education.

It is the *polis* that has the task of making people live the virtuous life. Hence the proper aim of politics, according to Aristotle, is

²³ R. KRAUT, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, 4.

²⁴ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.2.

²⁵ It is well known that Yves Simon and Jacques Maritain call this the "theoretical level of practical knowledge".

moral virtue. By coercion of the power of law, politics takes the greatest care in making the citizens to be of a certain sort, namely good and capable of noble actions.²⁶

1.3 The ethical function of the state

One of the important features of the view that holds ethics and politics to be two parts of a single inquiry is that it acknowledges private life as well as human commonality. It means one human being may have interest in some matter that does not interest other human beings of a particular community. It also acknowledges the variety of means in which interests—private or common—can be satisfied. There is more than a single way for human beings to attain well-being; it would be implausible and against experience to hold the contrary. Since, man is by nature a political animal, living in a society is, therefore, a necessary condition of the attainment of his well-being. But, as we said above, for Aristotle, the attainment of well-being or happiness requires virtue of character which develops through moral education.

What is common among the protagonists of the view that retains the interconnection between politics and ethics is their understanding that the purpose of the state is dictated not by the individualistic desires and interests of particular individuals but by the nature of man and the end for which he is destined. The state exists to promote justice among men, to help men to become better human beings, to facilitate the development of their creative potentialities, and to restrain their propensity to do evil. And again, it is the State (*polis*) that has the task to make people live the virtuous life.

The main problem in view is how to impose a common moral discipline upon the younger members of society; assuming that it is convenient to each to look only to his interests. For Aristotle it is the political leader (legislator), if anyone, who provides for the common good.²⁷

²⁶ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X.9. The whole of this section, starting with its opening sentence, is an argument for the fruitlessness of studying ethics in isolation from politics.

²⁷ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book V.1-2. See also Book X. Aristotle outlines the threefold role of the law and the politician who

According to the above perspective, law, which is a statesman's instrument for governing, is related to virtue as means are related to their end. The goal of the law is to develop good character in the citizens. The state (or statesman), therefore, is concerned with ordering the souls of its citizens, that is, with creating that order in the souls of its citizens which will make them good and just men. For this we agree with Pierre Manent, when he writes:

For Aristotle, looking properly at the city-state meant considering it according to its end: the city-state was the only framework within which man could fulfil his nature as a rational animal, by practicing the civic and moral virtues that permitted him to demonstrate his excellence.²⁸

Thus, every political community ought to affect the character of its citizens. It shows them what they should set as their personal horizon for the good of their souls: in other words, it affects the order of their souls. Aristotle suggests that how politics affects the souls of citizens depends on the kind of regime that is in place because it is probably true that right opinion (orthodoxy) is the firmest basis of right action (orthopraxy). The political concern to inhibit unjust acts (immoral acts) on the part of the citizens, leads inevitably to the concern on how to make the citizens both good and just.²⁹

Now the fact that the state has a moral function should not be understood as suggesting that morals are merely conventional. In Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that there are some correct, insightful conventional moral rules that enable humans to actualize their natural capacities as moral agents. Convention, according to Aristotle, must work with nature, not

administers the law: (1) To preserve peace, and provide economic security and leisure; (2) to furnish the young with that early habituation in the moral virtues which is, after all, indispensable regardless of the ends they may privately choose to pursue when they have satisfied the requirements of the law; (3) to impede by punishment any conduct destructive of the good order of society.

²⁸ P. MANENT, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, translated by Rebecca Balinski, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1995, 13.

²⁹ The first part of Book III.1-3 reveals the primacy of the government (state) in determining the moral and intellectual life of its citizens.

against it. Aristotle appears to believe that human beings are born without any character or virtue, but with a capacity, yet unrealized, to think or act in different ways. Nature endows human beings with potentialities that are later actualized. This means that no human being is simply a social product and no one simply comes to know what is right by merely accepting unexamined social opinions.

2. Political Realism: Politics without Morality

In contrast to understanding morality and politics as two dimensions of a single inquiry (see above, 1.1), another view holds that morality and politics are – or should be – separated. This view on the separation of politics and morality is notoriously present in various theories of political realism.

Political realism is prevalently associated with Niccolò Machiavelli and others such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hans Morgenthau and others. In our contemporary society, political realism has become a ruling theory in international relations. We include Michael Walzer's treatment of the problem of "dirty hands" because, although he does not consider himself a realist, his account of this problem is thought to be an attempt to justify political realism,

It would be erroneous for us to assume that all realists propose the same arguments to reach their conclusions. However, since they are in tandem with the same tenet, no matter what differences their theories carry, political realists share some certain characteristics.³⁰ We can begin to understand these common characteristics by explaining what political realism means.

When we traverse such domains of study as art, literature, morality, politics, and mathematics, we are sure to notice that the term "realism" presents a kaleidoscope of meanings – the particular meaning of the word depends on the domain under consideration.

In philosophical discourse, the term "realism" was first employed to denote the doctrine that universals exist outside the mind. In political theory, the term has acquired another meaning. In day-to-day language, to be a political realist is to assume an

³⁰ There are different kinds of realist theories, but it is possible to identify core elements that make an argument qualify as "realist" as opposed to something else.

attitude of grasping reality as it is, by focusing on the most salient aspects of a given political milieu.³¹

As Cornelia Navari writes:

In political theory, [...] the term [realist] has come to be reserved for the theorists of the *raison d'état* or Realpolitik. It denotes a school which holds that there are real forces operating in the world beyond our immediate perceptions of them, that these forces are revealed by the historical process and that the able political practitioner takes account of these forces and incorporates them into his political conceptions and his political acts.³²

According to Navari, theoreticians tend to put their own particular stamp on these "real forces" in tandem with their particular notions of history. For example, Machiavelli refers to them as "great forces" of *necessità* and *fortuna*.³³ E. H. Carr calls them "historical forces", and Hans Morgenthau refers to them as "the ingredients of national power". For many other realists, the "real forces" that determine political action and inter-relationships both on the national and international levels are: pursuit of power, acquisition of power, and the exercise of power in order to maintain and maximize the ramifications of power for the individual ruler's self-interest or for the national benefit.

Generally, realists conceive "power" in terms of the ability to influence other citizens or other states in order to elicit from them a certain manner of attitude and action as well as embed them in an immunity to the influence of others. From this perspective, even

³¹ D. BELL, "Political Realism and the Limits of Ethics" in *Ethics and World Politics*, DUNCAN Bell (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York 2010, 93–110, 93.

³² C. NAVARI, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought" in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 11(1982), 203–222, 207. The online version of this article can be found at: <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/11/3/203>.

³³ The expression "*raison d'état*" (reason of State) is not found in Machiavelli, but appeared for the first time as a literary expression during his lifetime with the tell-tale signs of his influence –for instance, in the work by Francesco Guicciardini entitled *Considerazioni intorno ai discorsi di Machiavelli* (*Reflections on the Discourses of Machiavelli*, 1529), and Giovanni Botero's *Della ragion di stato* (1589). See. V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, 29.

those who will never be in a position to rule others can at least satisfy their wish to have enough power to prevent themselves from becoming too completely submissive to the control of others.³⁴

Political realism is traditionally contrasted to political idealism. Political realism rejects ideals, especially moral ideals. In other words, for the political realist, the sense that what is real (facts) is contrasted to what is ideal (values), and “what is” is contrasted to “what ought to be” in the political sphere. The determinant of the realists’ viewpoint is that which constitutes the “what is”.

According to political realists, therefore, adhering to ethics in the political sphere is not only without benefit but also means total loss since the political ethicist seems to assume that in this world, virtue remains unrewarding. Machiavelli, for example, held that “there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation.”³⁵ By his insistent claim that political philosophy must be realist, Raymond Geuss hopes to vindicate, with some degree of insight, his claim that political realists are determined to reject ideals, whether those ideals are essentially human, conventionally civilized or both. Here is what he says:

Political philosophy must be realist. That means, roughly speaking, that it must start and be concerned in the first instance not with how people ought ideally (or ought “rationally”) to act, what they ought to desire, or value, the kind of people they ought to be, and so forth, but, rather, with the way the social, economic, political, and other institutions actually operate in some society at some given time, and what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances. The emphasis on real motivation does not require that one deny that human beings have an imaginative life that is important to them, aspirations, ideals they wish to pursue, or even moral views that influence their behaviour. It also does not imply that humans are not sometimes “rational” or that it would

³⁴ Cf. R. W. DYSON, *Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Sophists to Machiavelli*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing 2005, 254.

³⁵ N. MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, XV, translated and with an introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998.

not often be of great benefit to them to be "rational". What it does mean, to put it tautologically, is that these ideals and aspirations influence their behaviour and hence are politically relevant, only to the extent to which they do actually influence their behaviour in some way.³⁶

This means that a political realist does not (or should not) understand and practice political theory as a process of reasoning about what a just society should be like if human beings were to be rational and moral, or if they were to define the features of their political institutions in terms of ideal conditions within which individuals leave aside their passions and interests. Rather, politics must be understood in relation to the concrete behaviour of individuals and groups, and of peoples in their specific historical and cultural context, with their passions and desires.³⁷

The main premise that underlies such a claim is that politics and morality belong (or should belong) to two distinct and separate realms. Morality is considered as the domain of "ideals" while politics is the domain of "what is real".

In general, the proponents of political realism are in agreement that the realm of ethics concerns individuals and their private affairs, while the realm of politics concerns the assurance of a wholesome social life and regulation of social relations of individuals with one another, as well as with the government. Andrew Gamble shares the belief that one of the chief characteristics of realism is its view that moral judgments do not have a place in discussions of political affairs. In an article in which he seeks to provide an answer to the issue of whether ethical rules apply universally as far as "real politics" are concerned, Andrew Gamble states:

The moral rules that govern private life do not apply, or should be set aside if political action is to be effective and achieve its goals. From this perspective, all forms of ideal theory and ethics to which they give rise, whether deontological or consequentialist, are regarded as failing to understand the realities of politics and, as

³⁶ R. GEUSS, *Philosophy and Real Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2008, 9.

³⁷ Cf. R. GEUSS, *Philosophy and Real Politics*, 10.

a consequence, guilty of purveying illusions and aspirations that will never be realized.³⁸

Gamble's claim marches in tandem with that of Raymond Geuss. According to Geuss, the political realist perceives that ideals or moral principles may "look good" or "seem plausible" to those who propose them or to those to whom they are proposed, but that does not mean that "these norms, canons, or principles will have any particular effect at all on how people will really act". As a result, the political philosophers who adopt the realist perspective take ideals, moral principles, and models for behaviour as utopian conceptions which should be taken "at their own face value".³⁹

In emphasizing the separation of the political sphere from the ethical sphere, it is commonly argued that the difference between ethics and politics is profound and touches the core of each of these disciplines. The concept at issue is that while the core of ethics is truth and right, politics is anchored in interests and benefits. Ethics demands that we tell the truth, not lie; abstain from deception; not conceal the truth; not to act unjustly; conduct ourselves as advocates of justice in all circumstances; not take people as mere instruments or means for the attainment of our goals, and so forth. Politics, however, demands and necessitates the abandonment of some principles of ethics in pursuit of power and self-interest on the individual, national and international level.

Even when this approach is not explicitly negating ethics, the fact that the pursuit of power, interest and benefit is its goal seems to imply that there is no hesitation to trample on all the principles and norms of morality whenever expedient. Hence, throughout history this approach has been tantamount to the negation of morality in the political sphere.

2.1 Machiavelli and political realism

Machiavelli was born on 3 May 1469, second son of Bernardo di Niccolò Machiavelli and Bartolomea de Nelli. Not much is known about his early life. Famous among his written works is the

³⁸ A. GAMBLE, "Ethics and Politics" in *Ethics and World Politics*, DUNCAN Bell (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York 2010, pp. 73–89, 81.

³⁹ Cf. R. GEUSS, *Philosophy and Real Politics*, p. 10.

treatise entitled *The Prince (Il Principe)*, written in 1513. The book was not published, however, until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death.

By 1517, Machiavelli completed another important work entitled *The Discourses on Livy (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio)*. This book discusses how to establish a good republican government.

The status of Machiavelli as a political realist is almost universally undisputed, both among realists and their critics. Most commentators agree that Machiavelli is indeed the first important political realist. He is also regarded as the father of modern political science, for he is seen to have initiated a dynamic distinction between classical and modern political philosophy.⁴⁰

According to Leo Strauss, Machiavelli "tried to effect, and [in fact] did effect, a break with the whole tradition" of classical political philosophy.⁴¹ But the break in question seems to have been a result of Machiavelli's critiques of religion and of morality; he wanted the Church, believed to be the "custodian" and teacher of morals, to be excluded from civic life and so cease to exercise any influence in the public forum.⁴²

Because Machiavelli believed that politics constitutes an autonomous and independent sphere from morality, philosophy,

⁴⁰ In contemporary philosophy there is an attempt to distinguish between "political philosophy" and "political science". Jacques Maritain, for instance, considers Machiavelli's thought on politics as political science rather than political philosophy, because it is derived from the actual empirical reality of everyday experience. Paradoxically, when politics is viewed as "science", derived from empirical reality for the sake of governance, it ends up being an art or technique. See: P. VIOTTO, *Il pensiero moderno secondo J. Maritain*, Rome: Città Nuova Editrice 2011, 69-71.

⁴¹ L. STRAUSS, *"What is Political Philosophy?" and Other Studies*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1959, 40.

⁴² Cf. P. MANENT, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, translated by Rebecca Balinski, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995, 13. "Machiavelli was Florentine. His 'experience of modern things' was his experience of political life in a city-state. We have seen that the city-state was both particularly unfriendly toward the Church and particularly vulnerable when dealing with the Church. This situation of a quite powerless hostility naturally led to the idea of radically excluding religion from the city-state, of closing off completely the city-state from religion's influence."

and theology or religion, he considered it to be an amoral activity. According to his notions, the sovereign is a private individual, free in the making of choices and the practical scope of his behaviours. It is good for him to follow his own moral conscience, but as ruler he should only be concerned with how to achieve the good of the state by any means.

In disagreement with the common conviction that Machiavelli is the founder of political realism, some commentators and theorists maintain that the origin of political realism is to be found in the writings of the ancient Greek historian and philosopher Thucydides (460 – 398 BC). For them, Thucydides' realist views come to the surface in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Annette Freyberg-Inan is one of the authors who trace the origin of political realism to Thucydides.⁴³ Others, like Maurizio Viroli, oppose any attempt to regard or study Machiavelli as the founder of the modern science of politics or as a forerunner of modernity. Viroli argued that what Machiavelli did was not something new, for it had already found its way into the thinking of Roman political theorists. Viroli maintains that we should rather regard Machiavelli as the restorer of the Roman conception of politics as civil wisdom, that is, "the ideal of politics as the wisdom of the citizen whose aim is to preserve the civil life." According to Viroli, Machiavelli's works should be studied as the high point of the tradition of Roman *scientia civilis*.⁴⁴

We agree with Leo Strauss in his opinion that Machiavelli inaugurated a new stage in the development of political thought. The information that we have on hand about Machiavelli seems to make it undeniable that he was discussing political things which had never been expressed before, and that Machiavelli himself was aware of what he was doing. In the preface to *The Discourses*, he writes: "I have decided to take a path as yet untrodden by anyone,

⁴³ See. A. FREYBERG-INAN, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgment of Human nature*, New York: State University of New York Press 2004, 19-36.

⁴⁴ See. M. VIROLI, *Machiavelli*, New York: Oxford University Press 1998, 1–4.

and if it brings me trouble and difficulty, it could also bring me reward."⁴⁵

Machiavelli draws his political views from his study of history (particularly from his examination of the work of the ancient Roman historian, Titus Livy) and from his direct observations of Italian Renaissance politicians. For this reason, Maurizio Viroli is right in suggesting that Machiavelli's method of studying political reality was interpretive and historical rather than scientific.⁴⁶

However, while Machiavelli's critics admit that study of ancient histories may be relevant political theory, they accuse him of not being very critical in questioning the correctness of his sources. Alan Ryan, for instance maintains that though the method of analysis that Machiavelli applies is interesting and distinctive, lacking moral prejudice, it is not based on extracting general principles from a careful examination of the record.⁴⁷ The same view is held by R. W. Dyson, who writes:

Machiavelli's works display a penchant for general patterns arrived at by way of real examples and counter-examples, granted that his selection of examples is often tendentious and uncritical. The material that he examines is drawn from history as well as from contemporary affairs.⁴⁸

The break from the traditional outlook in regard to the relationship between morality and politics was prepared by the culture of the epoch. An important feature of the development of the Renaissance was the tendency in all areas of life to think of each art or science as autonomous. It is in that context that Machiavelli conceived politics as a domain that could be divorced sharply from other human concerns; and hence he proceeded according to this parameter to discover the inner rules or "real

⁴⁵ N. MACHIAVELLI, *Discourses on Livy*, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1996, Book I: Preface.

⁴⁶ M. VIROLI, *Machiavelli*, New York: Oxford University Press 1998, 3.

⁴⁷ A. RYAN, "Political Philosophy", in *Philosophy: Volume II*, A. C. Grayling (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press 1998, 375.

⁴⁸ R. W. DYSON, *Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Sophists to Machiavelli*, 251.

forces” which presumably differentiate it from morality, religion, economic enterprise, and art.

It is notable that in Machiavelli’s writings not only does he insist on the dichotomy between ethics and politics but also recommends the rulers and the princes to trample upon every ethical consideration as a way to fortify their power. As Felix Gilbert rightly remarks, Machiavelli’s methodology makes it clear that for him politics is only about political efficiency.⁴⁹ This is the central theme of his concise and famous thesis named *Il Principe* (*The Prince*).

2.1.1 Relationship between Politics and Morality

Machiavelli introduced a style of thought which rejects traditional or essentialist conceptions of society and denies the existence of a naturally highest good for human beings. His rejection of the traditional views, whether in the area of military affairs or in the general field of ethics, reflected his new vision of politics.

Before Machiavelli, the prevailing view had been that the essential function of government was the diffusion and maintenance of justice.⁵⁰ But Machiavelli believed that the law of life under which every political organization exists was growth and expansion. Consequently he saw the use of force as an integral and most essential element in politics. This is implied in Machiavelli’s warning to the rulers in *The Prince*:

You must know that there are two modes of fighting: one in accordance with the laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts. But because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second: therefore, a prince must know how to make good use of the nature of both the beast and the man.⁵¹

In this “new vision” of politics, there is simply no place for the notion of human development in pursuit of ends ordained by God

⁴⁹ F. GILBERT, “Machiavelli Niccolo” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. V, Paul Edward (ed.), London: Macmillan Publisher 1972, 119–121.

⁵⁰ F. GILBERT, “Machiavelli Niccolo” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. V, Paul Edward (ed.), London: Macmillan Publisher 1972, 119–121.

⁵¹ N. MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, XVIII.

or by nature. Indeed his conception of political order does not allow a relation of interdependence between morality and politics. According to Machiavelli, the political order must be distinguished as an order in itself, autonomous, having properties which are not reducible to those of the ethical order, adhering to laws which are not those of the ethical order, and penetrating the whole of man's social life. The unity of Machiavelli's view on the relation between politics and ethics, and indeed his entire political thought is built on some basic assumptions.

First, is his assumption about the nature of politics: he assumes that any means which will assure the preservation of power of the ruler—as an individual—or of the city state or republic, are legitimate. What matters most in politics is the efficiency in the pursuit of power and designated interests. This view of politics is very different from the conceptions and prescriptions of the major political philosophers of the past. The important features of political conduct according to Machiavelli's view are not its moral aspects but its consequences and strategic effects. There is no place for moral virtue in his political thought.

Based on this conception of politics, morality and politics become divorced. To enhance this separation Machiavelli attacks and rejects the conceptions of "good" and "virtue" proposed by classical philosophers.⁵² Machiavelli criticizes the concept of a "good life", the Aristotelian doctrine that demands virtuous actions in every type of behaviour. Machiavelli opposes Aristotle's and Aquinas' theoretical approach to politics. Machiavelli argues that a metaphysical approach is inconsistent with the real world. Ultimately, political philosophy must be judged by its practical consequences. For him, virtue in the classical sense is an abstract concept which does not concern itself with real-life practical consequences; and it can never serve as an effective guide for political action.

⁵² According to Pierre Manent, Machiavelli did not erase the distinction between good and evil. For him, the thesis that Machiavelli wanted to advance is that the 'good' or the political order happens and is maintained only through the 'bad' (deception, force, violence, or "necessity"), or that "good is founded by evil." Cf. P. MANENT, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, 14.

What is needed for a political man is not moral virtue but “*virtù*”, which for him means vitality and strength, in the sense of Nietzsche’s “will to power”. But even when he talks of “moral virtue” his understanding is not the same as that of classical philosophers. While Aristotle and others define virtue in relation to a highest good, Machiavelli defines it simply as that which receives the praise of others. Thus, for example, generosity is a virtue only because other people praise it.

A second assumption is his presupposition that sees him stress the universal wickedness of human nature. Dyson writes that throughout Machiavelli’s political writings there is a subscription to a conception of human nature that may be termed as cynical or pessimistic because of its betrayal of men as naturally wicked.⁵³ This negative conception of man as universally wicked, threads its way through both of Machiavelli’s important writings, *The Prince* and *Discourses*. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli writes that one can generally say the following about men:

They are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain. While you work for their benefit they are completely yours, offering you their blood, their property, their lives, and their sons, as I said above, when the need to do so is far away. But when it draws nearer to you, they turn away.⁵⁴

The same idea is re-echoed in *Discourses*:

As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it.⁵⁵

What Machiavelli seems to know about human nature comes from his understanding of human passions. Human passions, for him, have a feature of stability or immutability. It is this

⁵³ R. W. DYSON, *Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Sophists to Machiavelli*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005, 253.

⁵⁴ N. MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince* 17.

⁵⁵ N. MACHIAVELLI, *Discourses On Livy*, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1996, Book I, 3.

changelessness and predictability of human behaviour that enables Machiavelli to make generalizations about politics. In *Discourses to Livy* he writes:

Prudent men are accustomed to say, and not by chance or without merit, that whoever wishes to see what has to be considers what has been; for all worldly things in every time have their own counterpart in ancient times. That arises because these are the work of men, who have and always had the same passions, and they must of necessity result in the same effect.⁵⁶

For him, it is not that men are bad only because of some extrinsic factor that might be corrected by education or removed by changes in their material circumstances. Men are vicious because that is what human nature is like. For Machiavelli, men are fighting animals and are characterized by an "aggressive individualism". He believes that this kind of judgment is supported by evidence from the past and from experience. Dyson comments that Machiavelli arrives at this position after having observed that there is a struggle of "those who dominate", those with power or those who desire and strive for more power, against those who strive not to be dominated. Dyson holds that, according to Machiavelli, in principle there is no one who is not striving at all.⁵⁷ The forces behind this striving are, as Machiavelli notes in the *Discourses*, necessity and ambition:

For whenever engaging in combat through necessity is taken from men they engage in combat through ambition, which is so powerful in human breasts that it never abandons them at whatever rank they rise to. The cause is that nature has created men so that they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain everything. So, since the desire is always greater than the power of acquiring, the result is discontent with what one possesses and a lack of satisfaction with it.⁵⁸

Based on his consideration of human nature as selfish, tailored by passions, bent to evil, and incapable of living a social life, Machiavelli holds as useless and unnecessary the appeals to

⁵⁶ N. MACHIAVELLI, *Discourses on Livy*, Book III, 43.

⁵⁷ R. W. DYSON, *Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Sophists to Machiavelli*, p. 254.

⁵⁸ N. MACHIAVELLI, *Discourses on Livy*, Book I, 37.

morality and religion. What is necessary and useful for a collective life is the powerful and sometimes violent coercion on the part of the State in order to subdue individuals' self-interests who then submit themselves to the more entrenched self-interest of the ruler (i.e., the prince). This is the ground upon which Machiavelli bases his justification of immoral actions on the part of political rulers. His advice:

A man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity.⁵⁹

He concludes chapter 15 of *The Prince*, with the advice that a prince must not mind incurring scandal for having engaged in those vices without which it would be difficult to save the state; and if one thinks with circumspection, he would discover that some things which seem to be virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin. What appears to be vices, on the other hand, may result in one's greater security and well-being.⁶⁰

Machiavelli's third assumption is that societies do not arise by nature; they are created by the *virtù*⁶¹ of the political man. Machiavelli does not think of political society as natural in the classical Greek sense of that term and hence, not surprisingly, he is equally as far from St. Thomas Aquinas' conception. He attributes the origin of city states, governments and authority to chance (*fortuna*) and *virtù*.

Machiavelli hypothesizes that mankind was at first scattered, but as men increased in numbers they unconsciously began to submit themselves for self-protection to those who seemed stronger.

In other words, political society for Machiavelli is necessarily a thing of divisions. It cannot be reduced to a single unity of purpose,

⁵⁹ N. MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, XV.

⁶⁰ N. MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, XV.

⁶¹ The Machiavellian conception of virtue is Roman, not Christian. For Machiavelli *virtù* (virtue) means the dynamic or the vital energy, the indomitable will, the courage and the resourcefulness that seem to translate ambition into action.

because all men wish to achieve power over their fellows in order to satisfy their own desires; and sometimes those desires extend to nothing more than security for themselves and their families.⁶²

For Machiavelli, the view of human nature as having a natural capacity for social life and co-operation is mistaken. He thinks that men are able to co-operate, but their co-operation does not arise out of the kind of friendship or social harmony that Aristotle thinks is possible and natural. For Machiavelli, when men co-operate with others, they do so because they know that no individual can match the collective effort of a multitude. Their co-operation, therefore, arises out of self-interest, that is, each individual works in harmony with others so far as is necessary to secure his own good, while at the same time competing with others for the things that men value: glory, honour, and wealth. It is not difficult to surmise that this view leads to a position where political self-interest triumphs over moral principle and social responsibility.

2.2 Thomas Hobbes and political realism

Our inclusion of Thomas Hobbes in the "political realism" camp arises from the fact that his political thought leads to the implication that the success of politics does not depend on morals, precisely because the "moralization of politics not only does not help us resolve our problems, but ultimately makes them more difficult."⁶³ Hobbes' way of thinking tends to support the philosophical argument that favours caution in the application of morals to political activity. Indeed his suppositions about the nature of morality and of politics would actually lead to the separation of the two.

Hobbes' political interest was in part his desire to provide a response to the problem of how to create order out of a state of human affairs riddled with tendencies to anarchy.

⁶² In chapter 9 of *The Prince*, Machiavelli shows that in the city-state there is a fundamental division, that between the "common people" and the "nobility". These two groups have conflicting interests: the nobility is a small group that wants to oppress the common people, while the interest of the common people is to resist oppression.

⁶³ V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, p. xv.

Hobbes' philosophical reflections link to his historical context, that of England in the 1640s, where civil conflicts and violence were recurrent.⁶⁴ His measured perceptions of the situation in England is said to be the basis for his fundamental political insight that what populations fear most of all – more even than the most iron-fisted dictatorship – is a violent death. The cause of this “mutual fear” consists partly in the natural equality of human beings, partly in their mutual will to hurt – all men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt others. In such a milieu men will submit to almost any tyranny in preference to violent chaos.⁶⁵

For Thomas Hobbes, just as for Machiavelli, the pessimistic conception of the human person is the elementary presupposition of his system of political thought. Hobbes' political realism stresses the egoistic aspect of human nature. Hobbes conceives the human being as a self-interested, egoist, who in a “state of nature” cannot trust others or cooperate with them without being coerced.

According to Hobbes, there are three basic reasons why it is utterly impossible for human beings to live in security and in peaceful cooperation without a sovereign government.

First, he thinks that without a powerful controlling authority, individuals may compete violently with each other in order to secure the basic necessities of life to which every man is entitled. These necessary goods and services are limited.

Second, we fight and challenge others out of “diffidence”, i.e., fear and distrust) so as to ensure our own safety.

Third, Hobbes argues that without authority we will be ruined because of our tendency to seek glory or reputation, both for their own sake and for the sake of enriching our power over others.

In chapter of 13 of *Leviathan*, he writes:

⁶⁴ Living and writing during the years of the English Civil War Hobbes was personally close to some of the important figures in these events. He witnessed the execution of a king who believed himself to rule by divine right; and as a reaction to his execution, the country descended into violent disorder. Peace was restored only by a military dictatorship. When he wrote *Leviathan* he was in political exile in France.

⁶⁵ *Behemoth* or *The Long Parliament* is the work in which Hobbes provides a descriptive and interpretive treatment of the civil war that devastated England between 1640 and 1660.

...In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory. The first makes men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.⁶⁶

Like Machiavelli, Hobbes emphasizes human egoism and denies that human beings are naturally social.⁶⁷ Hobbes does not deny that human beings desire the company of others, but for him that does not mean that they are by nature fit for it. Because it is one thing to desire something, and another to be by way of capability fit for what we desire. Man, says Hobbes, is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. He could not see how social cooperation could emerge from naturally self-interested people without coercion from a powerful sovereignty. He says it in the following:

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.⁶⁸

The "war of every man against every man" is induced, according to him, because individuals are in constant fear of each other and carry the assumption that their fellows will always act in egoistic ways. Consequently, co-operation can only be possible when it is imposed by a sovereign power.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ T. HOBBS, *Leviathan*, Revised Student Edition edited by Richard Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, 88.

⁶⁷ T. HOBBS, *De Cive: The English Version*, edited by Howard Warrender, Oxford University Press, New York 1983, p. 42.

⁶⁸ T. HOBBS, *Leviathan*, p. 88.

⁶⁹ With this idea, Hobbes places himself in immediate opposition to the classical and Aristotelian view that man is by nature a social, political animal. His view of man is that of "*Homo homini lupus*", that is, man is a wolf toward other men.

Another aspect of human nature that justifies the necessity of authority, according to Thomas Hobbes, is the human powers of judgment and reasoning. In *Behemoth*, he perceives the limits of rationality and the reign of passions to be the major problem underlying political disorder. For him, human judgment or reasoning (“discourse”) is unreliable because it tends to be influenced by rhetoric and persuasion from others. It also tends to be distorted by self-interest or by the pleasures and pains of the moment, and therefore we need science.⁷⁰ If by nature human reason is unreliable, as Hobbes believes, it means there is no solid ground for moral beliefs, principles and values. He goes further to deny the objective sense to the concept of “final” or “ultimate” end, and he tells us that there is no *summum bonum*. In chapter 10 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes says:

The felicity of this life consists not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such *finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Moral Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, that he, whose senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later.⁷¹

Further, he writes that it is a mistake even to suppose that situations or agents outside our own minds had any moral qualities independently of our own judgment. As Vittorio Hösle rightly maintains, the concepts of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, for Hobbes, have no traditional meaning; they are mere projections of our inner sensations onto an external world, just like ‘red’ or ‘green’. We can understand this more clearly if we take into consideration what Hobbes writes in the *Elements of Law Natural and Politic*. He writes:

But for an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, and have disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia: for while we live, we have desires, and desire

⁷⁰ T. HOBBS, *Leviathan*, p. 47.

⁷¹ T. HOBBS, *Leviathan*, p. 70.

presupposeth a farther end. Those things which please us, as the way or means to a farther end, we call PROFITABLE; and the fruition of them, USE; and those things that profit not, VAIN.⁷²

From this vantage point, ethics is reduced to the calculation of utility and virtues are deprived of their intrinsic moral value. Virtues become useful only for maintaining the stability of the state. For instance, Hobbs prizes the capacity for forgiveness, but not because he sees something that is in itself valuable in the reconciliation of enemies and the overcoming of hatred, as Christianity teaches, but rather because it contributes to civil peace.⁷³

Hobbes surmised that the creation of the state is a rationally calculated political arrangement for securing political order, peace, trust and cooperation. Individuals might try to get out of the "state of nature" by entering into contract or agreement with one another about the parameters for a power to be handed over to a central authority whose job it would then be to impose law, and to punish severely any law-breakers. For such an authority to be effective it would have to possess more power than any individual, or association of individuals within the society could hope to attain. Hence this supreme authority would have – in effect, and as far as they would be concerned – absolute power, a power which no one would want to defy.⁷⁴

⁷² T. HOBBS, *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, Ch. 7, edited by Ferdinand Tönnies, Sempkin, London: Marshall and Co. 1928.

⁷³ V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, P.36.

⁷⁴ For Hobbes, a government with absolute power is the only way to maximize the security of the individuals who make up the society. This Hobbesian formula of maximizing order and security through a civil state with absolute authority is based on the idea that individual liberty means disorder, anarchy. It also implies that individual freedom and authority are antinomical terms. In fact in chapter 26 of *Leviathan* Hobbes writes that purpose of making "Civil Law" is to "abridge" and "restrain" the "natural Liberty of man (See *Leviathan*, p. 185). In his theory of authority Yves Simon shows that it an error to think of freedom and authority as antinomical or as mutually exclusive; he argues that the two should be understood as harmonious and complementary concepts. Our exposition of Yves Simon's thought on the relationship between authority and freedom will come in chapter four of this work.

According to Hobbes, this state would no longer play the role that it played among the ancients, that is, the function of providing a “framework” within which individual and public virtues could develop. “What is virtuous is what serves the state, and the state is a legitimate institution because it is in the rational self-interest of all”.⁷⁵

We therefore see that the Hobbesian political system is amoral precisely because Hobbes claims that in nature there is neither justice nor injustice: there is no morality. For him, justice and morality begin only when there is sovereign power and law. Justice means to honour the covenant made.⁷⁶ It is such that any individual who obeys the government is a moral person.⁷⁷ But because morality in this sense proceeds from politics, that is, from “civil law”, in no way can an individual question the law or the authority in power. And since morality proceeds from (or at least follows in the wake of) the sovereignty, morality cannot be the standard or yardstick for political power.

The validity of law by sovereignty, then, is not due to its moral qualities or even its relation to metaphysical or religious truths. Paradoxically, it becomes sinful for any individual in the commonwealth to judge what is good or bad according to one’s own conscience. The measure of good and evil is the civil law, which is the public conscience. For Hobbes, there is no other value system, other than the law established by the sovereign power; hence the validity of the law depends entirely on the authority of the ruler.

2.3 Michael Walzer: the “dirty hands” problem

Our inquiry into the relationship between morality and politics leads us to consider a “tradition” that seeks to investigate how the facts of political responsibility shape and constrain the demands of

⁷⁵ V. HÖSLE, *Morals and Politics*, P.36.

⁷⁶ T. HOBBS, *Leviathan*, p. 100. “But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is *Unjust*: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than *the not performance of Covenant*. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is *Just*.”

⁷⁷ We see Hobbes’ conception of justice as consisting in obeying the laws of the state as a preparation or an anticipation of the totalitarianism by which morality is subverted to the state.

the moral life. The question that keeps arising to the surface in this tradition is: are political actors inevitably supra-ethical in their decisions and implementations of political choices for the common good? This question marks the point of departure for this particular constellation of reasonable attempts to relate politics to ethics. This question lies at the heart of what political theorists and philosophers call the problem of dirty hands in political life.

The problem of "dirty hands" is a question that concerns the ethics by which political leaders think and act. Michael Walzer and other champions of this mindset generally agree that there is a need for political actors or leaders to "soil" or dirty their hands by committing immoral practices, not necessarily because of the complexity and the extreme stakes that are involved in politics, but because they view politics as something of such importance that morality is subsumed under politics – much like a means that is useful only if it serves an end. Those who follow this genre of thought view politics as an independent and separate sphere, with its own "special ethics"⁷⁸. This seems to be the mindset of Amy Gutmann when she writes:

The moral demands of ordinary politics may include the need to threaten and to use violence, the necessity to deceive and manipulate others, and the obligation to disobey orders. These otherwise immoral acts become moral, or so it is claimed, because officials are harming some people for the sake of helping more people or protecting the same people from even greater harm.⁷⁹

This is a way of saying that the conduct of political leaders cannot be measured by "ordinary" moral standards, in a way comparable to the Machiavellian Prince, who is required to "learn how not to be good" and "to enter evil when necessity commands".

⁷⁸ This "special ethics" is said to consist of moral judgments about two aspects of politics: process and policy. The moral judgments about processes are called "procedural ethics" for it considers the moral problems of the methods, procedures or means used to achieve political goals. The part that examines the problems of the content of the goals themselves is called ethics of policy.

⁷⁹ A. GUTMANN and D. THOMPSON (editors), *Ethics and Politics: Cases and Comments* (4th edition). Belmont, California: Thomson Higher Education Publishing 2006, xi.

This requires political actors to use bad means to achieve good ends. In Coady's words "the vocation of politics somehow rightly requires its practitioners to violate important moral standards which prevail outside politics."⁸⁰ This is so because moral considerations are often considered irrelevant or lacking in weight when compared to other factors of a more obviously political or even personal kind, such as the politician's need to gain prestige, to demonstrate his courage, and to retain his position of power.

Consequently, the morality of political action is considered secondary to other factors such as political expediency, the desired consequences of the action, the personal interest of the political actor, and so on. From this vantage point, we consider the problem of dirty hands as posed by Michael Walzer as a strand of political realism.

Walzer's proposal finds support in the thought of János Kis, who considers the problem of dirty hands as a part of the heritage of classical political theory. Kis opts to call it the "thesis of realism".⁸¹

The origin of the constellation of the ideas that coalesce in the problem of "dirty hands" in politics can be traced back to antiquity. The allegorical "dirty hands" evoke an ancient image that alludes to a time when morality was linked to cleanliness (purity), while immorality was related to uncleanness. Sometimes the hands are unclean because they are bloody.⁸² Sometimes the hands are rendered unclean because of the inclination to betray, to mislead, manipulate, deceive, steal, and coerce. However, many theorists believe that, in his own unique fashion, Machiavelli is the originator of the problem of dirty hands in political theory.⁸³

⁸⁰ C. A. J. COADY, "Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands", in Peter Singer (ed.), *A Companion to Ethics*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1993, 373.

⁸¹ J. KIS, *Politics as a Moral Problem*, Budapest: Central European University Press 2008, 36.

⁸² A perfect example is the case of Pilate's washing his hands of the decision to crucify Jesus of Nazareth.

⁸³ For a historical approach to the problem of dirty hands, see J. M. PARRISH, *Paradoxes of Political Ethics: From Dirty Hands to the Invisible Hand*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.

More than any other contemporary philosopher or author, it is none other than Michael Walzer who has presented and publicized the current form of the problem of dirty hands as it appears in contemporary ethical and politic discussions.

Walzer is considered one of the prominent American political thinkers and theorists of the 20th Century. He was born on March 3, 1935. As a professor, author, editor, and lecturer, Michael Walzer has addressed a wide range of issues in political and moral philosophy. Walzer is also a well renowned political activist in the United States of America. He is currently a Professor Emeritus of Social Science at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.⁸⁴

His decision to apply the expression "dirty hands" to the politico-ethical phenomena he was describing seems to have been influenced by Jean-Paul Sartre's drama on moral dilemmas in revolutionary politics, entitled *Dirty Hands*. Walzer made use of this expression in a famous article that reframes and places limits on the traditional version.⁸⁵

The earlier version of the dirty hands problem was framed in terms of a conflict between the requirements of the public benefit, on the one hand, and, on the other, the requirements of the moral virtue. This is the mode in which Machiavelli – to make reference to one example – frames the problem: for politics to be done well it inevitably requires the abandonment of conventional moral virtues by its political leaders.

Michael Walzer's account of this problem is a reframed version: in his version the conflict or dilemma is between utilitarian and deontological imperatives. On one hand, this dilemma consists of the political actor who ought to adopt a moral framework which targets the consequences of his political action. For example, if he must authorize the torture of a terrorist in order to get crucial information for the deterrence of an impending terroristic attack, he is justified in doing so. On the other hand, the one acting

⁸⁴ For more on Michael Walzer's life and works, see his online page at: www.sss.ias.edu/faculty/walzer.

⁸⁵ His article entitled "Political Action: the Problem of Dirty Hands" appeared for the first time in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2(1973), pp. 160–180.

politically knows and believes, categorically, that torture is immoral no matter what the circumstances may call for. Here, “doing the right thing” means doing something in a morally acceptable manner; and “getting one’s hands dirty” means (from a deontological perspective) doing something in a manner that is morally unacceptable. We can easily see that this position involves a logical inconsistency since it holds that an act is both acceptable and dirty at the same time.

In his article, Walzer prompts us to take the idea of dirty-handedness seriously. He argues that the problem of dirty hands cannot be ignored since it forms part of our moral and political reality. Michael Walzer neither theorizes explicitly an amoral politics, nor a separation between morality and politics. Nonetheless, we consider his theory of the problem of dirty hands as an equivalent to a restrained political realism. It is “restrained” political realism because the immoral acts which dirty the hands of politicians are permissible conditionally, that is, they must be committed in “situations involving moral dilemmas”. Walzer is suggesting that there is a specific morality appropriate to political activity and that its verdicts outweigh considerations of “ordinary” or “private” morality.⁸⁶

For Michael Walzer, the problems associated with dirty handedness are problems that arise in situations which involve moral dilemmas. They occur when a political leader (or military officer) finds that he must override certain moral principles he considers to be binding in order to achieve, what seems to him to

⁸⁶ Note that, C. A. J. COADY criticizes Michael Walzer and other contemporary writers like Stuart Hampshire for highlighting a sharp division between political or “public” and the personal or “private”, without elucidating the essential basis for distinguishing private and public. For Coady, this distinction is useful for an analytical purpose, but not essentially grounded. Coady’s view is that insofar as there is an issue about overriding the claims of morality in the face of some overwhelming necessity, then, it is an issue which can arise in any area of life. It is not special to politics, though there are some aspects of politics which perhaps raise the issue more acutely or dramatically. See. C. A. J. COADY, “Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands”, 374.

be the right and necessary "political action."⁸⁷ In Walzer's own words, "It means that a particular act of government (in a political party or in the state) may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms, and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong."⁸⁸ This could mean that in every political effort there is tension between ends and means, purposes and tactics. But because this happens in the political sphere, the utilitarian principles are deemed to be more all-embracing and hence are to prevail over moral considerations.

In his essay on the problem of dirty hands in political activity, Michael Walzer does not seem to limit himself to analysing and describing what happens in politics. It is true that he does not declare himself a realist, but indeed he is taking a position. He does not just argue that "it is easy to get one's hands dirty in politics," but he ascribes a moral value to this particular pattern to doing politics by declaring that "it is often right" to get one's hands dirty in political engagements.⁸⁹ As an endorsement of such a moral ascription, he indicates that the problem of dirty hands "is a central feature of political life, and that it arises not merely as an occasional crisis in the career of this or that unlucky politician but systematically and frequently".⁹⁰

Why does this schematic dirty hands situation capture the important aspects, or the heart, of politics more than any other spheres of life? There are many reasons, says Michael Walzer, but he considers principally three of them. First, he says, politicians are not like the other entrepreneurs. When politicians act, they do not act just for themselves, they also act on our behalf, i.e., they act for the common good. Their success in serving us as our representatives, brings them power and glory as "the greatest rewards that men can win from their fellows." Walzer argues that

⁸⁷ By "political action" Michael Walzer means an action performed for public and not for private reasons. See M. WALZER, *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement politics*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1971, 18.

⁸⁸ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands" in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2 (1973), 160–180, at 161.

⁸⁹ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", 174.

⁹⁰ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", 162.

politicians are likely to succumb to dirty hands situations because of the competition for power and glory:

The competition for power and glory is fierce; the risks are often great, but the temptations are greater. We imagine ourselves succumbing. Why should our representatives act differently? Even if they would like to act differently, they probably cannot: for other men are all too ready to hustle and lie for power and glory, and it is the others who set the terms of the competition.⁹¹

According to Walzer, because power and glory are widely desired, hustling and lying become necessary for politicians – hustling and lying become part and parcel of their identity as political figures.

The second reason why the problem of dirty hands is characteristic of political action over and above any other sphere of life is that political actors “take chances for our greater good that put us, or some of us, in danger.”⁹² Sometimes the politician puts his own life in danger.

For a political actor, despite the risks and the dangers, politics is his adventure; not all of us can comfortably choose to be political actors. Michael Walzer writes: “Probably we do have a right to avoid, if we possibly can, those positions in which we might be forced to do terrible things. This might be regarded as the moral equivalent of our legal right not to incriminate ourselves.”⁹³

He suggests that there are times when “it is good or necessary to direct the affairs of other people and to put them in danger.” This unwillingness and the reluctance of many people to join politics is an observation that Walzer had expressed two years before he wrote the article on the problem of dirty hands in a small book, which he submitted to publication in 1971, to serve as a practical guide to movement politics. In this book, Walzer writes: “A surprisingly large number of people do not want political power. They have no eagerness for command, no thrusting willfulness.”

⁹¹ M. WALZER, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, 163.

⁹² M. WALZER, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, 163

⁹³ M. WALZER, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, 165.

Walzer is speaking of people who "want to do the right thing", but they also "want someone to tell them what the right thing is."⁹⁴

And given that not all of us are willing or able to direct the affairs of others, we become a "little frightened" of the man who seeks the power to do so. Politicians have, or pretend to have confidence in their own judgments, and this makes them seem strong and intimidating.⁹⁵

Third, dirty hands situations are predominant in politics because violence is a political tool. Michael Walzer tells us that the victorious politician in the competition for power "uses violence and the threat of violence—not only against foreign nations in our defense but also against us". And he does so, in order to manage conflict and division among us, and also to assert the interests and desires of our community or as he says, "for our greater good."⁹⁶ This means that in politics a greater risk of committing "crime" awaits the political actor, and one must be ready to use violence when doing so is necessary. Michael Walzer writes:

Political action is so uncertain that politicians necessarily take moral as well as political risks, committing crimes that they only think ought to be committed. They override the rules without ever being certain that they have found the best way to the results they hope to achieve.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ M. WALZER, *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement politics*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1971, 55.

⁹⁵ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", 163. Our author has touched a topic worthy of thoughtful reflection. F. Nietzsche spoke of the human heart's incapability of escaping the overall implications of the "will to power." The will to power places every human being in a frame of mind where he or she cannot live worthily as a person if one does not enjoy a position of privilege, influence, control and domination in relationships with other people. The person with the will to power strives relentlessly to grow in his or her capacity to retain knowledge, accumulate academic degrees, and make oneself known in the intellectual and academic community. Pope St. John Paul II hinted that everyone ought to be frightened of this "power school of suspicion" because it victimizes a person into the mind-set that without a will to power one cannot achieve their full dignity as a human person (Ed.; see John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, General Audience of 29 October, 1980; 1 John 2:15-16).

⁹⁶ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", 163.

⁹⁷ M. WALZER, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", 179–180.

The point being made here is that politics is a sphere in which there is always a risk of doing evil, but with some consolation that the consequences of the evil done will justify the action. According to Walzer, people (non-politicians) may rightly feel dissatisfied by politicians involved in dirty hands situations because they—the people—are the ones who set the stakes and maintain values. However, Walzer is very skeptical whether any attempt, any effort by the people to punish political actors for their dirty hands is bound to succeed. For example, speaking of lying in politics, he states: “I suspect we shall not abolish lying at all, ... we won’t be able to do that, however, without getting our own hands dirty, and we must find some way of paying the price ourselves.”⁹⁸

Consequently, since according to Michael Walzer’s theory of the problem of dirty hands, actors in political life ought to be morally assessed on the basis of their political role which requires its own ethical standards (with some appeal to role morality⁹⁹), it follows that the relationship between morality and politics becomes that of separate domains. ... *To be continued.*

⁹⁸ M. WALZER, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, p. 180. Walzer’s philosophical critics, particularly democratic theorists, have recognized that the problem of how to punish the dirty handed politicians takes a different form in democratic politics. In the context of a democracy, the question is not what citizens should do to the leaders but what citizens and the state should do to compensate the victims of the decision or how citizens can hold leaders accountable for decisions that are legitimately made in secret. This is so because the leader who gets his hands dirty does so in the name of citizens and with their implicit approval. See: D. F. THOMPSON, *Political Ethics and Public Office*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1987, 11–39; N. LEVY, “Punishing the Dirty” in IGOR PRIMORATZ (ed.), *Politics and Morality*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, 38–53.

⁹⁹ Role morality accentuates the specification of normative moral systems according to the various roles or positions that one holds. Often the actor feels that he has permission to act in a manner that ordinarily would be wrong if it were not for the role he plays.

Learner-Centred Pedagogical Approach in Tanzania Secondary Schools

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Abstract

This manuscript analyses the current practice of learning science in Tanzania's secondary school settings. The analysis is grounded on the theoretical bases of a learner-centred pedagogical approach vs. the concrete applications of the theoretical axioms to the science-oriented classrooms of Tanzania's secondary schools. The manuscript examines six critical areas, which may be identified succinctly as follows: (1) the relationship between constructivism theory and learner-centred pedagogy; (2) the concept of a learner-centred pedagogical approach; (3) the application of the learner-centred approach in Tanzania; (4) students' prior knowledge in enhancing learner-centred pedagogy; (5) the impact of culture on learner-centred pedagogy; and (6) teacher professionalism.

The author of this work observes that learner-centred pedagogy does not necessarily follow a specific formula. Lesson plans have to be designed and implemented with the purpose of creating opportunities for students to learn, regardless of the teaching methodology used. She concludes that teachers have to exercise extraordinary creativity and a sincere, intelligent, morally upright openness to the changing world in order to meet the demands of learner-centred pedagogy. The author deems it important for the Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Vocational Training to reduce the factors that are limiting the implementation of the

learner-centred pedagogy, such as hard-to-manage teacher-student ratios and a perhaps unreasonable amount of content taught per programme. By resolving these challenges the quality of learning science in secondary schools will hopefully improve.

1. Introduction

It has been a tradition that educational philosophers introduce theories for the purpose of improving the school curriculum. Curriculum theories such as those associated with the learner-centred curriculum have emerged from a notion labelled constructivism. Constructivism has played a part in promoting concepts of learner-centred pedagogy, pedagogy that is inquiry-based, pedagogy that is focused on problem-solving, and critical thinking pedagogical methods. This manuscript aims at examining the philosophical and pedagogical practices of the learner-centred curriculum in the Tanzanian secondary school setting.

The foci of this manuscript include: the notion of learner-centred pedagogical approaches; the relationship between constructivism theory and learner-centred pedagogy; the learner-centred approach in Tanzania; the prior knowledge that students may have achieved that assists them so as to enhance the value of the learner-centred pedagogy; the impact of culture on learner-centred pedagogy; and teacher professionalism.

2. Constructivism Theory and its Relationship to Learner-Centred Pedagogy

Philips (2000) suggests that the term constructivism refers to how an individual acquires knowledge from the environment or from the society to which he or she belongs. Constructivism is a slogan or a fashionable term which for decades has been used by educational researchers, curriculum developers, teacher trainers, teachers, sociologists, philosophers, and other persons who characterize themselves as constructivists.

Baviskar et al. (2009) defines constructivism as a theory that explains how knowledge comes to be possessed by an individual. The theory is a set of inter-connections that coalesce into a comprehensive construct of facts, concepts, experiences,

emotions, and values that then form a constellation of inter-relationships with each other in the manner of a synthesis.

Constructivist theory is grouped into two major areas: social constructivism and psychological constructivism. There are several known constructivist pioneers, but for the sake of this manuscript, only three are considered and these include; Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and John Dewey.

2.1 Lev Vygotsky

Vygotsky (1896-1934) is well known through some of his writings such as "Thoughts and Languages" and "Mind in Society." According to Cole, John-Steiner, Scribner, and Soubetman (1978), Vygotsky was born in Russia in 1896 and graduated from Moscow University in 1917. It is reported that while at the university, Vygotsky studied a range of topics including sociology, linguistics, psychology, and philosophy. From 1917 to 1923, he taught literature and psychology. He also founded a psychological literature journal and a psychological laboratory; and he worked as a director for the Department of Education of Physically Defective and Mentally Retarded Children.

With so much experience under his belt, he developed a theory of social constructivism by relating language, culture, and the learning process of the student. Cole et al. (1978) suggest that Vygotsky's theory of social constructivism explains how at each stage of development a child acquires the means by which she/he can bring to full realization her/his learning. Vygotsky emphasizes human interaction between changing social conditions and the biological substrata of behaviour. Therefore, Vygotsky believes that to study development in children, one must begin with an understanding of the dialectical unity between biological and cultural factors (Cole et al., 1978).

2.2 Jean Piaget

The second founder of the constructivist theory is Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Burnett describes Piaget as a constructivist who is well known through his work *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (1936) and for his theory about the cognitive

development of children (Burnett, 2010). His theory suggests that children learn best when they are actively engaged in the learning process and when they are challenged to construct their own understanding of the world. Burnett also adds that Piaget believes that human intelligence is dependent on the adaptations that children make to an existence schema in response to direct interactions with the environment (cf. Burnett, 2010, p. 146).

Therefore, in 1952, Piaget published a manuscript which explains the assimilation and accommodation processes involved when a child experiences cognitive disequilibrium in their attempts to understand, as they actively question, test, make sense of, and ultimately adapt new information to pre-existing ideas.¹ Moreover, the process of assimilation and accommodation is consequently hypothesized as the means through which a child builds and expands his/her intelligence by balancing his/her cognitive understanding to achieve equilibrium (Burnett, 2010). Through Piaget's publication, then, psychological constructivism emerged.

2.3 John Dewey

The third person considered to be a pioneer of the constructivism theory is John Dewey (1859-1952). As described by Michael Schiro, Dewey is known as an extraordinary American educational philosopher whose works have inspired many educators, educational researchers, and curriculum developers. He is known for his work at the University of Chicago laboratory school.

His theory of constructivism gives rise to a learner-centred curriculum (Schiro, 2008). The theory includes such popular preconceptions as children learn by doing; children make meaning and children construct knowledge through the new experiences with which they involve themselves. Learning takes place when children take the initiative and explore problems on their own. An

¹ It is not difficult to notice that this description of Piaget's theory mirrors B. Lonergan's notion of corrective insights in the cognitive process. See *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library 1956), 283–287. In these pages, Lonergan is addressing himself precisely to the issue of learning (editor's note).

application that follows from this theory is that school subjects have to be integrated through project-based learning.

2.4 What the Constructivists Teach Us

The main message that we can learn from all three pioneers of the constructivism theory is that learning takes place when a student is completely involved in the learning process. However, language, culture, cognitive ability, surrounding environment, experience, proper parenting, ethical training and religious beliefs all exercise a significant influence on effective learning. In other words, empowering and providing learners the opportunity to grow intellectually, emotionally, psychologically, socially, ethically and spiritually is vital for effective learning. Constructivists are concerned with the gestalt, with the whole person without separating a person from his/her academic acquisitions. The constructivism theory relates well to learner-centred approaches, which concentrate more on the individual student's style, initiative, aptitude and propensity for learning. For that reason, the significance of the learner-centred pedagogical approach is discussed in this manuscript.

3. Learner-Centred Pedagogical Approaches in Tanzania

In his book *Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns*, Schiro (2008) describes learner-centred curriculum theories as coherent with the type of pedagogical approach that emphasizes the unit of work that allows students to explore and make choices among the things they want to learn. Such an approach is organized in a manner that both the instructional materials and the learning activities are intended to maximize the growth of learners. Therefore, the implementation of the learner-centred pedagogy is multidimensional in scope in a way that caters to students' learning choices and possibilities of empowerment.

The success of learner-centred pedagogy seems to be a result of the activities designed for specific school programmes. Schiro (2008) describes four school practices that foster learner-centred pedagogy. These include: (1) the opportunity for students to have

a first-hand experience with schemes of recurrence in their day-to-day living; (2) students' experience with the purpose and use of physical materials and their ongoing interactions with the people in their social environment; (3) students' involvement in physical activities (e.g., sports); and (4) a thoughtful balance between students' intra-curricular and extracurricular experiences. The point of emphasis is on first-hand experience: this is vital because the student interfaces with reality by proactive learning that requires initiative, active involvement and critical thinking rather than the more confining method of learning that reduces the student to finishing assignments for reading, writing, or listening (Brown, 2003; Schiro, 2008).

This type of approach is very important especially in teaching and learning science because experiential instructional techniques render more practical and more concrete the intricacy of scientific theories and principles.

The success of the learner-centred pedagogies depends on several factors that indeed are indispensable to the implementation of the methods concerned. We are referring to such vital factors qualified teachers and specialists in the subjects to be learned, a standard number of students per classroom, adequate facilities, an adequate reservoir of learning resources, and students' motivation to learn.

Tanzanian secondary schools, especially the governmental schools, suffer from inadequate facilities, an excess number of students per classroom, limited learning resources, and a scarcity of science teachers per school. John F. Kalolo (2015) suggests that currently the goal of pedagogy in the field of science in Tanzania is to prepare students to accumulate factual knowledge of various sciences without training them to apply that knowledge to solve social problems. This state of affairs might contribute to the dearth of the aforementioned resources that typically facilitate the learner-centred pedagogy. For example, exposing a larger number of students to hands-on activities that promote critical thinking requires facilities, adequate learning supplies and personnel.

The use of physical materials and social encounters is another strategy for success in learner-centred pedagogy. Since learners must personally experience the schemes of recurrence in their day-

to-day reality in order to grow, learn and construct meaning, the schools strive to provide students with vivid experiences. For example, students may grow plants, handle animals, make models, or cook instead of listening to lectures. The conviction behind this practice is that students must discover knowledge themselves as long as sufficient materials are provided.

In addition to doing practical study, students are also required to mingle with peers and adults to explore focal points of interest together, to exchange ideas with each other, to play together, and to construct meaning about their physical and cultural world together (Brown, 2003; Schiro, 2008). Students' cultural background and environmental context play a vital role in the learning process as Vygotsky insists in his theory of social constructivism. He emphasizes his conviction that students' culture, languages, and interactions with adults and other children contribute to the learner's aptitude for constructing knowledge through the curriculum design that we have been describing.

Reflection on the Tanzanian culture, customs and traditions brings to light the fact that learner-centred pedagogies are not new approaches because they have been practiced in Tanzania before the colonial error. Sanga (2017) reports that before colonialism Tanzanian children took part in economic activities such as animal grazing, petty trading, fetching water, collecting firewood, clearing compounds, caring for the young, cooking, and the like. They also participated, of course, in God-oriented activities according to their particular religions.

It is important to note that in contemporary Tanzania the type of learning approach to which we have been paying attention is still vividly a *propos*. Despite the fact that the majority of the children are attending formal educational institutions organized according to the formal curriculum, the informal curriculum plays a major role when it comes to how parents communicate their culture, customs, and religious beliefs to their children. Societies characterized by farming like that of the Sukuma people teach their children how to prepare land for farming and cultivating. In this scenario, therefore, adults work together with children. Most girls learn how to cook by observing their mothers and their elder sisters or cousins.

Generally speaking, learner-centred approaches in Tanzania are not confined to farming and pastoral activities but find a foothold in small businesses such as those where food vendors are the business keepers and the saloons where young people may readily learn techniques from the hair dressers and other personnel who are engaged in that kind of work.

In other words, these arenas of life are using learner-centred approaches without formal classes: those who are learning are following the guidance of an expert to put their own skills into efficacious operation. Since learner-centred approaches offer room for freedom to the students who may choose what to learn based on their interests and aptitudes the learning process is not stress-provoking in comparison with the formal curriculum.

Because of the nature of the pedagogical approach represented by the formal curriculum, students and instructors may find obstacles in their attempts to adopt simultaneously learner-centred approaches that require more flexibility and room for student initiative in their implementation.

Baviskar et al. (2009) and Schiro (2008) offer a sketch of the learning environments that favour learner-centred pedagogy: the inside and outside classroom activities involve walking around, talking, singing and dancing – each activity at its proper time. Students are free to talk in class or to move around the classroom without asking permission.

School activities in the learner-centred approach are designed to provide students with experiences that correspond to the schemes of recurrence in their social environments on almost a daily basis. These experiences occur both inside and outside the classroom. The outside classroom activities include exposure to natural adventures free of any human manipulation or interference and constructed adventures that may cohere with deliberate design and purposefully selected goals on the part of the instructors. In order to implement the learner-centred approach in Tanzania schools, teachers and other educators have to learn from their own culture and customs how Tanzanian culture has been transmitted meaningfully to their children from generation to generation.

4. The Importance of Prior Experience on Enhancing Learner-Centred Pedagogy

Students' prior experience of learning and teaching are fundamentally important to their points of focus in their studies. Hence their past experiences are fundamentally important to the way they perceive the learning situation and form attitudes towards their studies. This means that prior experience of certain learning approaches plays a major role in determining whether students' accept or deny new approaches to teaching and learning.

For example, if students' prior learning experience is to memorize information for answering exams, it is possible that these students will resist the pedagogical approaches that require involvement with projects that prioritize critical thinking and time investment.² Schools in low-income communities cannot afford to implement the learner-centred pedagogy due to the fact that students who go to schools in these communities are exposed principally to the type of education that emphasizes listening to lectures, taking notes, doing homework assignments, and answering quizzes. Consequently, some students become resistant when they are introduced to a different or unfamiliar pedagogy such as that of learner-centred teaching.

Baviskar et al. (2009) suggest that the rejection of or resistance to unfamiliar knowledge usually occurs when a learner does not interpret and modify prior knowledge in the context of new knowledge. In other words, if the student cannot make any connection between prior and new knowledge, most likely the new knowledge will be rejected since the former knowledge was accepted with a certain degree of irreversible truth.

For instance, if the student is used to being spoon-fed information through the practice of note-giving on the part of the instructor and note-taking on the part of the student with tests and exercises that simply explore how much the student has remembered from the flurry of notes, then his or her ability to think

² It is always possible, on the other hand, that the students who are more successful not only in the task of memorizing but also in the task of understanding what they are memorizing can apply what they know to project designs, methodologies, objectives, commentaries and conclusions (ed.).

critically and solve problems of a complex nature may atrophy. Hence the students may feel inadequate to engage in the open-ended learning activities, the solving of problems with a high degree of complexity, and the other inquiry-based, hands-on activities required by the learner-centred pedagogy. This feeling of inadequacy may compel them to resist this approach. One possible conclusion to be reached is that when students are not exposed to the learner-centred pedagogy at an early stage of learning it is more likely, they will resist that type of pedagogy at later stages of learning.

5. The Impact of Culture on Learner-Centred Pedagogy

Culture and education are intimately and integrally connected. The culture pattern of any society or country or even the global patterns that have been emerging have a strong impact upon educational patterns. Radhika Kapur (2018) states that people are born into a culture that provide them definite patterns of behaviour and values that guide their conduct in the schemes of recurrence of everyday life. With that in mind, school practices in a particular nation are mainly a reflection of the society in which they are immersed. Elise Langan (2014) specifies the elements that influence school practices. These elements include: hierarchy, power relationships, infrastructures and particular customs related to the sharing of space.

Reflecting on the Tanzania society, one can find that the educational system is a top-down system and coheres with the living patterns of the communities and families in which children are raised. Mothers and children receive orders from the father who is the head of the family. Sometimes the mother and the children cannot contribute or express their opinion on family affairs. Children are there to accept orders from adults and act accordingly. The style of parenting seems to be more authoritarian.

The students bring that prior experience to schools, and consequently the majority seem to be unable to ask questions and discuss issues with their teachers. This inability limits the applicability of the learner-centred pedagogy. Scholars such as Schiro (2008) and Brown (2003) argue that learner-centred

pedagogy works better when students mingle with peers and adults to explore together, exchange ideas with each other, play together, and construct meaning gleaned from their physical and cultural world together. This issue seems particularly pertinent to the situation of science students and teachers in Tanzania's secondary schools. The question many seem to be asking themselves is: do we have the free will to explore, exchange ideas, and discover meaning together without any confusion in power relationships, infrastructures and space-sharing?

6. Teacher's Professionalism

What the teacher knows about learner-centred pedagogy is another key factor in promoting this style of learning. Among the obstacles to learner-centred pedagogy, one finds not only the students' resistance and culture barriers, but also a lack of well-trained and qualified teachers who are expert in both subject knowledge and teaching methodologies. Since learner-centred pedagogy requires students to discover and elucidate meaning through first-hand experience rather than through the knowledge acquisition that may come by way of books, videos, and lectures, teachers have to have the expertise and subject knowledge that render them capable of meeting students' needs (Schiro, 2008; Baviskar et al., 2009). In other words, teachers need to know how to help students integrate the information they have gained through studying the subject matter with what happens in their environment from day to day.

Scholars that work with the scientific method suggest that science subjects are easy and enjoyable if the teacher is able to integrate the subject content with the schemes of recurrence in their daily life cycles.

If the teacher is preparing a lesson plan about energy for secondary school students who are studying physics, for example, the teacher should make sure that students define energy in their own words and what it means to them. Besides defining the term energy, they have to short list some elements or items that are used as sources of energy in their surroundings.

It is sometimes true that books provide quality knowledge about subjects dealing with science, but acquiring knowledge only from

books does not provide students with first-hand experience rather than memorizing content and formulae from those books. Baviskar et al., (2009) suggest that teaching by using learner-centred pedagogies does not necessarily follow a specific formula. Problem-solving exercises and group discussions exemplify a flexibility that often cannot be pinned down by rigorously articulated terminology and formulae. The lesson plan, therefore, has to be designed and implemented with the purpose of creating opportunities for students to learn, regardless of the teaching methodology used. The designs of the lesson plans, in other words, must account for the polymorphic nature of human consciousness.

To summarize what we have said in succinct fashion, the teacher's role is to create a learning environment where students get motivated to learn. Baviskar et al. (2009) identify three constituents that the teacher can implement to make a lesson more meaningful. These are (1) testing students' prior knowledge about the planned subject; (2) providing students with new content that create new pathways for knowledge; and (3) allowing students to investigate issues in a critical manner that will allow them to explore and to widen their knowledge about the subject.

In order to put into effective practice the thoughtful suggestions of scholars about how to develop teachers' professionalism and inculcate teaching approaches that inspire students to inquire, to investigate, to formulate insights, to understand and to learn there are other factors to which we have already alluded that must be in place to support learning and teaching processes.

Up to date, however, Tanzania is a country where such progress is hampered. We are all too familiar with the difficulties in developing countries: classrooms have large numbers of students, limited resources and facilities, a limited number of science teachers per school, insufficient time allocation and overemphasis on content coverage. Research into teaching and learning in Tanzania secondary schools show that teaching and learning focus more on passing national exams than on reflective learning because the passing of the national exams is a grant for students to enter into the next stage of education. In addition, classroom instructional practices encourage students to memorize the facts and be able to reproduce the same facts in the examination for

higher grades and formal employment, but students cannot apply the knowledge to solve society's problems (Wandela, 2014; Kalolo, 2015; Kinyota, 2020; Lupeja, & Komba, 2021). Though there might be a willingness to implement the learner-centred pedagogy in Tanzania's school settings, especially in the governmental schools, the limiting factors as described hinder that implementation.

Exposing a larger number of students to hands-on activities that promote critical thinking requires adequate facilities, enough learning resources and the availability of a good number of teachers. That is not all. Taber (2006) argues that the implementation of the learner-centred pedagogy suffers because the everyday experience of science teachers is not only that their students are assessed through national exams, but also that their own teaching is judged on the basis of the results of these same examinations. In other words, teachers seem to have suffered the plight of having to convince assessors and examiners that students have learnt and understood the subject matter represented in the syllabus. The concentration on the national examinations can make the efforts to introduce learner-centred pedagogies quite futile.

7. Conclusion

The learner-centred pedagogy is an important learning strategy that occasions more freedom of negotiation for the students in the planning and implementation of their educational process than in the traditional pedagogical approaches. A learner-centred pedagogy is thought of as a multi-dimensional constellation of activities that draw students more easily into methodical manners of investigation, and gives ample room for students' choices, empowerment, and social interactions. The learner-centred pedagogy, in other words, conforms more harmoniously to the polymorphic nature of human consciousness.

Hence the pedagogy varies greatly from the traditional methods of curricula presentations that are relatively narrow and logically arranged with a body of predetermined knowledge (Brown, 2003; Schiro, 2008). Since learner-centred pedagogy seems to support and to promote students' learning processes, it is important to the Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Vocational Training to

reduce the factors that are limiting the implementation of the learner-centred pedagogies, especially in science classrooms. Increasing the number of students who are trained in science subjects may call for the standard ratio of teachers per students in science classrooms. In addition, teachers are professionally encouraged to use their skills and creativity in teaching science subjects. As suggested by Baviskar et al. (2009), teaching by using a learner-centred pedagogy does not necessarily follow a specific formula; rather, lesson plans have to be designed and implemented with the purpose of creating opportunities for students to think, to inquire, to research all questions relevant to what they are investigating, to make judgments about what is really true and what should be rejected as false, to make free choices on how to act with the new knowledge gained, and so by their new actions based on their judgments according to the parameters of truth and goodness, they can determine themselves as upright, self-reliant human beings – regardless of the teaching methodology used.

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The Phenomenology of the Belief in “Ebibiriria” (Evil-eye) among the Abagusii of Southwestern Kenya

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Abstract

The Abagusii of southwestern Kenya believe, like many other cultures around the world, that through our thoughts or through our envious glare one person is able to cause harm to another in the form of illness, injury, or even death. They call this phenomenon “ebibiriria” [in English, evil-eye]. The belief in “ebibiriria” is a powerful factor affecting the behaviour of many people in Gusiiland. It is considered to be a very dangerous phenomenon. However, because science has not fully grasped this phenomenon, perhaps because it is partly physical and partly spiritual, many of our contemporaries view it as a pure superstition, i.e., as a phenomenon that has no rational foothold. They fail to understand how various aspects of dimensions that transcend the physical can have a direct effect on us.

In light of this, the present essay responds to the contemporary problem of what readers enlightened by today’s science should make of the available data that provide evidence for the existence and danger of “ebibiriria”. The underlying question is how the phenomenon affects our understanding and use of the evidence provided for by the data. The essay attempts a response by exploring the historical, social, and cultural context of the belief and practice of “ebibiriria” among the Abagusii community. It highlights several characteristics of the beliefs and the practices of the evil-eye among the Abagusii such as the strategies of the evil-eye, their effects, and their treatments, symbolic features of the belief, and social relationships between evil-eyed persons and their

victims. From these factors the essay draws a contextual analysis of the phenomenon using the phenomenological method to understand it in relation to the worldwide evil-eye belief and practice in general.

1. Introduction

*If, however, your eye is evil,
your entire body will be full of darkness.*

(Words of Jesus in Matt 6:22–23)

Is your eye evil because I am good?

(Words of Jesus in Matt 20:15)

*O you uncomprehending Galatians,
who has injured you with an evil eye?*

(The Apostle Paul in Gal 3:1)

*Remember that an evil eye is a wicked thing.
What has been created more evil than an evil eye?*

(Sirach 31:13)

The purpose of this essay is to give the contemporary reader a strong foundation about the concept of *ebibiriria* [evil-eye] with reference to the Abagusii community of southwestern Kenya. It explores the Abagusii emic perspective on the evil-eye and the factors that lend it plausibility and power. It then considers it from a contemporary etic perspective, with attention to various theoretical points of view that cast either light or shadow over the various perspectives under consideration.

The anthropologists' choice to distinguish between "emic" and "etic" enables us to avoid imposing on the Abagusii sources our current scientific views and moral judgments. In other words, it is not our intention to subscribe to the subjectivist fallacy.

"Emic" pertains to the perspectives, descriptions, and explanations provided by members of a particular culture – in our case, the Abagusii people – that by means of our empathic attentiveness to the sources made available to us by that culture enable us to embark on a cross-cultural understanding of that other culture that may differ greatly from our own. "Etic" pertains to the perspectives, descriptions, explanations and criteria used to analyze a culture by persons outside this particular culture – in our

case, contemporary historians, classicists, social scientists, or theological anthropologists who are intent on understanding and explaining the data according to acceptable contemporary scientific criteria.¹

The belief in *ebibiriria* constitutes a cultural phenomenon with personal, social, and moral implications for the people in Gusiiland. It is very powerful in its effects on the behavior of many people in that region. However, the phenomenon is hardly understood by contemporary science. Today's science actually raises questions about the folk beliefs concerning the evil-eye with a skeptical attitude. It considers the belief in *ebibiriria* as a pure superstition and a phenomenon that has no rational foothold.

According to the sciences of today, the universe is made up of basic physical particles that include electrons, protons, neutrons, mesons, gluons and quarks. Although science acknowledges another component of the universe, that which is referred to as force or energy, that triggers change among the physical particles, science has not considered the possibility of this force operating on the spiritual level. Experts looking at *ebibiriria* from the medical point of view consider the phenomenon as pneumonia while others are not sure about it.² For science, anything that is not physical in nature, anything that is difficult to specify with a physicality that is only ambiguous does not fall into their field of concern. Hence, it is difficult for science to give us a sense of the phenomenon of *ebibiriria*.

Nevertheless, the persistence of this folk belief in our present day and age in the face of countervailing scientific evidence is a fascinating phenomenon that begs for closer examination. Evil-eye is not just a superstition, but something that can severely affect anyone on a physical, psychological and spiritual level. In myriad

¹ On "emic" and "etic" as analytical categories see Marvin Harris, "History and Significance of the Emic-Etic Distinction." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 5 (1976) 329–50; Barnard, Alan & Jonathan Spencer, eds., *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Routledge 2002) 180–83.

² Joyce Manoti Ondicho, "Factors associated with use of herbal medicine among the residents of Gucha Sub-county, Kenya" (Unpublished MA Thesis: Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology 2015).

ways the evil eye continues to haunt our everyday lives and imagination, whether we are aware of it or not. Looks can insult; glances can threaten; evil eyes can wreak havoc in families and communities. The serious evil eye is no laughing matter. “The evil-eye,” folklorist Alan Dundes reminds us, “is not some old-fashioned superstitious belief of interest only to antiquarians. The evil eye continues to be a powerful factor affecting the behavior of countless millions of people throughout the [world].”³ Over the centuries the evil eye has haunted our dreams and spooked our imaginations.

The exploration of the historical, social, and cultural context of *ebibiriria* [Evil-eye] belief and practice, among the Abagusii community of southwestern Kenya offers evidence of the presence of the phenomenon. This essay therefore highlights several aspects of the belief and the practices of the evil-eye among the Abagusii such as: methods of the evil-eye, its effects, its treatment, symbolic features of the belief, and social relationships between evil-eyed persons and their victims. From the contextual analysis of the phenomenon of evil-eye the essay draws a phenomenological understanding relating it to the worldwide evil-eye belief and practice in general.

2. The Phenomenon of the Evil-eye

What is this phenomenon called the evil-eye? The evil-eye is a very widespread complex system of beliefs in the world and in history; yet, to anybody who is not part of an evil-eye culture, the evil-eye is an enigma. The belief in a personal evil influence is not only prevalent but almost universal. The systematic historical and anthropological investigations of the phenomenon indicate that it is a fact that can neither be suppressed nor exaggerated.

The story of evil-eye belief and practice has flourished for at least 5000 years. It is a theme of the human drama that weaves its way through history. Written and material evidence attests to the existence of the belief in the evil-eye across the Mediterranean and

³ Dundes (1992) and Maloney (1976) present collections of scholarly case studies of Evil-eye belief and practice from antiquity to the present and from East to West.

Near Eastern worlds of antiquity. Speaking of an eye that is evil, the Greeks call it *baskania* or *ophthalmos ponēros*, the Romans *fascinatio*, the Hebrews *‘ayin harah*, in English “evil-eye”. Others speak of a *gaze*, *glance* or *look*: e.g., *böser Blick* (German; also *Scheel*, *Scheelsucht*); *booze blik* (Dutch); *mauvais regard* (French); Teso, the Luo, “witches of eyes (*jajuog wang*); the Kipsigis, and the Logoli, in Kenya, *omulasi webikoko/ omusohi*; and the Nuer in Sudan (*peth*). The Gusii call the evil-eye *ebibiriria*, and an evil-eyed person is called *omonyabibiriria*.

The belief in evil-eye holds that certain individuals (humans, gods, demons, animals, and mythological figures) possess an eye whose powerful glance or gaze can harm or destroy any object, animate or inanimate, on which it falls. Through the power of their eye, which can operate involuntarily as well as intentionally, such evil-eye possessors (also known as “fascinator”) are thought capable of injuring, withering, or obliterating the health and life, means of sustenance and livelihood, familial honor, and personal well-being of their hapless victims. The evil-eye is believed to harm nursing mothers and their babies, breast milk, fruit-bearing trees, crops in the field, milking animals, and the sperm of men. All persons, things, and sound states of being, however, are deemed vulnerable, but especially children, the beautiful and successful, and what is most prized and essential to survival. The more attractive, beautiful, flourishing and outstanding the object, the more likely an attack from an evil-eye may attempt to pervert the object.⁴

3. The Evil-eye as Seen by the Abagusii

The Abagusii are a Bantu-speaking people numbering close to 1.9 million and they are the sixth most populous community in Kenya.⁵ They occupy the larger region of Gusiiland, an area estimated to be 2,196 km square, covering the two counties of

⁴ Elliott John Hall, *Beware the Evil Eye, The Evil Eye in the Bible and the Ancient World, Volume 1: Introduction, Mesopotamia, and Egypt* (Oregon: Cascade Books 2015).

⁵ 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume 1: Population by County and Sub-county, 7.

Nyamira and Kisii. They claim a legendary man called Mogusii as their founder and the man after whom they are named.

They share in the long-standing and widespread folk concept that some persons are enabled by nature to injure others, cause illness and loss, and destroy any person, animal or thing through a powerful noxious glance emanating from the eye. We reiterate that the Abagusii call this belief *ebibiriria*. The belief in *ebibiriria* constitutes a cultural phenomenon with personal, social, and moral implications to the people. The phenomenon is considered a very dangerous “disease” among the Abagusii.

The belief and practice of *ebibiriria* among the Abagusii is represented by a range of evidence. Many anthropological studies done among the Abagusii attest to the evidence of the phenomenon. The phenomenon, however, seems to be a recent one among them. Its belief and practice is considered to have been introduced among them through some “Kipsigis women who were sold into the tribe as wives when there was famine in Kipsigis territory.”⁶ It was a common practice among the Abagusii that people who had no daughters could take the opportunity and buy Kipsigis girls, and those who had no sons could buy boys.⁷ It is through these children that the phenomenon of *ebibiriria* is believed to have found its way to Gusiiland.

Historically armed fighting between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis was brought to an end in the 1910s through the British colonial rule in Kisii. The British rule abolished the cattle villages, and the *ebisarate*, which were dens for the young men’s fighting groups. The cessation of the tribal fighting brought a peaceful atmosphere conducive for interaction; and open markets were introduced at the borders. It was believed that infamous markets for *ebibiriria* could be found in the North Mugirango Locality. It was through the North Mugirango Locality, which is adjacent to the Kipsigis region, that the practice of *ebibiriria* is believed to

⁶ Robert A. LeVine, & Barbara B. LeVine, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1966) 119–120.

⁷ Makio Matsuzono, “Rubbing of the Dirt: Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii” in *Nilo-Ethiopian Studies* 1: 1–13 (Tokyo Association for Nilo-Ethiopian Studies 1993:8).

have been disseminated to other parts of Gusiiland.⁸ It is also commonly believed that the Kipsigis phenomenon of Evil-eye is more embedded than the one of Abagusii.

The Abagusii have knowledge of the phenomenon of *ebibiriria*, the ones who are the possessors of the evil-eye. They understand how the evil-eye works, what it does to the victims, and how it can be warded off.⁹

They refer to the beliefs and practices associated with what certain persons do through an envious or spiteful glare in order to cause harm to others in the form of illness, injury, or even death. This is *ebibiriria*. The person who possesses *ebibiriria* [the evil-eye] is called an *omonyabiriria* (plural, *abanyabiriria*). Through the power of their eye, which can operate involuntarily as well as intentionally, the *abanyabiriria* are thought capable of injuring, withering, or obliterating the health and the life, the means of sustenance and the livelihood of their hapless victims. The phenomenon of transmitting *ebibiriria* to another person is known as *okobiriria*. The victim is called an *omobirigwa* [pl., *ababirigwa*]. This derives from the passive form of the verb *okobiriria* and *omo-* a prefix indicating a singular person. The treatment of *omobirigwa* is referred to as *okongura*. This is to be done by a specialist known as an *omokorerani* (pl., *abakorerani*). Remedies and cures from an evil-eye attack are thought possible.

3.1 Omonyabiriria or the Agent of the Evil Eye

The *Omonyabiriria* [the evil-eyed person] is a subject of natural force, capable of producing extraordinary electromagnetic charges that are capable of causing negative radiation to certain human skin, cattle, goats, or chickens to the extent of causing the death of

⁸ Makio Matsuzono, "Rubbing of the Dirt", 8.

⁹ For studies on the evil eye among the Abagusii see Levine, R. A. & Levine Barbara, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya* (New York: Wiley 1966); Makio Matsuzono, "Rubbing of the Dirt: Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii" in *Nilo-Ethiopian Studies* 1: 1–13 (Tokyo Association for Nilo-Ethiopian Studies 1993); Mwalimu Johnstone Nyamboga, "Continuity and change in the Indigenous therapeutic Systems among the Abagusii of Nyamira county, Kenya, 1880-2010" (Unpublished M.A Thesis; Kenyatta University 2019).

the victims. Thought to be animated by some malevolent disposition such as envy, miserliness, greed, or malice, the *omonyabiriria* is believed to convey, project, and cast forth particles of energy that damage or destroy the object struck.¹⁰

It is believed that in some cases an evil-eye is inherited and can work involuntarily, injuring even loved ones and the evil-eyed person herself/himself. When exercised voluntarily, the *omonyabiriria* directs malice arising in the heart through the eye against external objects with the intent to harm others and destroy what makes them stand out with attractive uprightness and success or gives them pleasure. It can be the cause of illness or death to children and other human beings; the cause of illness or death to animals; the cause of damage to crops; and the cause of severe obstruction to a person's means of livelihood.

In most cases, women have been reported as the carriers of *ebibiriria*. However, on rare occasions, men can also be carriers.¹¹ No explanation is given as to why women are the major carriers of *ebibiriria*. It is believed that since women spend a good deal of their time together congregating in market places, at river sources where they fetch water, in the farms picking vegetables, in the fields cultivating together, at home doing chores together or plaiting hair with each other,¹² they easily transmit the evil eye from one person to another.

3.2 Method of Transmitting Ebibiriria

There are various ways of transmitting *ebibiriria*. It can be done through gazing, stepping on another's toes, shaking hands and exchanging gifts. Occasions that pose a threat that this phenomenon may occur include general gatherings, funerals, weddings, assemblies in church, congregating in market places, associating with each other at tea-buying centers, and encountering strangers.

¹⁰ Cf. Levine, R. A & Levine Barbara, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya*; Makio Matsuzono, *Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii*.

¹¹ Makio Matsuzono, *Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii*.

¹² Johnstone Mwalimu, 56.

- *Gaze through the eyes:* This is the most prominent one. A glaring, staring eye, a penetrating gaze, can burn, wither, reduce to ashes, zap, hurt, injure, damage, or destroy any object struck by the ocular emanations.
- *Stepping on toes and shaking of hands:* This happens mostly when one is being assisted to put some load on the head. A person with *ebibiriria* uses the opportunity to step on the victim's toes. An evil-eyed person can also step on another person's toes while shaking hands.
- *Exchange of gifts:* Cunning evil-eyed persons may trap their victims with money abandoned on the road. If an unsuspecting person picks up the money he/she becomes a victim of *okobirigwa*. Thus, the victim becomes a full-fledged evil-eyed person. It is believed that if someone participates in chopping meat together with an *omonyabiriria* chances of falling victim to him/her are very high. If a person holds a piece of meat on one end and the evil-eyed person holds the piece of meat on the other end, there is an enabling of an easy dissemination of *ebibiriria*. There is another common belief that if one carries firewood or even just picks up a piece of wood that has been touched by an evil-eyed person it may lead to transmission of *ebibiriria*.

3.3 The Effects of Evil-Eye

Fear of the evil-eye and its devastating effects is intense and pervasive among those who belong to the Abagusii community. The evil-eye can cause harm, loss, damage, illness, or death. Indeed an evil-eye is feared as a major cause of illness and death. The evil-eye appears to be regarded as no respecter of persons or classes; it is capable of injuring all sorts and conditions of human persons. The evil-eye is believed to harm nursing mothers and their babies, the mother's breast milk, fruit-bearing trees, crops in the field, milking animals, and even houses. Everything of value, and especially the children, flocks, herds and means of livelihood, are thought vulnerable to the evil-eyed gaze of envy and spite: hence the need for concealment and protection. The more attractive, beautiful, flourishing and outstanding the object is, the more likely an attack from an evil-eye.

3.4 Treatment of Evil-eye Effects

The Abagusii not only have folk knowledge of the phenomenon of *ebibiriria* and how it works, but also knowledge of the agents and how this knowledge can help them ward off the phenomenon. As indicated above, the community believes that remedies and cures from an evil-eye attack are possible. Both the victim of *ebibiriria* [*omobiririgwa*] and the agent [*omonyabiriria*] can be cured.

Treatment of the Victim of Ebibiriria [Omobiririgwa]: Treatment of the *omobiririgwa* can be done through the method of oil, the method of herbs, or the method of coin. It all begins with the process of discernment to clarify the cause of the illness. A ritual (usually performed by an older wise woman) involving water, oil, and incantations is used to detect and cure injury by the evil-eye. Drops of oil are allowed to fall over water in a basin and attention is given to whether the oil beads or spreads. Beading is an indication of the presence of the phenomenon of *ebibiriria*.¹³

It has not been proven scientifically, but Abagusii have a way of detecting and dealing with *ebibiriria*. Treatment is administered by rubbing oil on the belly, head and legs of the affected child. Emissions consist of sand, hair and ashes.¹⁴ The treatment continues by a massage involving the use of liquid jelly, and sometimes tobacco leaves. A person doing the massaging can feel those things in her palm – what the masseuse is holding and feeling is observable to all present. . Gestures and defensive actions have included spitting, the wearing of amulets and the display of protective devices in the home, fields, shops, and public places.

Treatment of Omonyabiriria: The agent of *ebibiriria* who admits to it is taken to a waterfall accompanied by relatives and a village elder who act as witnesses. The expert (evil-eye remover) then uses his/her paraphernalia, slaughters a black sheep whose meat is thrown into the waterfall and utters certain words that seem to carry the weight of an imperative and convey the meaning that terrible evil go and be carried downstream to the great lake

¹³ Cf. Levine, R. A & Levine Barbara, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya*.

¹⁴ T. Liyong, *Popular culture of East Africa*.

(*enyancha or ritibo*). The meat from the sheep is not eaten. The person is bathed; once the bath is complete, the person becomes free of evil-eye. He/she is instructed not to eat sheep meat again for if she/he does, the condition recurs.¹⁵

3.5 Symbolic Features of the Belief

The color red is believed to both absorb and repel the power of the evil-eye. Consequently people put on red clothes to avoid *ebibiriria*. It is commonly held that evil-eyed persons are attracted by red things and the power of their evil-eye decreases when they look at red things. However, the Levines think otherwise.¹⁶

Amaemba [Eleusine grain or finger millet] is believed to absorb the evil effects and is therefore held before an evil-eyed woman giving birth. She is forced to focus her eyes on the eleusine grain held in front of her to absorb the evil effects and prevent the child from being infected.¹⁷

A ram and ewe are animals used in the ritual of curing an *omonyabiriria*. For a man the offering is a ram and for a woman, an ewe.

To make sure a child resists the evil spell, locals in Gusiiland have devised various tactics such as applying special oil on a child's forehead, placing a coin on the child's shoe or clothes, and making the child wear a necklace made of seeds from the Abyssinian coral tree (*omotembe*).¹⁸

4. Phenomenological Analysis of Ebibiriria

Systematic historical and anthropological investigations of the phenomenon conducted among the Abagusii of southwestern

¹⁵ Makio Matsuzono, *Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii*.

¹⁶ Cf. Levine, R. A & Levine Barbara, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya*, 119–120; Makio Matsuzono, *Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii*.

¹⁷ Cf. Levine, R.A. – Levine Barbara, *Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya*, 119–120; Makio Matsuzono, *Evil-Eye Belief among the Gusii*.

¹⁸ Elvis Ondieki, "The 'evil eye' spell on babies: Myth or reality?" in *Daily Nation*, Friday, June 22, 2018 — updated on July 05, 2020.

Kenya over the last eighty years¹⁹ have brought to light several cultural features associated with ideas and practices of *ebibiriria*:

(1) Power emanates from the eye and strikes some object or person.

(2) The stricken object is of value, and its destruction or injury is sudden.

(3) The one casting the evil-eye may not know she/he has the power.

(4) The one affected may or may not be able to identify the source of the power.

(5) The evil-eye can be deflected or its effects modified or cured by particular devices, rituals, and symbols.

(6) The belief helps to explain or rationalize sickness, misfortune, or loss of possessions such as animals or crops.

(7) In the functioning of the belief, envy (spite) is a factor.

Anthropological researchers seem to have identified the web of ideas, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, symbols and actions that give the belief and practice of evil-eye their plausibility and power.²⁰

This belief complex includes:

- *the notion that the eye is an active organ that projects energy capable of harming, withering or destroying;*
- *the notion that certain individuals possess ebibiriria and can be identified as such;*
- *the notion that certain victims are particularly vulnerable such as nursing mothers, newborn babies, and children;*
- *the bi-operational character of ebibiriria as either involuntary or voluntary;*

¹⁹ Philip & Iona Mayer, and Robert A. Le Vine & Barbara Le Vine conducted anthropological research among the Gusii, between 1946–1949 and 1955–1957 respectively (LeVine – LeVine 1966: 119–120; Matsuzono Makio between 1977–1978 and 1979–1980. More studies have been done since then in form of unpublished Master theses or doctoral dissertations. Many of these unpublished works consider *ebibiriria* as one of the dangerous diseases among the Abagusii but which is curable traditionally and defies modern scientific treatment.

²⁰ Cf. Elliot John Hall, *Beware the Evil Eye*.

- *the odium of wielding ebibiriria;*
- *the fear of being struck by ebibiriria, and the belief that attack from an evil-eye can be prevented or repelled by a variety of words, gestures, and amulets.*

This belief complex is found in the Abagusii traditions reflected in their manner of knowing, customs, and oral and artistic schemes of recurrence. These traditions are expressed in folk values and folklore. Anthropologists suggest that the essence of folklore is its spontaneous or organic nature; that is to say, it is the result of the experience and interpretations of experience of persons engaged in social interaction.²¹

Folklore does not necessarily aspire to universally valid knowledge nor attempt exhaustive communication. Its concern is the concrete and particular. Its function is to master each situation as it arises. Its procedure is to reach an incomplete set of insights that are to be completed only by adding on each occasion further insights that inquiry into what is happening at the present moment reveals. The spontaneity of folklore requires the trust-trustworthiness of the people involved. This means that what the folklore reveals may not be easily accessible to those who are strangers to the relationships that have been cultivated by mutual trust.

One may consider as a limitation of folklore the fact that it clings to the immediate and practical, the concrete and the particular. It remains within the familiar world of things as we experience them. But those living within the confines of the familiar world cannot intelligently and effectively explain the phenomenon of the evil-eye. So the contemporary reader at this point who is not privy to the inter-relationships cultivated by entrustment is in a dilemma as to what she/he should do with the body of evidence that suggests the existence of the phenomenon. Indeed the issue presents a problem that all contemporary readers must be prepared to address: what am I, a reader informed by

²¹ Seymour-Smith, Charlotte. 1986a. "Folklore." In *Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology*, edited by Charlotte Seymour-Smith. (London: Macmillan Reference Books) 120. Concerning folklore see also Dundes, Alan (ed.), *The Study of Folklore*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1965.

contemporary science, able to conclude about the existence and danger of an evil-eye? How does this affect my understanding and judgment about the evidence?

This essay explores beyond the folklore experience and observation. The first question to be encountered here is whether there exist necessary relations between the Evil-eye and the effects observed in the victim of *ebibiriria*. The aim is to present a rational explanation of the phenomenon based on experience, observation, and current folklore knowledge. The rational explanation should quench the curiosity of the contemporary reader.

5. Contemporary Explanations of the Phenomenon of the Evil-eye

It is true that the questioning of the folk beliefs by contemporary science has led to a demise of evil-eye belief in many so-called advanced societies but not to its complete disappearance. Nevertheless, the persistence of this folklore belief in our present day in the face of countervailing scientific evidence is a fascinating phenomenon that begs for closer examination.

Our exploration begins with the fact that much of what has been written about the belief and practice of the evil-eye among the Abagusii is a matter of information, with little if any attempt at theoretical explanation. Moving away from the Abagusii emic perspective of the evil-eye, we encounter a modern etic explanation with attention to the various biological, psychological, social and moral factors at play. However, we are dealing not with an etic concept invented by anthropologists but rather with an image of great historical depth, breadth, diffusion, and a remarkable quality of persistence.

Many scholars from various parts of the globe have given much importance to the issue of the evil eye.²² These beliefs have been studied in the various disciplines of the social sciences. More recent analysis has examined the belief from a variety of theoretical

²² Most detailed studies include, Clarence Maloney, ed., *The Evil-Eye*, (New York: Columbia University Press 1976); Elliott John Hall, *Beware the Evil Eye, The Evil Eye in the Bible and the Ancient World*, Volume 1: Introduction, Mesopotamia, and Egypt (Oregon: Cascade Books 2015).

perspectives: ethnological, anthropological, folklorist, sociological, psychological, and biological among others. Ethnological studies have been instrumental in describing the peoples and cultures that practice the evil-eye. These studies give a rich examination of the variables that are associated with the evil-eye belief cross-culturally.

They identify the evil eye as an ethnographical fact but at the same time as a variant of a wider phenomenon. It may present itself as a synthetic image, or it may present itself as a cluster of disparate phenomena, i.e., primary factors or evocative carriers of significance. The primary factors are considered as elements of experience that exhibit the qualities of simplicity and immediacy. These elements capture the cultural imagination and inclination to be inventive. The primary factors that typify the evil eye as a synthetic image include the act of gazing, eye contact and eye image, notion of magical harm, and images of automatically induced harm as a consequence of violating a taboo.²³

Many anthropologists have made an effort to explain the evil eye in terms of medical events from indigenous societies.²⁴ In such societies, the diagnosis of a health problem and its interpretation mainly rests upon preternatural explanations of causative factors, which are frequently attributed to the relationship between the sufferer and his/her surroundings.²⁵ There are anthropologists who

²³ Michael Argyle & Mark Cook, *Gaze and Mutual Gaze*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-25 Quoted also in Anthony H. Galt, "Evil eye as synthetic image and its meanings on the Island of Pantelleria, Italy" in *American Ethnologist*, (September 1981), 669.

²⁴ T. M. Johnson & C. F. Sargent (Eds.). *Medical anthropology: A handbook of theory and method*, (West Port, NY: Greenwood Press 1990); D. N. Kakar, *Primary health care and traditional medical practitioners* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers 1988); A. Kleinman, "Concepts and a model for the comparison of medical system as cultural systems," *Social Science and Medicine*, (1978), 12 (2), 85-93; R. Wellman, & D. Kavadias, "Afflictions in the field: Evil eye and the anthropologist" (2005, March 25). Retrieved from <https://jugaad.pub/afflictions-in-the-field-evil-eyeand-the-anthropologist/>.

²⁵ H. A. Baer, S. Miller, & I. Susser, *Medical anthropology and the world system: A critical perspective* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey 1997); P. Conrad, & K. K. Barker, "The social construction of illness: Key insights and

define the term “supernatural” as “an order of existence beyond what is pragmatically visible and observable, that is paranormal in the sense that it supposedly defies the laws of nature”.²⁶ This definition, however, does not really correspond to what is supernatural; it more typically corresponds to the word “preternatural”.

From a sociological perspective it has been observed that the root cause of apprehending evil-eye is fear of suffering harm and experiencing distress from someone’s spiteful, jealous and malicious intentions. The presence of ebibiriria is an expression of the dread and fear-provoking noxious evil that accompanies and overshadows the human condition. It arouses the suspicion of enemies who are intent on harm and injury through their glaring eyes and gaze. Evil-eye belief is thus a convincing fear which reveals man’s deep knowledge that, no matter what our situation in life regarding our fortune and assets, there will always be someone less favoured by life. And he is a potential enemy.

Most scholars of social sciences believe that envy serves as a basis for casting an evil eye. Envy involves perception, emotion, and action on the part of both the one who envies and the one envied. Envy begins in the eye of the beholder, an eye that exaggerates, misrepresents, and selectively chooses things to hate.

policy implications”, *Journal of Health Social Behavior*, 2010, 51 (S1), 61–67; J. Devarapalli, “Ethnomedical practices of Chenchu: A case of integrated system”, *The Anthropologist*, (2007), 22(1), 27–33; R. K. Kar, “Ecology of health and health culture: A case study among the tea labourers in Assam, India”, *International Journal of Anthropology*, (2000), 15 (1), 171–183; G. K. Kshatriya, “Tribal health in India: Perspectives in medical anthropology” In: A. K. Kalla & P. C. Joshi (Eds.), *Tribal health and medicine* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co, 2004) 17–45; M. Winkelman, *Culture and health: Applying medical anthropology*, (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons 2009).

²⁶ R. Anderson, “Defining the supernatural in Iceland”, *Anthropological Forum*, 2003, 13, 125–130; E. Roussou, “Believing in the supernatural through the ‘evil eye’: Perception and science in the modern Greek cosmos”, *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, (2014). 29 (3), 425–438.

Foster²⁷ and Schoeck²⁸ consider envy to be a powerful human feeling that stimulates imagination and triggers spite, particularly in societies with inequality in the distribution of resources.

Envy serves as a basis for forming secularist human society. Human societies formed by the unnatural dynamism of envy where sharing is not a natural pattern of experience find it difficult to suppress this dynamism. Envy is different from jealousy, although the two terms often are used as synonyms in contemporary discourse. In terms of its social dynamics, envy is displeasure at the possessions of others; jealousy, on the other hand, is fear of losing to others that which one already possesses. Envy is aggressive; jealousy is protective. The evil-eye is rarely linked with jealousy, but regularly with envy. Envy and spite coalesce with each other into a malevolent grief over another's happiness. The malevolent feeling, in turn, prompts actions of extreme aggression towards others and can even lead to self-injury. Evil-eyed and envious persons can harm themselves as well as others.

The evil-eye, then, symbolizes the intensity of community interaction; it indicates that each person is under observation by others. Everyone is measured from moment to moment and regarded with admiration or envy, with approbation or censure. In this regard it can be said that implicit awareness of the consequences of the opinions and actions of others towards oneself emerge in the concept of *ebibiriria* which attributes ones' own health and welfare to the judgments made and feelings held that others hold about the person.

Psychologists consider the evil eye as a cultural paradox, emergent with a construct of meanings, meanings that seem to be interwoven with the contexts of even the closest interpersonal attachments. According to Jaan Valsiner²⁹, the context may carry the idiosyncratic meaning of a benevolent spirit that can be used to

²⁷ George Foster, "The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior", in *Current Anthropology*, (1972), 13:165–202.

²⁸ Helmut Schoeck, *Envy, A Theory of Social Behaviour* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World 1969).

²⁹ Jaan Valsiner, "Personal culture and conduct of value" in *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology* www.jsecjournal.com – (2007), 1(2): 59–65, at 62.

explain everything. How is that context constructed? According to Valsiner, the mechanisms of construction of meaningful contexts can be found in the dynamic interplay between personal and collective cultures. Both the person and the surrounding world are considered as cultural phenomena – hence, the distinction between “personal culture” and “collective culture”.³⁰

The person constructs cultural novelty in the form of personal sense, which becomes externalized and thus enters the process of communication with other persons as a part of the social suggestions system. Persons’ active encounters with the world transform “collective-cultural” meanings into personal-cultural systems of sense by way of internalization, and contribute to the re-construction of meanings by externalization of one’s personal sense system.³¹

The notion of “personal culture” refers not only to the internalized subjective phenomena (intra-mental processes), but to the immediate (person-centred) externalizations of those processes. The latter make personal culture publicly visible, as every aspect of personal reconstruction of one’s immediate life-world reflects that externalization. Thus, the personal sense system becomes projected to the world of things³², and is reflected in the personal construction of publicly visible symbolic domains of body decorations and personally relevant interpersonal interaction rituals.³³

³⁰ Jaan Valsiner, “Personal culture and conduct of value”, 62.

³¹ Cf. Jaan Valsiner, *Human development and culture* (Lexington, Ma.: D.C. Heath 1989); Jaan Valsiner, *Culture and human development* (London: Sage 2000); Jaan Valsiner, *Culture in minds and societies*, (New Delhi: Sage 2007).

³² See M. Csikszentmihalyi, & E. Rochberg-Halton, *The meaning of things: domestic symbols and the self*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981).

³³ See R. Firth, *Symbols: public and private*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973); G. Obeyesekere, *The work of culture: symbolic transformation in psychoanalysis and anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990). The editor notes that social psychologists will recognize in this discussion the expansion of the notions of self-concept and self-image into the broader notions of cultural meanings and their externalizations. See Mohammed, R. & Gibson, J., “Premises of Psychological Research:

Armed with their interpretation of the dynamic interplay between personal and collective cultures, psychologists explain evil-eye by distinguishing human conduct from culturally refracted behaviour immersed in the cultural values it carries. All conduct is considered goal-oriented—and the various orientations are culturally axiological. Some human acting is easily labelled “pro-social”, other “anti-social”. However, the psychological processes that give rise to both kinds of acts are the same; only their manifestations (forms of externalization) differ... and they can differ quite dramatically.

As psychologists, occupied with consensually created folklore observe, eye contact is one of the very first prosocial behaviours in adult-child dyadic interaction.³⁴ Yet, in a contradictory vein, cultural histories of human societies are filled with beliefs in dangers of “evil-eye” that can be cast upon children – intentionally or unintentionally. Thus, cultural semiotic processes undertaken by active agents (persons who interpret everyday life events) relate the behavioural phenomenon (i.e., eye contact) with the cultural meaning system of benevolent, or malevolent connotations. In other terms, the prosocial or antisocial nature of any episode of eye contact is not a pre-given objective fact, but a result of interpretation.

“Evil-eye” is thus a complex of social actions that occupy a cultural matrix and are linked with emotions of the bearer that can become dangerous to other persons and the community-at-large. In societies that are not similar to each other, one can find varied versions of differentiation in the “evil-eye” beliefs, all of which have a direct bearing upon the treatment of persons in social interaction, and upon their status within the local community.

A snapshot of these various theoretical perspectives suggests that they are confining themselves to the parameters of the scientific revolution which applies to organic phenomena that belong to a conception of a world that is governed by biological, anatomical, physical, chemical, physiological, astronomical,

geological and mathematical laws. Because these laws essential concern what is physical in nature, they obviate the significance of spiritual, mental, and moral factors in their explanation of reality. This is noticeable even in those fields of inquiry that, strictly speaking, are not subject to the laws of science, for example, in the sphere of philosophy.

Philosophical inquiry transcends the limitations of the scientific method in its pursuit of the truth that governs social phenomena; hence the philosophies of physical and social science transcend any method limited to the realm of the senses (and mechanical extensions of the senses) and dedicate themselves to the realm of what is knowable beyond the senses. Yet there are those who incline themselves to a scientific explanation of all of reality, and thus may be guilty of reducing the preternatural and the supernatural, the spiritual, the cognitive and the moral to the level of what is observable and therefore measurable.

6. Concerning the Social Phenomenon

Our attempt to make the phenomenon of the evil-eye philosophically intelligible takes us to the contestable issue on how a socio-cultural phenomenon should be investigated. A well-informed contemporary reader should be familiar with the fact that the notion that the social sciences must be judged by reference to the natural sciences has been, and continues to be, a popular theme in the literature of the philosophy of social science.³⁵ According to Gordon, it “not only reflects the general view that there is a ‘unity of scientific method’ but, more specifically, that the practices of the natural sciences constitute the standards to which the social sciences are obliged to conform. This notion has survived the controversies among philosophers concerning the philosophy of science.”³⁶ There is, today, no consensus on this subject. Presumably, the social sciences are to be judged by reference to the natural sciences even though there is no agreement concerning the epistemic foundations of the natural sciences themselves. In the

³⁵ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 1991), 635–36.

³⁶ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p. 636.

majority of these discussions, both the preternatural order of existence and the supernatural order seem to be ominously missing.

Gordon suggests that "the view that the sciences, or at least those disciplines that are truly sciences, are united by the adoption of a common philosophy of knowledge and the use of similar methods of investigation was a central principle of the Vienna Circle positivists."³⁷ None the less, serious objections to the unity-of-science thesis have been expressed by a variety of writers. Weber³⁸ argued that the study of social phenomena must be pursued in a fundamentally different way from the natural sciences. Social phenomena result from the rational, evaluative, and purposeful actions of individuals. If the individuals act "transcendentally", i.e., according to the parameters/ norms of divine truth and goodness, these individuals cannot be analyzable by the methods of science that confine themselves to observable data that are studied for their explanatory and predictive value.

The natural scientist cannot go beyond the construction of a body of knowledge based upon external observation; but the social scientist, who shares the property of consciousness with those entities whose actions determine social phenomena, can, and must, present a more intimate, empathetic understanding of these phenomena. Karl Popper seems to go a considerable distance towards a meaningful understanding of social phenomena in contending that social scientists should pursue 'situational analysis', investigating the decisions of human agents in the situations in which they find themselves.³⁹ In a widely discussed book (*The Idea of a Social Science, and its Relation to Philosophy*, 1958), Peter Winch⁴⁰ argues that the study of social phenomena must be 'philosophical' rather than 'scientific', by which he means that the proper way to comprehend such phenomena is by

³⁷ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p 637

³⁸ See Max Webber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, with a foreword by Edward A. Shils (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe 1949).

³⁹ See Douglas W. Hands, "Karl Popper and Economic Methodology: a New Look", *Economics and Philosophy* (1985).

⁴⁰ See Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science, and its Relation to Philosophy*, (London: Routledge-Taylor & Francis 1958); reprinted 2015.

conceptual analysis rather than by means of empirical research. The notion of ‘cause’, says Winch, does not belong to the domain of social phenomena; what is needed instead is a penetrating analysis of the concept of the human person as a ‘rule-following’ being.

Most philosophers continue to insist that empirical phenomena, of whatever sort, must be investigated by procedures in which empirical methods play a vital role. Generally speaking, many social scientists are now firmly committed to the view that the investigation of social phenomena should strive to be objective and empirical, limited in this only by technical feasibility. All data from the preternatural and supernatural orders are ignored, perhaps out of the scientist’s reluctance to attempt to study events from these orders as determinative in the formation of the human person.

It is easy to see why the social and natural sciences differ. Physical entities such as atoms and planets cannot be regarded as active agents in this sense; and, while non-human animals can be regarded as behaviourally respondent to instinct and impulse, the biologist is too far removed from the various animal species to achieve an empathetic understanding of their behaviour.

There is a recent attempt to explain social phenomena using mental states. We speak of a person as having ‘desires’, ‘preferences’, ‘purposes’, ‘intentions’, or the “will to submit to a prerogative of a Higher Power”, and as being ‘lonely’, ‘irrational’, ‘happy’, or ‘apprehensive’. All these may be collapsed into three terms; ‘motives’, ‘beliefs’, or ‘states of feeling’. The first of these refers to that which is valued by the actor, the end or ends he hopes to attain by his actions. Under the heading of ‘beliefs’ is included the individual’s views concerning the probability that an action will, in fact, serve to realize his motives; that is to say, the knowledge he considers himself to possess with respect to the relevant relations of cause and effect. ‘States of feeling’ refer to what happens emotionally within a person, not deliberately chosen by the person, but nevertheless capable of affecting the motives, beliefs, and choices that a person is making. A person may consider more than one thing to be worthy and there may be more

than one way of attaining any particular end, so a fourth mental concept is added: 'choice'.⁴¹

The notion of mental states, therefore, supports the contention that the methodology of the social sciences is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences, and necessarily so, because the explanation of social phenomena requires an analysis of what individual persons do, not in terms of their physiological processes or their passive responses to changes in ambient conditions. To analyse what individuals do means to examine them as active agents with the rational capacity to choose the means of achieving their objectives.

The data here become even more polymorphic when the persons whom researchers are investigating make their personal choices according to the parameters of divine truth and goodness, which means that their spiritual activity intersects with the supernatural order and hence may extend their horizon of freedom in choice-making. It goes without saying, that this group consciously exposes itself to the ground of all sciences, both natural and social, as a datum with an invariant character.

Gordon reminds us that some philosophers of science accept references to mental states in scientific explanations; others regard such references as dubious; while still others firmly reject them.⁴² The central point at issue is whether social phenomena may be explained by construing motives and beliefs as their causes. The early positivists attempted to reject the concept of causality from the domain of scientific inquiry. They were unsuccessful, but the restoration of causality leaves open the issue of what sorts of things may properly be accorded causal status in a scientific explanation. Resolution of this question would seem to rest upon the solution of a prior problem: the nature of causality. Especially problematic in the social sciences was the fact that positive and negative correlations between two variables did not necessarily indicate that one was the cause of the other; indeed a third variable, unknown to the researcher, could have been the cause of the correlations at issue. This is still the state of the question today.

⁴¹ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, 645.

⁴² Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, 645.

Philosophers have come to no agreement about this as a general issue in epistemology, so firm statements that motives and beliefs may be construed as causes, or that they may not, would seem to be at least premature. But we may have to wait a long time for philosophers to reach a satisfactory definition of the nature of causality. Meanwhile, science proceeds. The physical sciences have no warrant for referring to motives, beliefs, and states of feeling because such things do not operate within the phenomenal domain of their concern.

Some philosophers circumvent the impasse with a new approach to the philosophy of science: cognitive instrumentalism, which permits the use of mental entities. If one is prepared to adopt cognitive instrumentalism as an epistemological theory, the question can be reformulated: does reference to mental states enable one to render an observed phenomenon more intelligible than it would be without it?

7. Cognitive Instrumentalism

In the philosophy of science, cognitive instrumentalism is the position that theories are not to be considered as either true or false but as instruments of explanation that allow observations of the world to be meaningfully ordered. Cognitive instrumentalism holds that we have two basic tools at our command in investigating the world: logic, and factual data.⁴³ A theory concerning a real-world phenomenon is particularized logic. It regards logic and factual data as instruments that may be used to arrive at beliefs that are, according to the circumstances, rational to hold.

According to Gordon, “one of the legacies of positivism that has been especially difficult to shake off is that we have knowledge of the world when we have constructed a literal picture-model of it. This position has been particularly resolute because physics, the archetypical science, seems to construct such models. Upon reflection however, this is clearly not the case.”⁴⁴ Thus, “even Bohr’s model of the atom, or the Newtonian model of the planetary system, depicts only certain aspects of the phenomenon it

⁴³ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p. 624.

⁴⁴ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p 625

addresses; and modern particle physics can hardly be described in terms of picture-models at all."⁴⁵

When we say that Bohr's model enables one to 'see' how the atom is structured, or to 'grasp' its structure, we are speaking metaphorically. What we mean is that the model renders this aspect of the real world rationally intelligible. Science is here considered as an activity that uses logic and factual data to understand the way of the world in rational terms. The understanding so obtained is 'public knowledge' because it can be communicated to others with minimal ambiguity, and shared by an indefinite number of people without any depreciation of cognitive value.⁴⁶

'Cognitive instrumentalism' as an epistemological theory views the logical constructs called 'theories' and the sense data called 'facts' as instruments that are used in the process of cognition. We cannot obtain immediate and irrefragable knowledge of the way of the world, but we can make it intelligible by the use of such tools. As one philosopher puts it:

The concepts of science are the working tools of scientific thought. They are the ways in which the scientist has learned to understand complex phenomena, to realize their relations to each other, and to represent these in communicable form. Among the most wonderful of those things we consider inventions of science are the concepts of science. They are, in effect, the sophisticated instrumentation, the high technology of scientific thought and discourse.⁴⁷

According to cognitive instrumentalism, theories and empirical data function as complementary phases of the cognitive process involved in investigation, and the only rules that must be followed are that theories should be coherent, logically sound, and thoroughly interfaced with observation data that are objectively obtained and properly processed. Except for those who reject empiricism, these are the rules that are, in fact, accepted as binding by social as well as natural scientists. Epistemological unity does

⁴⁵ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p. 625.

⁴⁶ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, p. 625.

⁴⁷ Marx W. Wartofsky, *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York: The Macmillan Company and London: Collier-Macmillan Limited 1968), 4f.

not mean homogeneity of substantive content, or homology of research procedures in all domains of scientific investigation. In understanding a scientific discipline it is necessary to comprehend not only what it shares with other disciplines but also the points of dissimilarity. In order to sustain the unity of science thesis, one must show that the same basic principles of epistemology apply to the investigation of very different kinds of phenomena.

Cognitive instrumentalism, however, is rejected as a philosophy of science by some thinkers under the guise that it cannot supply a clearly defined criterion between science and non-science. Nevertheless in certain respects it can do better than other philosophies. From the instrumentalist standpoint, concepts referring to human mental entities such as motives, preferences, and beliefs are not inherently non-scientific. That they are properties of consciousness rather than material objects does not mean that they lack explanatory capacity.⁴⁸ On the contrary, in dealing with social phenomena, which result from the behaviour of individual persons, they can be, and have been, effectively employed by the social sciences. There is no warrant for believing that the social sciences could necessarily be improved by adopting specific models and concepts that have been successful in the natural sciences.

Most important is to acknowledge that it is not true – as some scientists may claim – that the only ontological reality is the empirical. Similarly the creation of a scientific revolution of a metaphysical outlook that rejects preternatural forces is misleading. If we turn to phenomenology we learn that what we know for certain consists of our internal mental impressions and the data that gave rise to those impressions, whether they be data of the senses or data of consciousness.

Phenomenology is as radical in its subjective view of knowledge as Vienna Circle positivism was in its objectivism.⁴⁹ Phenomenology reflects a long tradition in philosophy that emphasizes the power of intuition. A combination of phenomenology and cognitional instrumentalism renders reference

⁴⁸ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, 633.

⁴⁹ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*, 612.

to introspectively known mental states serviceable in rendering social phenomena intelligible. It becomes problematic if one rejects the notion that there are non-material transcendental entities of the sort that idealist philosophers and theologians talk about. The epistemological theory of cognitive instrumentalism permits the adherence to mental entities.

Social scientists who accept the causal status of motives, states of feeling, beliefs, and the choices made within the freely accepted norms/ parameters of divine truth and goodness may be inclined to treat explanations in terms of this choice-making process as complete.⁵⁰

The contention that complete explanations are required is implicit in the argument of some philosophers and social scientists that, while motives, states of feeling, beliefs and choices freely made according to the parameters of truth and goodness may demonstrate an explanatory heuristic, they are hypothetically only links in a causal chain, being themselves the effects of other causes, which must be elucidated.

But why stop there? Scientific investigation is not truly grounded on bottom until, hypothetically, it has reached quantum mechanics or the Big Bang. For a philosopher or a scientist to think that his or her own thoughts carry the explanatory power that covers all the orders of nature, freedom, the preternatural, the supernatural and what lies before the human mind as irresolvable mystery is to greatly overestimate one's own place within the world of being.

8. Phenomenology of Evil-Eye Based on Extrasensory Perception

While the evil-eye has been viewed by many people as a pure superstition and a phenomenon that has no rational claim, they fail to recognize or understand how various aspects of the spiritual dimension can have a direct effect on us. Extrasensory perception (ESP) attempts to fill the gap in its theoretical explanation of evil-eye. It is the only one that embraces the notion of a transcendental entity that manifests visible symptoms that are empirically

unexplainable. It employs what has been termed as a sixth sense. Clairvoyance, premonition, intuition are terms that find points of correspondence with the sixth sense or subtle perception ability. Sixth sense, or subtle perception ability, is considered as an ability to perceive the subtle-dimension or the unseen world of angels, ghosts, Heaven, and so forth.⁵¹ It also includes our ability to understand the subtle cause and effect relationships behind many events, which are not easily accessible to the understanding of the intellect. When the sixth sense is developed or activated, it helps us to experience the subtle-world or subtle-dimension.

This experience of the subtle-world is also known as a ‘spiritual experience’. The word ‘subtle world’ or ‘spiritual dimension’ can be defined as the world which is beyond the understanding of the five senses, mind and intellect. The subtle world refers to the unseen world of angels, ghosts, heaven, and so forth, which can only be perceived through our sixth sense.⁵² The sixth sense, then, is preternatural. The sixth sense, however, does not admit of entrance into states of mystical love, friendship with God, and holiness of life unless God himself were to admit the person into these states. In fact these states transcend every capacity of the human person including the sixth sense. The sixth sense, therefore, is to be distinguished from the supernatural order,

Extrasensory perception explains evil-eye as a process of being afflicted by some negative forces vibrating from one person to another. Desire-oriented waves are generated in a person about another individual. They are transmitted to that individual and an evil eye is cast on them. This is demonstrated by the drawing [below] based on subtle-knowledge that shows how the flow of negative energy is transmitted onto the other person and attacks the gross body, vital body, mental body, and causal body. This creates a subtle distress bubble around the individual and consequently the individual experiences distress.

The triggers of affliction by the evil eye can be desirous thoughts, envious thoughts, black magic or negative energies.

⁵¹ “Evil-eye meaning” in *Spiritual Science Research Foundation* Retrieved from <https://www.spiritualresearchfoundation.org/spiritual-problems/evil-eye/evil-eye-meaning/>.

⁵² “Evil-eye meaning” in *Spiritual Science Research Foundation*.

Desirous thoughts exert the mildest effect of the evil eye as they depend on the will power of the person casting the evil eye. Black magic is considered to provoke a more intense effect of the evil eye since it depends on the spiritual strength of the person practicing the black magic. The most intense effect of the evil eye comes from negative energies, which depend on the spiritual strength of the negative entity.⁵³

In today's competitive, materialistic and sex-crazed world, many people seem to have personality defects and vices such as jealousy, hatred, hunger for publicity, and addictions of one sort or another. The vibrations generated from these vices have a spiritually distressing effect on us. This is what is termed as suffering affliction from the evil-eye.

Distress experienced because one is affected or possessed by negative energies is also a type of affliction by the evil-eye. Various impressions in the mind, like greed, jealousy, lust and so forth are predominant, and this means many people have strong attachments to worldly things. All of these thoughts are associated with desire-oriented responses. These impressions and desires are dominant in today's society; and this means the component from the first force affects in one way or another every person who does not direct supernatural energies received from God towards the horizon of freedom that allows soaring escapes from any insidious activity of the evil eye. Because the incidence of those who choose to live according to the parameters of divine truth and goodness, i.e., according to the divinely instituted supernatural order, is low today, the activity of negative energies is high. The incidence of evil-eye in today's times, therefore is formidably increasing.⁵⁴

9. Conclusion

The Abagusii emic perspective on the evil-eye is one demonstration of the reality of the phenomenon of evil-eye. Evil-eye is neither an Abagusii emic superstition nor an etic concept invented by anthropologists but rather an image of great historical depth, wide, diffusion, and a quality of persistence. Those who

⁵³ "Evil-eye meaning" in *Spiritual Science Research Foundation*.

⁵⁴ "Evil-eye meaning" in *Spiritual Science Research Foundation*.

view the evil-eye as a pure superstition and a phenomenon that has no rational claim fail to recognize or understand how various aspects of the spiritual dimension in the preternatural order can have a direct effect on us. If the physical sciences fail to see a rational claim in the phenomenon of evil-eye it is because they have no warrant for referring to motives, states of feeling, and beliefs, since such things do not operate within the phenomenal domain of their concern.

There is no warrant for believing that the social sciences could necessarily be improved by adopting specific models and concepts that have been successful in the natural sciences. If the social sciences attempt to succeed in giving us a rational account of the evil-eye they have to embrace the notion that there are non-material transcendental entities of the sort that idealist philosophers and theologians talk about. This is what has been employed by the extrasensory perception theory of the evil-eye. A modern reader who bends towards the empirical sciences alone will need an intellectual conversion to accommodate the spiritual entity. Those who tend to accept extrasensory perception theories, in their turn, will need a divinely initiated conversion to enter into the supernatural order that, by the power of grace, carries the thoughtful human being towards the horizon of eternal freedom.

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Assessing the Effect of Parenting Style on the Psychological Well-Being of Young Adults

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Abstract

This study relied on data from university students to assess the influence of parenting style on the psychological well-being of young adults. Keeping in mind that the respondents were always presenting their replies according to their personal perceptions – which perhaps could have reduced the objectivity of the data – the researchers proceeded to formulate specific objectives as follows: (a) to identify the most common parenting style; (b) to identify which parenting style is more effective for raising young adults in a manner that helps them grow in confidence and in a positive attitude about their life and surroundings; (c) to identify which parenting style is associated with young adults who have negative attitudes towards themselves and towards life.

In order to accomplish these objectives, a questionnaire was provided to 46 participants who were social psychology students in the Psychology and Counselling Bachelor of Science degree program at Jordan University College. The questionnaire had two segments, both of which have been meta-culturally standardized, a Parenting Style scale and a Psychological Well-Being inventory. The students were chosen on account of their ability to recognize the theoretical constructs upon which the questionnaire was based.

The Parenting Style scale focused on identifying the style that corresponded to the participant's perception about how he or she was raised; the Psychological Well-Being inventory concentrated on identifying the status of the person's psychological well-being according to his or her self-perceptions.

Those who have published research on parenting have observed that the Parenting Style scale harmonizes very well with the phenomenology of parenting styles that Diana Baumrind of northern California has proposed. The PWB inventory relies on six factors that Carol Ryff and other researchers have abstracted on the basis of intensive experimental research pertaining to the phenomenon of psychological well-being.

In order to clarify the values associated both with efficacious parenting and psychological well-being in the African context, the researchers relied on two people: (1) an expert in the African notion of *ubuntu*, Nobel Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and (2) a well-acknowledged investigator in the area of the phenomenology of human development, Edith Stein, who was also prominent in the 20th century as the greatest expositor of empathy who ever lived. (She was executed by a European fascist regime.) Pertinent remarks by an expert in forgiveness and restorative justice completed the survey of the literature that is particularly helpful for understanding the relationship between parenting style and psychological well-being.

In the present study, the respondents reported that the one style to which no one submitted their children was that of neglectful parenting. Once mothers, fathers, grandparents and other caregivers eliminate neglectful parenting from the repertoire of possible parenting patterns, the respondents indicated their self-opinion that they were enjoying a good level of psychological well-being. Since no caregiver had adhered to the neglectful style, this positive assessment of their own well-being seemed to be the case regardless of the form of parenting that they experienced in their childhood and adolescent upbringing.

1. Introduction

It's not easy for people to see how their attitudes and behaviour as parents have affected them or their children. As the body of

research grows about parenting patterns, links between what is called parenting and what happens in the day-to-day life of human relationships become evident. One noteworthy connection, for example, that becomes an application for our study is that between the parent-child relationship and the psychologist-client relationship. The same can be said, of course, for teacher-student interactions, doctor-patient relationships, employer-employee interpersonal dynamics, the ambience occasioned by what happens between religious authorities and the believers who depend on them and perhaps most fundamentally the relationship between God-Allah and those who either submit or do not submit to his all-powerful, all-merciful Will.¹

Our research was quite modest in scope: we were not involving ourselves with large samples that from a certain perspective may have given us valuable data for a solid statistical analysis. Our intention, on the other hand, was to show how our type of research can stimulate more creative thinking about those human relationships where one person is at the service of another, whether it is the parent at the service of a child, a teacher at the service of a student, a doctor at the service of a patient, a psychologist at the service of a client and so forth. A fulcrum for our research is that God himself has rendered a very precious service to the human person by bringing her or him into existence and then giving what is necessary not only for survival but to live with moral, intellectual and spiritual integrity with a view to eternal bliss in heaven. This is the maximal form of psychological well-being. God's principal attribute as a parent is his all-merciful, all-sustaining, eternal love.

This study's more specific purpose is an intention to expand awareness about how parenting affects the psychological well-being of young adults who have grown to maturity in households where the patterns of choice – even if they are simply an adherence to the family's traditions of parenting – are identifiable and accessible for analysis according to the norms for development in psychological well-being during the years of childhood and adolescence.

¹ During the course of this research, God and Allah shall be used interchangeably since Allah is the Arabic word for God.

We shall follow a typical social scientific research procedure in the course of our essay. Because of the fragile sample size, we shall consider our research to be a pilot study with the intention of growing in insight into the inter-relational patterns that are most constructive for human growth, in a wide range of interpersonal interactions. Although we do not list it as a concrete focus of our objectives, our review of the literature leads us to the possibility that parents may be best equipped to raise children when they can move with facility between several parenting paradigms depending on the circumstances within which the family finds itself.

We shall present a literature review that not only offers a panorama of the major types of parenting, but also clarifies phenomenological issues about what constitutes psychological well-being.

Next we shall give a brief overview of the methodology that we adopted in our research. Then we shall present important results that distinguish parenting practices that respondents perceived to be effective from those perceived not to be effective. We shall examine the possibility that parenting styles are related to psychological well-being (PWB). We shall draw conclusions and suggest ramifications of the conclusions for various types of person-to-person relationships, and offer recommendations for further research.

1.1 Background of the study

Here in East Africa our contemporary family life is quite different from that of our parents' generation since during their lifetime they lived in an extended family. This was their normal way of living, and all elders in a family were responsible for nurturing and guiding the young ones in a family. In a manner of speaking, all society was responsible for the discipline and nurturing of the young ones even if they were not family members. Parenting was considered as a duty of the society-at-large, not only that of parents, so that children were able to experience exposure to a great diversity of people.

But in our contemporary family life the nuclear family style has been adopted more and more as the milieu for raising children because of day-to-day expenditures and especially more intensive

involvement in education. Hence parents are the ones who are in charge of everything in the family since they are older and more experienced both in the family and in the society.

In the nuclear family milieu, what others are doing outside the family is not regarded as part of the gestalt for an individual's network of relationships during the years of growing up. This is probably the consequence of lifestyle changes in our society. One major change of lifestyle that can inflict suffering and tribulation on a nuclear family is occasioned by the assignment of a parent to work in a distant town or city. In this kind of circumstance, the nuclear family typically moves away from the extended family so that the nuclear family may be near the place of work. In this type of situation what happens within the family does not become exposed to the public forum of the extended family; it stays private within the family unless the family asks for help from relatives, friends and neighbours from their home place. It is not difficult to notice, therefore, that every family has a different manner of choosing how to parent their children.

The family is the main agent for preparing children for their future physically, socially, intellectually, morally and psychologically. Parents raise their children based on their economic resources, socio-political forces in their environment, their moral and religious convictions, their culture and the way they envision their parenting responsibilities. Similarly, children learn about ways of thinking, feeling, making choices and behaving according to their reactive/ proactive responses to environments. Children have unique ways of responding and acting according to their own individual formation of cognitive process, interior emotional fabric, moral convictions, and decision-making capacity that are all in interaction with their environments and all subject to the norms of truth and goodness that constitute the conscience (Gelan, 2016).

Parenting is a socialization process through which parents transfer their values, beliefs, traditions, norms, and behaviours to their children, adolescents, and young adults to be worthy human persons in the presence of God, good citizens of the society and trustworthy candidates for adult competence (Elias, 2014). The socialization process may proceed both consciously and

subconsciously. There is obvious evidence that parents may influence adolescents via their style of parenting. We have already hinted in the introduction to this article that parents are not alone as agents of influence on adolescents; anyone who acts as a significant long-term agent of formation may also exercise influence – and may do so in ways that are able to be categorized according to parenting paradigms. This is the case for teachers, medical doctors, employers, religious authorities, and other persons in service to the adolescents.

Diana Baumrind is well known for her theory about parenting and its influence on children's development (Baumrind, 1967; Darling, 1999). In 1967, Baumrind deciphered three styles, the *authoritarian*, the *authoritative*, and the *permissive*. Later Maccoby & Martin (1983) integrated their theorizing with that of Baumrind and subdivided the permissive style into the *neglectful* and the *indulgent*.

Most authors in the field analyse four of the styles: they accept the indulgent style to be an extreme of the permissive style. At a later point in this research report, we shall explain in detail the significance of each style for our operational variables in the present research. A short description of each style shall suffice for now.

Counselling students who had learned a variety of counselling techniques have learned that the authoritative approach to parenting corresponds to the authoritative, directive approach that counsellors adopt in order to help clients who are prone to wander in their decision-making. We are referring to those clients who may be prone to make choices according to their whims, caprices, and self-focused desires instead of intelligent and morally sound principles. These are clients who seem to give a priority to avoiding suffering at the expense of a moral and spiritual backbone that can actually bring clients enjoyment of enduring psychological health. To such clients a moral and spiritual backbone may not be available to them if they have been over-exposed to the non-directive, permissive approach, whether in counselling or in their day-to-day family life.

In order to place the permissive approach in perspective with other parenting approaches, Baumrind together with Maccoby &

Martin established two interpersonal axes in parenting that help to define each style: (1) acceptance/ responsiveness and (2) behavioural control/ demandingness.

Baumrind describes parental responsiveness as the level of parents' emotional and cognitive response to their children's needs, which sometimes consist of support, warmth, and parental acceptance, and sometimes consist of food, water, sleep, help with study, help in understanding what is right and what is wrong (Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Darling, 1999; Baumrind, 2013). Parental demandingness is the parents' expectation of more mature and responsible behaviour from their children, sometimes seen as control of the child (Darling, 1999). According to Maccoby & Martin (1983), the dimension of demandingness refers to parental control or parental power assertion.

Parental guidance or discipline is an essential component of parenting. When parents discipline their children in an authoritative manner, they are not simply punishing the children's bad behavior but aiming to support and nurture them for self-control, self-direction, and their ability to care for others.

Baumrind's early research laid the groundwork for a useful subdivision of parenting styles according to four dimensions of parenting: authoritative, authoritarian, permissive and neglectful. She arranged all four parenting styles along the two axes to which we have just made reference: level of parental demanding behaviour and level of children's responsiveness behaviour (Baumrind, 1967).

Demandingness denotes the expectation of parents for mature behaviour from their children by setting and consistently enforcing reasonable rules and standards for their conduct. Responsiveness refers to the ability to draw forth from the child his or her own participation in the interactions with parents and involves a climate of parental warmth and demonstration of physical affection towards the child that helps the child to be forthcoming.

Authoritarian parents attempt to shape, control and evaluate the behaviour and attitudes of children based on a dogmatic communication of an absolute set of standards that exacts respect for authority and obedience. Authoritarian parents are more likely to use harsher forms of punishment and are less responsive to the

children. Consequently children may be more guarded in their speech patterns and behaviour styles.

Authoritative parents encourage a verbal interchange. They explain the reasons behind demands and discipline, and expect the child to be independent and self-directing. Thus authoritative parents are both demanding and responsive.

Permissive parents are more likely to give way to the child's impulses, desires and actions. Permissive parents are less demanding and more responsive and could be indulgent while disengaged parents are neither demanding nor responsive and could be termed as neglectful parents (Baumrind, 1991).

The intention of the present research was to connect parenting style to psychological well-being. Psychological well-being connotes lives that are well-integrated. Even if the person is of poor physical health, there is interior peace in the psyche when a person is morally and spiritually integrated, i.e., thinks, decides, speaks and acts according to the directives of a well-formed conscience. It is the combination of feeling right with one's habitual manner of deciding and acting and functioning efficaciously and creatively according to the parameters of truth and love. Sustainable well-being does not require individuals to feel good all the time: the experience of painful emotions, for example, disappointment, failure, grief, and feelings of isolation and abandonment are normal responses to the absence of truth and goodness. The ability to manage these negative or painful emotions is essential for long-term well-being. Psychological well-being is, however, compromised when negative emotions are extreme or very long lasting and interfere with a person's ability to grasp the parameters of truth and goodness and act accordingly.

The development of psychological well-being is associated with social factors and brain development. Unlike the other major organs of the body our brain undergoes most of its development after birth. God has designed it to respond to the environmental conditions within which a child happens to grow. There appears to be a sensitive period in brain development up to around age two but major changes and reorganisation continue to occur until adolescence. Moreover the development of our frontal lobes,

which are responsible for such high level processes as planning and emotional control, continues until early adulthood.

Later emotional well-being and cognitive capability are profoundly influenced by the social environment. Of particular importance is the closeness of the bond between mother and infant. Study of human development has shown that the role of the father as well as that of the mother are important in the development of well-being. Having an absent, abusive or authoritarian father is associated with increased risk of mental health problems in adulthood.

Any tendency for a spouse to reduce his partner to a sexual object for gratification, either unilateral or bilateral, by the use of contraceptives and other pleasure-enhancing devices can have an unwanted effect on children since sooner or later they can tend to think that they were an unwelcome side-effect of their parents' relationship with each other and not wholeheartedly embraced as gifts for the family.

Having a mother who may always be on the scene but nevertheless acts abusively or with the proclivity to be authoritarian may also be injurious to a person's mental health.

Jorm, Dear, Rodgers, and Christensen (2003) found that mental health outcomes were poor when the father showed a high level of affection but the mother showed a low level.

It is not difficult for psychologists to detect the parallels between the parenting styles of mothers and fathers towards their children and the communication styles of teachers, music directors, religious leaders, police officers, medical doctors and counsellors when they exercise their authority in accord with their own profession towards those who need their services.

Of special interest to psychologists who focus on parenting patterns and psychological well-being is the parallel between parenting styles and the styles of counsellors who are often invited to offer guidance and therapeutic insight to clients who need their help. A cluster of events initiated by Carl Rogers and William Coulson in southern California of the United States, for example, gave Diana Baumrind the evidence she needed to make a comparison between the authoritative and permissive styles of parenting.

The permissive style of parenting corresponds to the kind of counselling that has been labelled non-directive. In order to assess the value of the non-directive approach, researchers find it helpful to follow the example of Diana Baumrind who was conducting her psychological practice in the same state of California where Rogers and Coulson directed sensitivity sessions among the Immaculate Heart of Mary Sisters in the Los Angeles area – sessions that, ethically speaking, proved to be quite inadequate for female personal development. This will become clear in the Literature Review.

Baumrind saw the non-directive approach in action and reached a conclusion that is quite transparent to any professional observer: non-directive counselling parallels the parenting style that has come to be known as permissive. At the time of Baumrind such a style was called “spoiling” the child because there is a lot of catering to what the child wants without authoritative parental assistance to the child who may need to control his or her impulses, appetites, or out-of-focus desires. With the permissive, non-directive approach the child was not able to enjoy personal autonomy, a stable sense of a purpose in life, and a continuing sense of personal growth. Consequently, the child suffered a lack of self-acceptance, a fragile sense of mastery of the environment, and a dearth of the confidence needed to ground the belief that positive interpersonal relationships can endure.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Evidence suggests that the family environment constitutes the basic ecology where children learn their behavioural patterns, receive encouragement for their behaviours, and manifest them without undue anxiety or fear. Nevertheless there are family environments that may discourage or stifle the children’s growth in healthy behavioural patterns so that the child may even repress their experiences of behavioural learning because of the intolerable pain that these experiences involve.

As researchers we hold the conviction that the parents’ role in the family environment is primarily to prepare children for adulthood through a system of rules and discipline that correspond meaningfully to the parameters of truth and love. These parameters

become concrete for the children through the way the parents conduct themselves with each other – if parents unite with each other in an affection and tenderness that mirror their inner spiritual states, and express the truth of their love in a responsible togetherness in the raising of their children, the children become more stable in their ability to make healthy decisions. Rules and disciplinary measures seem best communicated in an atmosphere where parents and caregivers focus on children as persons of a dignity given by God and as persons called to be perpetual inhabitants of a peaceful milieu.

The influence of parenting during adolescence continues to affect behaviour and thinking patterns into adulthood (Hoskins, 2014). Being raised by parents who are not aware of the personal dignity, basic needs and emotional requirements of their children will result in a kind of adult that contrasts with the type of adult that develops in an atmosphere of parental awareness of their physical, emotional, mental, moral and spiritual needs. If parents are not aware of what constitutes a good parenting style, their children may become plagued with negative psychological well-being as adults.

According to Carol Ryff (1989) psychological well-being is the consequence of an active engagement with a number of existential challenges, and is composed of six areas of positive functioning: autonomy, positive relationships with others, a meaningful purpose in life, personal growth, environmental mastery, and self-acceptance. Thriving in life depends on the degree to which one functions efficaciously in these six areas. These six dimensions can be a good starting point for self-actualization.

The present study aims at investigating how parenting styles can affect the future life of children. The study recommends the most appropriate parenting style for giving the child both a positive self-concept and a positive self-image. For those young adults who are already affected, this study will be a useful tool for them to identify the possible origin of their current psychological crisis or distress and the behaviour problems that they may be facing in a recurrent fashion.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General objectives

The main objective is to examine the impact of parenting style on the psychological well-being of young adults.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

- A. To identify the predominant parenting style among the research participants;
- B. To identify which parenting style is more effective for raising young adults so that they may be confident and have positive attitudes about their life and surroundings;
- C. To identify which parenting style is associated with young adults who have negative attitudes towards themselves and life.

1.4 Research questions

- I. Is there any relationship between the influence of a parenting style and the psychological well-being of the young adult?
- II. Can the psychological well-being of a young adult be exclusively the result of parenting?
- III. What type of parenting style can bring forth a young adult with a high degree of psychological well-being?

1.5 Significance of the study

This research intends to bring to awareness how parenting has the power to change the direction of someone's life. A child has the ability to understand things even at a very early age; and his or her memory stores information and experiences, whether bad or good, and hence develops a memory bank that can come alive in the future. Parenting helps develop the conscience according to the parameters of truth and goodness. A positive sense of well-being corresponds to self-confidence in one's ability to integrate into the activity of cognitive processes events that happen in the external environment and the somatic, emotional and motivational impulses that carry their own impact in the internal workings of the psyche.


Parenting is very important so that parents can build families with well-integrated children, i.e., children who are self-

determining, self-reliant and capable of making choices and engaging in actions that are free, creative and efficacious according to the parameters of truth and love. That is not all: by their choice of a parenting style, the parents grow in their own self-determination and self-reliance because the style they have adopted introduces behaviours, mannerisms, communication habits, and new constellations of feeling that can redirect their own personality formation no matter how mature they are as adults.

The aim for the parents and for the children is not to live empty lives but to know how to integrate impulses, emotions, events in the external environment and events in the interior of the self so that they can perpetually choose and act according to a vision of the horizon that enfolds them within the possibilities of what is both true and good. Hence they can perceive that they have a destiny to fulfil and live with the confidence that they are blessed.

This research can prove to be of assistance to parents, educators and counsellors who may use the information available in the literature review, in the result analysis and in the discussion to make additions to their own personal manuals on the topic of parenting.

Figure 1 Conceptual framework adopted from Carol Ryff's model of psychological well-being



1.6 Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework can be a research tool intended to assist a researcher to develop an awareness and understanding of the topic under study and to assist the reader by reporting in a succinct manner what the researcher intends to do by means of the study.

Carol Ryff (1989) proposed a model of well-being with six components: self-acceptance, purpose in life, personal growth, positive relationships with others, environmental mastery, and autonomy. These seem to be the factors in the model that develop – or fail to develop – according to the particular parenting style that parents and caregivers have chosen for their own parenting attitudes and behaviours.

Explanation of the Framework

Self-acceptance: to possess a positive attitude towards the self. In other words, the person acknowledges and accepts multiple aspects of the self, including good and bad qualities. The person feels positive about one's past life.

Positive relationships with others: to have affectionate, satisfying, trusting relationships with the people in one's social environment. The person is concerned about the welfare of others, shows a manifest capability to empathize, to express warmth and intimacy, and to understand the give and take of human relationships. The ability to forgive is paramount.

Autonomy: to be self-determining and self-dependent (i.e., self-reliant), able to resist social pressure, able to think and act in certain ways without undue influence from other people. This person regulates behaviour from within and evaluates the self by personal standards.

Environmental mastery: to have a sense of mastery and competence in all situations with an ability to manage the environment; to be able to control any complex array of external activities. This person makes effective use of opportunities that are available to him/her in his or her particular milieu. He or she is able to choose or create contexts suitable to personal needs and values.

Purpose in Life: to have goals in life and a sense of directedness. This person feels that there is meaning to one's present and past life. He or she holds beliefs that give life purpose and has decided upon aims and objectives for living.

Personal growth: to have a sense of continuing development, to see self as growing and expanding, to be open to new experiences, to have a sense of realizing one's own potential, to see improvement in one's self and behaviour over time, to be capable of changing in ways that reflect more self-knowledge and effectiveness.

1.7 Definition of key terms

Parenting: this is a socialization process by means of which parents transfer their cultural values, beliefs, traditions, and norms as well as other socially and culturally desirable behaviours to their children, adolescents, and young adults so that they may be good citizens of society, act according to their conscience with a full consideration of God's will and plan for their lives, and act diligently in their quest for adult competence (cf. Gelan, 2016).

Parenting style: this represents the standard strategy that a parent uses in child rearing.

Authoritative Parenting Style: this term refers to the style of parents who are responsive, supporting, and attentive to their children in their physical, moral, psychosocial and spiritual development. Responsiveness and demandingness are two elements that describe authoritative parenting. This involves high levels of nurturance, involvement, sensitivity, reasoning and encouragement of autonomy.

Authoritarian Parenting Style: this term describes the style of a parent who is unresponsive to the children's needs and generally does not nurture. Such a parent usually justifies his or her unkind treatment as tough love and shows low support but at the same time high control over the children, and requests them to follow specific rules.

Permissive Parenting Style: this term describes the style of parents who exhibit behaviours with their children that are highly supportive and show a high degree of sympathy for their children. Nevertheless they do not exert much effort to guide their children

according to forthright moral directives. Hence their style can often lapse into the indulgent parenting style.

Indulgent Parenting Style: When the parents' sympathetic support for their children reaches the extreme of submitting to all the children's expressed wishes regardless of the prudence necessary to help the children make upright choices the parenting style is called *Indulgent*. This style is more or less confined exclusively to the personal likes and dislikes of the children.

Neglectful Parenting Style: This style is another extreme of the permissive parenting style. Neglectful parents leave the child to his or her own devices in a manner that the child may experience as abandonment. Parents who practice this style show behavioural patterns that are low in monitoring and low in supporting their children. They lack involvement in making demands on their children and are not attentive to the children's needs. Low responsiveness and low demandingness are two elements that characterize neglectful parenting (Baumrind, 1991).

Self-actualization is the ability to become the best version of oneself. This tendency might be described as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything one is capable of becoming.

Young adulthood is a stage between adolescence and adulthood which is estimated to be between 18-29 years of age according to the World Health Organization.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Child development

Children are already learning at birth, and they develop and learn at a rapid pace in their early years. This provides a critical foundation for lifelong progress; and the adults who provide for the care and education of children from birth through age eight bear a great responsibility for their health, development, and learning.

Research during the past decade has revealed much about how children learn and develop. Studies have shown that early childhood is a time when developmental changes are happening that can have profound and lasting consequences for a child's future. While people have long debated whether "nature" or

"nurture" plays the stronger role in child development, recent studies reveal the importance of how the two influence each other as a child develops: what a child experiences and is exposed to interacts with his or her underlying psychosomatic makeup

Together with the research in developmental biology and neuroscience, research in developmental, cognitive, and educational psychology has contributed to a greater understanding of the developing child. The picture that has emerged is remarkably complex and reveals that many aspects of development and learning are interrelated. For example, a child relies on developing an ability to regulate emotions and attention in order to concentrate and stay engaged long enough to learn new ideas and skills.

Similarly, while certain skills and concepts are distinct to particular subject areas, learning in these subject areas also relates to general cognitive skills such as reasoning, attention, memory, and the ability to integrate cognitive skills into conscientious decision-making.

Learning is influenced by a child's developing relationships with adults and peers. The notion of *Ubuntu* becomes a key that unlocks the door to both the social and the religious development of even the youngest children. One person who excels in the explanation of *Ubuntu* is Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999, pp. 31-32):

Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, "*Yu, u nobuntu*"; "Hey, so-and-so has *ubuntu*." Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, "My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours." We belong in a bundle of life. We say, "A person is a person through other persons." It is not, "I think therefore I am." It says rather, "I am human because I belong, I participate, I share." A person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.

Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us *the summum bonum* – the greatest good. Anything that subverts, that undermines this sought-after good, is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good. To forgive is not just to be altruistic. It is the best form of self-interest. What dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me. It gives people resilience, enabling them to survive and emerge still human despite all efforts to dehumanize them.

A child finds her irreplaceable, unrepeatable, indispensable, irreducible and unique identity in the thoughtful attention to her needs that others give her. She loves others just as thoughtfully.

Instrumental to childhood learning and hence to parental teaching is the process by which the child develops the conscience. Depending on the parents' propensity for prayer and for teaching religious matters to their children, children can learn at a very early stage who God is, the companionship he offers by way of the conscience, and the nature of God's revelation about good behaviour and the positive self-concept that develops from it.

The world's major religions usually communicate to their believers the nature of God's mercy so that parents may teach their children when the children are very young that God will never love them less no matter how they may make mistakes and commit offenses against God and other people. God's ability to forgive has no limit. When the children learn the ethic of forgiveness even in their earliest years from parents who know how to express their forgiveness to their children when the children misbehave and know how to teach their children how to forgive those who may hurt them, perhaps even severely, the children grow more confident in God's love and forgiveness. Fear does not govern them in the challenges of childhood.

2.2 Religious norms for cultivating forgiveness

Parenting styles that favour forgiveness favour the child's possibilities for psychological well-being. Children learn quickly that there is no forgiveness without a relationship with the God who forgives and favours a child's psychological well-being. Without

a forgiving God within the pattern of a child's day-to-day life, the propensity for psychological well-being diminishes.

Children can learn from their parents even in their earliest years why people forgive and how they forgive. Desmond Tutu, operating by means of the *Ubuntu* ethic, presented the following norms to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1999):

1. Truth is not relative: there is one supreme Truth that governs us all. Conscience is intended to perceive the truth, not fabricate it. All of us, therefore, inhabit a moral universe that receives its unambiguous definition from the one, true God: what is good and what is evil are objectively determinable; and judgment can be passed on whether individuals or groups have acted according to these determinations.

2. No matter how depraved the monstrous acts committed by the human beings who appear before the [Truth and Reconciliation] commission, the perpetrators continue to be moral agents and children of God; consequently, they remain capable of repentance and moral transformation.

3. The commission places even the most conspicuously guilty person within the Good Shepherd's supreme desire to find the lost sheep and restore it to its proper dignity.

4. Because God has loved each human person from all eternity, there is nothing we can do to make God love us more; but wonderfully there is nothing we can do to make God love us less.

5. We contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment. In the spirit of *Ubuntu*, the central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offense...

6. Once amnesty is granted – and this has to happen immediately when all the conditions laid down in the act have been met – then the criminal and civil liability of the erstwhile perpetrator, and of the state in the case of its servants, are expunged. The effect of amnesty is as if the offense had never

happened since the perpetrator's court record relating to that offense becomes a *tabula rasa*, a blank page.

... God does not give up on anyone, for God loved us from all eternity, God loves us now and God will always love us, whether we are good and bad, forever and ever. His love will not let us go, for God's love for us, all of us, is unchanging, is unchangeable. Someone has said there is nothing I can do to make God love me more... And wonderfully, there is nothing I can do to make God love me less. God loves me as I am to help me become all that I have it in me to become; and when I realize the deep love God has for me, I will strive for love's sake to do what pleases my Lover. Those who think this opens the door for moral laxity have obviously never been in love, for love is much more demanding than law. An exhausted mother, ready to drop dead, will think nothing of sitting the whole night by the bed of her sick child.

Parenting is a socialization process according to which parents transfer their spiritual, moral and cultural values, beliefs, traditions, and norms as well as other socially and culturally desirable behaviours to their children, adolescents, and young adults to become gradually good citizens of society and competent adults, and people with the wisdom to help others and themselves to reach supernatural goals according to the norms of Divine Truth and Goodness (Gelan, 2016). Every parenting pattern must include the wholehearted desire of both parents to sacrifice themselves for each other and for the children.

Vital to the parenting process is the child's ability to speak the truth, learn the truth and live by the truth. The growth in the child's ability to trust in God's mercy and forgiveness is as equally indispensable. Archbishop Tutu's words introduce yet another dimension to parental responsibility: to teach by word and by example the meaning of **restorative justice**.

2.3 Restorative Justice, Wholehearted Forgiveness

With Professor Robert Enright of the University of Wisconsin, Madison campus, we move into the area of virtue formation. No matter what the parenting style may be, psychological well-being increases or diminishes according to the habits and values that parents inculcate in their children.

Enright is the first to have pursued the scientific study of forgiveness. More than one thousand researchers worldwide have followed in his footsteps in pursuit of more comprehensive knowledge of the dynamics of the virtue of forgiveness, the value of forgiveness and the therapeutic benefits of forgiveness. In tandem with Archbishop Desmond Tutu's convictions, Enright presents his ideas about forgiveness that provide new considerations for parenting priorities. To rescue youth who have suffered much in troubled households, he has provided an education program for helping wounded people to forgive. He explains that "if we can reduce anger (through forgiveness education) when a person is young, then he or she may have an important protective factor from developing harmful anger as he or she goes through life" (2021).

Forgiveness as a virtue for all ages of childhood, adolescence and adulthood is the central focus of Enright's research. Yet he has introduced another topic that dovetails with forgiveness, that of restorative justice. Not only do his convictions coalesce with those of Archbishop Tutu; they also clarify the shortcomings of such developmental psychologists as Erick Erickson. Hence Enright's notions offer parents certain priorities in virtue training that move the children towards psychological well-being.

On the surface, Erickson's theory appeals to those who wish to be efficacious in their parenting. Both Tutu and Enright bring to the surface a glaring weakness in the type of developmental theory advocated by Erickson. The weakness concerns growth in virtues, specifically the virtue of restorative justice.

We have already pointed out Tutu's take on this virtue: "Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment. In the spirit of *Ubuntu*, the central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offense."

Enright begins his critique of Erickson by a succinct summary of Erickson's intentions (Enright, 2021).

Erik Erickson's psychosocial developmental theory (1950, 1968) was a response to Freud's tendency to strip the human personality

of values specific to the human person. Freud was inclined to downplay the ability of the human person to self-determination by free, creative, efficacious acts that, in turn, are capable of cognitive and volitional integration of everything that happens to the person by way of external (environmental) events and by way of internal feelings, emotions, somatic impulses, temperament, and spiritual consolation or desolation. Freud seemed to overlook the human capacity to choose self-determining acts according to the parameters of truth and goodness.

For Erikson, all people have an essence, which is malleable and can either blossom or fall into decay including the sexuality emphasized by Freud. For Erickson, however, even sexuality itself goes well beyond the Freudian pleasure principle to include meaningful social relationships.

Erickson's theory moves along the following dimensions: (1) relationships with parents that move either in the direction of Trust or Mistrust; (2) relationships that involve both parents and siblings that propel the child towards Autonomy or begin to lock the heart of the child into recurring experiences of Shame and Doubt; (3) relationships within the family in general that encourage the growth of Initiative or dampen the heart with recurring feelings of Guilt; (4) relationships with schoolmates and teachers that either promote Industry or sink the child into a sense of inferiority; (5) relationships with peers and the larger society that either clarify for the growing youth his or her personal Identity or leave the youth with Ambiguity about his or her Identity; (6) a relationship with a romantic partner that opens the mind, heart and soul to Intimacy or, in lieu of a romantic partner, disappoints the heart and soul by maintaining the person in a state of Isolation; (7) relationships with the next generation that declare their presence with human marital acts that bring forth children or leave the spouses with a sense of non-fertility, that some call Stagnation; and finally (8) the acceptance of one's life with all its byways, crossroads, dead ends, safe arrivals and a consequent confirmation in the truth of who one is (Integrity) or the discouragement of what one would have liked to have been but indeed is not (Despair).

Enright makes an important observation: "For each of these eight psychosocial stages, the person learns something important

to be used throughout life. These insights, influencing behaviour, are called virtues."

Following the lead of other virtue theorists, Enright suggests that the person consciously and deliberately fosters insights that influence behaviour precisely because the person knows these insights are "good". This kind of knowledge, says Enright, is only possible when the child has reached adolescence and so is capable of the necessary self-reflection.

What we would suggest in our own research of parenting is that it is possible for children even in the early stages of life to learn the necessary distinctions between right and wrong, and between virtue and vice because of the style of parenting to which the child has been exposed even in the earliest years of life.

For Erickson, what constitutes a virtue proper to each stage of development is a mixed bag. He perceives trust, for example, to be the necessary dynamic in the parent-child relationship that is going to bring to flower the virtue of hope. One may retort, however, that the objective of hope is clearly distinguishable from the virtue of trust.

It is to be noted that in Erickson's assessment of the virtues, self-dependence, i.e., autonomy, corresponds to an ability to act independently of others' dictates. This style of thinking, however, precludes obedience as a virtue necessary for full personal development.

Even though an analysis of Erickson's perception of virtues proper to the stages is beyond the scope of this research, we can take note of the possibility of making other distinctions that match the child's development in virtues that do not exactly correspond to what Erickson says. We are referring to virtues that need parental guidance if the children and adolescents are going to abide by them.

2.4 Justice and the Truth of Unitive, Creative Love

Virtues central to psychological well-being are fidelity and love. The three most important categories that are three points of confusion in Erickson's analysis are Stages Five, Six and Seven. Enright (2021) points out that what Erickson refers to as "fidelity" in Stage Five for the formation of a personal identity can become

an ideological nightmare if it is directed towards a cause or a person who does not deserve the fidelity. Following a long philosophical tradition that dates back to Plato's remarks in *The Republic*, on the other hand, Enright suggests that justice should be the anchor point for fidelity (Plato, 2015/330 B.C.). Parental guidance in this virtue of justice is essential to the psychological well-being of the children.

Here Enright seems to correspond to what Tutu said about the place of *Ubuntu* within a cultural setting. The justice in question is a restorative justice that seeks social harmony with all people according to the parameters of reason (wisdom), temperance (control of the appetites especially hunger, anger and lust) and courage (the deliberate intention to do what is right for everyone no matter what the personal cost). When parents cultivate a sense of social and restorative justice in their children and adolescents, the growth of an identity becomes healthier because the choices to which one commits oneself become wiser. Justice leads to a fidelity that helps everyone.

A fidelity grounded in justice brings forth the truth about the inseparability of true romantic love and true procreative love. These are the fulcrums for Erickson's Stages Six and Seven. In order to rectify what Erickson explains about these stages we turn to one of the twentieth century's greatest philosopher-psychologists namely, Edith Stein (St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross).

We perceive immediately with her eyes and her mind that it is an unnecessary and insidious divorce of virtues to place romantic love, which is the virtue of Stage 6, and care for the next generation, which is the virtue of Stage 7, into independent categories. We are not saying that this divorce between romantic and procreative love is a deliberate strategy of any parenting style. Rather, we are saying that there is a misunderstanding of the growth process involved in romantic love relationships that often fails to perceive within romantic love the stirrings – emotively and cognitively – of the beauty and responsibility inherent in procreative love.

Such a division fails to recognize the inseparability of unitive love and procreative love. Such a division would incline adolescents to suppose that romantic love does not carry with it the

responsibility of cultivating the kind of true love that is necessary for raising and educating children.

Departing from Erickson's conceptual speculations, one notices that the truly romantic love of Stage Six is in evidence when one chooses not merely a partner to enjoy the togetherness of romantic love but a person to whom he or she wants to give his or her whole life for the purpose of bringing forth a family with the anticipation that the spouse has the same desire and intention (John Paul II, 1981/1960). The gestalt of romantic love always includes procreative love in the form of the hermeneutic of gift.

According to Stein, the human person is a gift that God gives to parents. God has already set in motion a plan, a specific task or occupation that lies hidden within the child's soul and must be carefully nurtured by the parents as the child begins to blossom according to the talents and inclinations that God has planted in the depths of her spiritual life. Within God's plan there must be a task or occupation, i.e., a vocation, for which a person is qualified or suited and for which God has naturally inclined her.

Parents cultivate this sense of vocation in their children from the earliest years. Parents must constantly be on their guard so that they inculcate in the children their own personal sense of being self-determining and capable of free, creative, efficacious acts according to the norms of truth and goodness and in harmony with God's designs that are operative in the children's souls.

For Edith to say that a woman has a specific vocation does not mean that there is a so-called feminine vocation in contrast to a masculine vocation. Her aim rather is to show how a woman is naturally prepared to be in a vocation that is specific to her. In other words, women like men specialize due to the natural talents with which they are endowed. She shows that a woman is destined to be a wife and mother. To be a wife involves the love of attraction, the love of desire, good will love (loving kindness), the love of friendship, betrothed love with the intention of making one's home in the heart of the other, and the love of marriage. The reciprocal self-gift that spouses entrust to each other for life is the only truly romantic love that is worthy of a woman who accepts her spouse as someone who complements her identity as a woman.

Similarly this kind of love is worthy of the man who accepts his spouse as someone who complements his identity as a man.

This romantic love that parents must cultivate in the hearts of their children as the children enter adolescence always carries with it the conviction that in my love for the other I discover that I am irreplaceable, indispensable, irreducible, unrepeatable and unique as a human person. I make the same discovery about my spouse (Stein, 1996).

A woman who freely offers herself to a man as a gift of self in marriage with the interior conviction that the man is offering himself to her as a gift of self feels complete. The man, too, experiences this completeness. When the mutual attraction that a man and woman feel for each other at the beginning of their relationship becomes a realization that each needs the other; when this realization grows into the will to live wholeheartedly for the good of the other (a wholehearted love that yearns to see the fullness of the horizon of the other's eternal happiness); when both the man and the woman reach the point of feeling their togetherness in their companionship so that when the other is not present there is a sense of "I have missed you"; and when the love that is now binding them together becomes a friendship so complete that each can say to the other, "I intend to live with you and for you by the power of a unifying love that is so complete that I will fully respect your identity as a potential parent", then the love is truly romantic. It is also truly generative because it is a love that fully accepts the other's identity as a potential parent (John Paul II, 1981/1960).

A woman yearns to be a mother not because of her aspirations but because of her nature. The yearning to love with a mother's love corresponds to her nature. This is true not only of the woman with a vocation to marriage: she may be called to love God himself as a religious Sister. Within whatever vocation God gives her, she develops a lifestyle that draws forth from the deepest recesses of her spiritual life the capacity to be a good mother.

Naturally she is in a state of total dedication to the growth and development of her young ones. This natural endowment enables a woman to guard and teach her own children (Stein, 1996). She is required to behave according to her feminine nature towards her husband, her children and her society. Edith suggests that for the

woman to guide others in her own feminine way towards this development, she must have a correct personal attitude, i.e., she must be affirming herself both as a person and as a woman. This self-affirmation depends greatly on how her own parents nurtured her. The nurturing behaviour of teachers and significant others have either been a light to help her develop her vision or a distressing plunge into darkness and identity confusion.

Parenting styles, therefore should be a light to bring her to the point of recognizing herself for precisely who she is in the individuality that God has given her. She should be able to recognize her potential in society; and no one should forbid her from exercising this potential. She should not belittle her own self; rather she must have outstanding confidence in the fulfilment of her tasks and obligations. In every respect, she must be "just" – in other words, she must offer her talents and energies to a social harmony that embraces every person without exception.

Despite the criticisms and discriminations which she may face, a woman has to be courageous to live a worthy and reputable life, ready to be a feminine mirror of her society's aspiration to uprightness; hence she must avoid or abandon every sort of wanton lifestyle.

A young adult who is the victim of irresponsible parenting and hence of identity confusion can be preoccupied with securing her own personal importance. This preoccupation occasions the debasement and/or blockage of the correct personal attitude. Such a preoccupation manifests itself as a reluctance to give of oneself in the development of those for whom she should be caring. The preoccupation culminates in a failure in virtue.

If she who has been educated in moral principles, has been a witness to these moral principles in action in the lives of her parents since early childhood, and if she herself behaves consistently according to these moral principles, she will be able to look into herself and will perceive with satisfaction that she is becoming a virtuous woman.

There may come a day, however, when she suddenly experiences herself as someone who has been living under a parental or cultural influence that indeed has not harmonized with who she really is. She discovers that her nature – not just that of

“woman” in general but that of one particular irreplaceable, unrepeatable, indispensable, irreducible, unique woman – is of an entirely different character from the person she thought herself to be while she was measuring herself according to an education and a formation that did not match her personal identity (Stein, 1996).

Edith Stein speaks of the woman who abandons herself completely into the will and attitude of another human being. If she loses herself completely in the other person – a person who behaves as a stranger towards who she really is – she is not only doing an injustice to herself but is also doing an injustice to the other person. This disposition on her part renders her unfit to perform other duties that correspond nobly to her nature as woman (Stein, 1996).

Edith explains that a woman is by nature never to be isolated from her society. She is first and foremost the companion of her husband and at the same time the mother of her children and a woman for the society at large. To be a wife is to be a companion who supports and safeguards her husband, her family and the human community (Stein, 1996). She enlivens both her family and society at large. She cherishes, supports, cares, loves, helps and guides all who show dependence on her. It is her gift and the source of her happiness to share the life of another human being, in other words, a man, to become a “we” with him, and indeed to take part together with him in all situations, in the greatest and smallest things, in tears and in joys, in work and in problems.

Love involves self-sacrifice: the woman offers herself as a gift of self-sacrificial love to the one who accepts her for who she is – a person who is a gift – and so in gratitude wishes to sacrifice himself as a person-gift in return. This is true whether the receiver of the gift is a husband, God himself, or others whom she is called to serve. Edith could very well have learned this when she served as a military nurse in the front during the First World War. It was certainly at the basis of her choice to become a Discalced Carmelite Sister. A woman should be in a reciprocal relationship with others. Love is not for procuring something that is readily available; love is not utilitarian.

The child is the fruit of mutual self-giving and, more than that: it is the very embodiment of the ‘gift.’ Each of the two spouses

receives in the child an 'image' of his or her own being as well as the gift of the other spouse's being. The gift (i.e., the child) is a third person, an independent creature and, as a 'creature' in the full sense of the word, a gift of God. Is there a further possibility of knowing what this creature receives, at the moment of conception, immediately from God, and what it receives mediately from its parents? Does the new structure, which owes its corporeal existence to the common generative will of the parents, receive from them also the form of its soul, a form that corresponds to the particular individuality that is alive in the generative act and to the particular nature of the parents' oneness [*Einssein*]? Or with the soul of the child, does God *give* to the parents a gift proportionate to their nature, in the manner he gave to the first male a proportionate female companion?

... Like Mary, every human mother is called to be mother with her whole soul, so as to pour the abundant riches of her soul into the soul of her child. And the more of the nature of the spouse she has in loving self-surrender received into her own self, the more the individuality of the child through her mediatorship, will be co-determined by the individuality of the father.²

2.5 Baumrind's Theory of Parenting Style

As we have already indicated, Diana Baumrind, a developmental psychologist, is well known for her theory about parenting and its influence on children's development (Baumrind, 1967; Darling, 1999). When one juxtaposes Baumrind's theory with that of Maccoby & Martin, one is able to detect two dynamisms in parenting that help to define each style: (1) acceptance/responsiveness and (2) behavioural control/demandingness.

As previously mentioned there are three parenting styles that emerge from Baumrind's analyses that she published in 1967: the *authoritative*, *authoritarian*, and *permissive*. Later Maccoby & Martin (1983) joined Baumrind in her theorizing and subdivided the permissive style into the *neglectful* and the *indulgent*.

Most authors in the field analyse four of the styles: they simply seem to accept the indulgent style to be an extreme of the permissive style. Baumrind describes **parental responsiveness** as

² E. STEIN, *Finite and Eternal Being*, 515–517.

the level of parents' emotional and cognitive response to their children's needs, which sometimes consist of support, warmth, and parental acceptance, and sometimes consist of food, water, sleep, help with study, help in understanding what is right and what is wrong (Maccoby& Martin, 1983; Darling, 1999; Baumrind, 2013).

Parental demandingness is the parents' expectation of more mature and responsible behaviour from their children, sometimes seen as **control** of the child (Darling, 1999). According to Maccoby& Martin (1983), the dimension of demandingness refers to parental control or parental power assertion.

Parental guidance or discipline is an essential component of parenting. When parents discipline their children in an authoritative manner, they are not simply punishing the children's bad behavior but aiming to support and nurture them for self-control, self-direction, and their ability to care for others.

2.5.1 Authoritarian parenting style

Authoritarian parents tend to be quite controlling and demanding. They emphasize obedience and conformity and expect rules to be obeyed without explanation. Hence they tend to create a milieu that is riddled with formality and emotionally cold. They tend to use harsh punishment more frequently than those who engage in the other parenting styles. There are particular circumstances, however, that render the authoritarian style beneficial to the children. One considers wartime circumstances where the children have to take their parents' directives seriously. There are also social plagues that can overwhelm children in their teens and compel them to engage in dangerous, sexually inappropriate behaviour. One must remember, however, that in spite of their sternness, the parents must engage in conversations with the children to explain the seriousness of the situations that demand harshness so that the children can understand and trust the dispositions of their parents.

Authoritarian parents, therefore, may appear to the children as people who will reject them if they do not behave properly (Baumrind, 2013; Baumrind et al., 2010). Hence the need for an explanation of the authoritarian disposition.

Authoritarian parental control is domineering (Baumrind, 2012). This parenting type has been related to less optimal child outcomes, including lower self-efficacy (Baumrind et al., 2010), problems in social interaction with an emphasis on external attribution (Maccoby & Martin, 1983), and a tendency towards rebellion (Baumrind, 1968). Parents often justify their mean treatment of their children as tough love.

2.5.2 Authoritative parenting style

Authoritative parents tend to have a relationship with their children that encourages them to be morally, spiritually, emotionally, socially and physically well-integrated according to the parameters of truth and goodness. The parents are forthright in their directives; at the same time they show a sense of prudence, justice, trustworthiness, fearlessness and self-control in their effort to draw forth responses from their children that are self-confident and psychologically healthy.

To express what I have just said succinctly, Baumrind (1966, 1967) conceptualized authoritative parents as both demanding and responsive. They monitor and impart clear standards for their children's conduct. They are assertive, but not intrusive and restrictive. Their disciplinary methods are supportive, rather than punitive.

Authoritative parents are those who manifest a good degree of acceptance and behavioural self-control, but in no way do they exercise coercion in their relationship to their children (Baumrind 2013; Baumrind et al., 2010). Baumrind (1966) conceptualized authoritative parents as rational, warm, encouraging, and controlling in a way that promotes child autonomy to plan and make decisions.

Similarly, Maccoby and Martin (1983) describe authoritative parents as ones who are clear in their directives and use reasoning and empathy to enforce them. Hence they encourage open communication, support children's independence, and express love and affection in such a way that they do what they can to ensure the children's ability to understand what they are trying to communicate.

The authoritative parenting style has been deemed the optimal parenting style (e.g. Baumrind, 1966; Baumrind, 2013; Maccoby & Martin, 1983) and has been related to positive child outcomes such as self-reliance (Baumrind, 1968; 1971), the ability to perceive objective norms of truth and goodness in a manner that brings a mature sense of social responsibility (Baumrind, 1971), and adjustment (Baumrind et al., 2010).

Research results show that the authoritative parenting style reduces mental disorders and promotes mental health. It also reduces adolescent behavior problems, alcohol consumption and truancy. Furthermore, it minimizes the negative impact of stress on health and operates as a predictor of academic marks. Indeed it is associated with higher educational attainment.

2.5.3 Permissive parenting style

The permissive parenting style is sometimes known as indulgent parenting. The parents set very few rules and boundaries and are reluctant to enforce them. Permissive parenting is characterized by the parents' desire to accentuate freedom in their household and so encourage the children to express their likes and dislikes without any fear of authority and without any worry that they may be saying something inappropriate. Hence one could say that in this style of parenting, parents demand little but give room to their children to express themselves without any boundaries or recourse to the norms of truth and goodness. According to Carl R. Trueman (2022), who among his other credentials served at Princeton University as a Fellow in Religion and Public Life, there has been a transformation of culture at least in the regions of Europe, America, Australia and Canada, that no longer anchors human development in the kind of personal identity that grows according to parameters of moral formation but rather in the person's ability to express himself or herself with "emotional authenticity" that may or may not coincide with traditionally upright morality.

Emotional authenticity and individual expressiveness seem to be what the permissive style is all about. The permissive style seeks to allow a child to express with words, emotions and actions

whatever the child is feeling "naturally" within the interior of his or her being.

Parents included in this type appear to be affirming and place few behavioural demands on their children (Baumrind, 1966). Any affirmation does not establish the children in the conviction that they are growing in wisdom, honesty and goodness. Rather the affirmations of this parenting style simply give the children the instinct to perceive that they can get whatever they want because their parents will never deny their wishes. Their wishes, after all, are coming from their inner self. This is an *indulgent style* of parenting. As we have already indicated, this particular manner of treating children has been called traditionally "spoiling". The intention of the word "spoiling" is to remind parents that the permissive style leaves the children without a moral or a spiritual backbone. Some of the current evils in the world, such as abortion, the use of women as objects by means of contraceptives, homosexuality, bisexuality, and manipulation of one's gender identity are easily traceable to the permissive, "spoiling" mentality. There is little doubt that the tendency to conceive only one or two children is also traceable to this mentality.

Diana Baumrind could easily witness the disastrous effects of the permissive, non-directive style of interpersonal relations while she was doing her research in northern California. A psychologist was conducting sensitivity sessions and encounter groups not far away from Baumrind's place of residence. We have already mentioned his name: it was Carl Rogers. He partnered with Dr. William Coulson to give group therapy to the Immaculate Heart of Mary Sisters in Los Angeles precisely in 1966 when Baumrind was publishing her research.

This is what Rogers had to say about his own project ten years after the fact (1976):

Well, I started this damned thing, and look where it's taking us; I don't even know where it's taking me. I don't have any idea what's going to happen next. And I woke up the next morning feeling so depressed, that I could hardly stand it. And then I realized I was wrong.

It is to be noticed that Rogers was explaining exactly the "nondirective" quality of permissive parenting: the children have

no “direction” to follow, and – if one follows Rogers’ logic – the parents have no idea what “direction” their lives are taking. Rogers said he realized he was wrong. He had no direction: “I don’t have any idea what’s going to happen next.” Do permissive parents realize that if they give no direction to their children, that very soon they will not know what direction their own lives are taking?

Rogers and Coulson were giving Baumrind all the data she needed to see the flaws in the non-directive, permissive approach. The IHM’s had some 60 schools when Rogers and Coulson began hosting encounter groups with them in 1966. At the end, they had one school. In the name of nondirective, permissive parenting, the Sisters would dispense their students from exams, then they would dispense them from their marks. They left their classrooms mean-spirited and chaotic.

There were more or less 615 Sisters when Rogers and Coulson began their work in California, in the city of Los Angeles. Within a year after their first interventions, the communities collapsed, and 300 Sisters asked permission to revoke their promises to God. They did not want to be under anyone’s authority except the authority of their “inner self”. For some it was the last time they would believe in any God; they would believe only in the self.

Dr. E. M. Jones (1999) published an article in *Culture Wars* that, on the basis of participants’ testimony, gave very credible support to the fact that Rogers’ method in sensitivity sessions led to a breakdown of moral norms and the willingness of participants to engage in deviant sexual behaviour. They tended to neglect completely their obligations and aspirations to do what would please God.

Diana Baumrind certainly realized what was happening so close to her place of residence. From her vantage point in Berkeley, she described exactly what happens when parents use the permissive style. Maccoby and Martin (1983) brought her observations to their logical conclusion: **The permissive parenting style may easily collapse into the subcategories of an indulgent style and a neglectful style of parenting. The same can be said of the non-directive counselling style.**

Tailay Mkuna (2015), a graduate of Jordan University College, is a psychologist who has cited extensively one of the world’s

experts on permissive parenting. The expert is Janet Smith, known to be the foremost expositor of the religious explanation of the harm that the contraceptive/permissive mentality brings to children. It may be remembered that Smith made a significant contribution to *Africa Tomorrow* with her article "Conscious Parenthood" (2019).

Smith observes the great number of parents who in fact follow the permissive style of parenting and manifest the dangers of this style. Smith explains that there is an indivisible link between the potential to bring forth a child and the love that – hopefully – binds together the spouses in a unitive love. She emphasizes the fact that neglectful parenting is the style of those who could very well have indulged themselves sexually when they were younger since their permissive parents allowed them to do what they wanted: in other words, the children of the permissive parenting style may have enjoyed sexual escapades when they were teenagers with no concern for the responsibility of procreating and loving children that come forth from a love that is truly marital; and now they become prone to follow the neglectful style.

Teenagers who live a permissive lifestyle for themselves and the young adults who neglect their children because their children are not a priority for them help create a culture where the child is no longer recognizable as a gift from God. Smith speaks in terms of a "sexual utopia" that has led to the wholesale massacre of unborn children just as a political utopia at various periods during the twentieth century led to the massive killings of the innocent. In J. Smith's words (2015):

Babies are generally received into the world by parents who are not mature themselves and who, sadly, have been formed by the values of their dysfunctional society. They have too little sense of the value of life and a great deal of this lack of value comes from the severe misunderstanding of the meaning of sexuality in our culture. Whereas in other decades of the past century, it was political utopianism that led to the hostility to life which resulted in massive killings of the innocent, in our age, it has been an attempt to establish a sexual utopia that has led to the massive killings of the unborn and the great devaluing of the lives of their living brothers and sisters...

According to Smith, the conjunction of the devaluing of human life and the devaluing of children strongly correlates with a devaluing of the meaning of human sexuality. Her critique corresponds to our critique of Erickson: he offers us a flawed theory by separating the stage of romantic love from that of generative love. As soon as having babies is separated from having sex, babies are no longer joyfully accepted as the natural and proper outcome of sexual intercourse (Smith, 2015):

The devaluing of human life and the devaluing of children we have seen in these last several decades has been paralleled by a devaluing of the meaning of human sexuality. When contraceptives became widely available we had the igniting of the sexual revolution which separated having babies from having sex. When that separation happened, babies were no longer welcomed as the natural and right outcome of sexual intercourse, but were considered an accident of sexual intercourse, an inconvenient burden, so inconvenient that we argue that we need abortion to keep our lifestyles going... [The Supreme Court of the United States has said that] abortion is necessary because contraception has enabled individuals to engage in sexual relationships that are not in the least receptive to children...

The concentration on sexual intercourse as a moment of giving and receiving the pleasure that comes with arousal and ecstasy and the concomitant reluctance to give a spouse the joy of a child can easily induce a person to make a bad choice of a marriage partner and, therefore, an intolerable choice of a parenting pattern for the children that are born into such a marriage. In other words, those who marry with this mind-set are often simply marrying a sexual partner that they have become used to. Most probably they do not have in the forefront of their hearts the question, "Would this individual be my best choice for collaborating with me in raising the children we bear?" When couples leave children out of the equation as a privileged reason for having sexual relations, unhealthy consequences follow (Smith, 2012):

The notion that children are an optional offshoot of sex and not the reason for sex or marriage leads individuals to make bad choices for marriage partners. Those who marry are often simply marrying a sexual partner that they have become used to. Sexual

attraction and sexual compatibility become the chief foundation for relationships. Often when I suggest to young people that the primary question they should ask themselves when they are looking for a spouse is "Would this individual be a good parent to our children?" they are astonished by the question and realize that it would radically influence their choice of a spouse – and they admit that such a consideration has been far from their minds!

Most couples who get married have lived together before marriage and have contracepted. Their contraceptive practices have shaped their view of the purpose of sexuality and this carries over into marriage. The contraceptive view of sexual intercourse conveys that sex is for pleasure and that children are an option and largely an unwelcome option...

The erroneous view of the purpose of sexuality flows over into an erroneous view of the purpose of life. If sex can be used strictly for the satisfaction of our own pleasures, then it seems like life itself is meant to be lived in the pursuit of satisfying our desires – not in the pursuit of serving God. Those who have been sexually active since their teen years enter marriage as quite selfish individuals in regard to sexual intercourse. They have not learned self-restraint in respect to their sexuality nor are they likely to restrict themselves in the indulgence of other desires as well...

In our day when some animals have more rights than some humans, people are hard pressed to understand what it means to have an immortal soul and what a grand privilege it is to be able to participate in the bringing forth of new human souls. Contraception is so thinkable and doable because couples do not realize what a great insult it is against children as a gift from God. Those who engage in contracepted sexual intercourse are engaging in an act that God designed as a means of conferring a great gift on them, [the gift of a child] ... Contraception is an emphatic rejection of the gift of the child while at the same time a selfish embrace of the pleasure that comes with the act...

While we can, we must try to make clear why such acts as abortion and contraception are so in conflict with a love of nature and of life.

In a word, the contraceptive culture is a permissive culture. If one or both parents advanced through their teenage years with the

feeling that they were free to do what they wished with their bodies in the way they conducted themselves sexually, their permissive attitude towards their sexual partner and towards themselves could easily become a pattern of behaviour in their parenting. Because they have been devaluing children, their parental style becomes more and more neglectful.

In the permissive mind-set, freedom eclipses truth and goodness. Parents do not set rules, avoid engaging in behavioural control, and set few behavioural expectations for their adolescents (Baumrind et al., 2010). With permissive parents a child may even end up controlling the parents. This parenting type has been related to child outcomes such as lower achievement (Baumrind, 1971), lack of impulse control (Maccoby & Martin, 1983), and lower autonomy (Baumrind et al., 2010). Children living within the permissive milieu encounter more problems in relationships and social interactions. Put briefly, their parents have been granting them what they wished; they now expect their peers to do the same.

2.5.4 Neglectful parenting style

The authoritative, authoritarian and permissive (self-indulgent) parenting styles all seem to be parental strategies for loving their children. It has already been seen that the love may be a mask for a desire to control the children (the power mentality of the authoritarian parent) or a covert tendency to let the children control the parents (the psychosocial mentality of the permissive parents).

The neglectful parenting style, sometimes known as uninvolved parenting, tends to be the behaviour pattern of parents who are not really concerned with what happens to their children from day to day and hence leave the children with the feeling that they do not really have parents. The children may feel lonely, abandoned and unwanted.

The neglectful parenting style is described as low in responsiveness and low in demandingness. Parents of this style behave in a way that minimizes the time spent with the children and hence simultaneously minimizes parental effort to raise the children with thoughtfulness and care (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). They often fail to monitor or supervise their children's behaviour and do not support or encourage their children's self-regulation

(Baumrind et al., 2010). Thus, neglectful parents may respond to a child with hostility or may not respond at all,

These uninvolved parents may themselves have been victims of depression, physical abuse or child neglect when they were young. This could have left them unmotivated to be a thoughtful parent.




Figure 2: Demanding? Responsive? Four Parenting Styles

2.6 Child Temperament and Parenting

A temperament is defined as an apparently biologically-rooted, early-appearing disposition that shapes long-term patterns of socio-emotional development (Fu, Pérez-Edgar, 2014). Children are born with their unique personalities. Some smile and reach out to explore. Others are irritable and fearful. Even week-old babies have differences. Children’s temperaments develop early in life. They are influenced by biology and by experience (e.g., by the children’s experience of their parents even when they are in their mother’s womb). Some features of temperament include activity level (e.g., the very active child who is hyper); a predisposition to positive feelings that are expressed by the child’s laugh or smile in the presence of others; or a predisposition to negative feelings expressed by fear, temper tantrums, refusal to eat, and persistent nightmares.

How easily does your child become fearful, frustrated, irritable and sad? How does your child react to the unknown? How comfortable is your child with new people and new situations? How well does your child concentrate, pay attention and focus on

a task? Children's temperaments have an impact on how they get along with others, their mental health and how well they do at school. Children who are fearful and inhibited tend to be better at understanding the feelings of others; but they are also more likely to become anxious and depressed.

According to Chess and Thomas (1996), temperament types include easy babies: 40% of infants adjust to new situations quickly, establish routines, are generally cheerful, and are easy to calm. Difficult babies make up 10% of infants. They are slow to adjust to new experiences, and are likely to react negatively and intensely to stimuli and events. Fifteen percent of infants are low-to-warm-up babies. They are somewhat difficult at first but become easier over time. The remaining 35% of the babies seemed not to fit any of these three categories.

Children who learn to manage their impulses can pay attention for longer time spans and stay focused on a task. Although children are born with a bias towards a given temperament, they can learn to overcome the more challenging aspects of the temperament that seems to be habitual for them. Children's temperament and developmental outcomes (e.g., impulsivity, fearfulness) can also be changed naturally over time or changed in a more systematic manner through interventions. Various parenting strategies work better for children with certain temperaments. Parents can help by learning about their child's temperament and adapting their behaviour and demands to it.

Formation in virtue and the training in the dynamics of forgiveness may stabilize emotional states in a way that brings the children into a harmony with others in their family and outside their family – a harmony that could not have been anticipated. This again is the principle of *Ubuntu*. Edith Stein's emphasis on the individuality of a person's psychological and vocational constitution are also not to be overlooked. For Stein, the network of relationships that forms during childhood, adolescence and young adulthood is precisely that of trust.

2.7 Psychological Well-being

At a superficial level, psychological well-being (PWB) is quite similar to other terms that refer to positive mental states, such as

happiness or satisfaction. If one were to rely on Edith Stein, one would deem it important for psychological well-being to live according to the individual identity with the values associated with that identity that God has planted deep within the soul from the very beginning of the person's existence. The person enjoys well-being because she or he is precisely the person that she or he was meant to be. Hence the formation of the child would not follow today's tendency to cultivate emotional authenticity and individual expressiveness at the expense of upright moral formation according to divine directives.

This is why parenting would be a valuable assistance to the child and the adolescent so that she or he could learn continuously to integrate everything that happens in the external milieu with everything that happens somatically, emotionally and mentally in the internal happenings of one's being. If the young person learns to make choices after doing such integrating according to the norms of truth and goodness, the person can learn to live peacefully, joyfully with one's own identity as a self-determining being who acts freely, creatively and efficaciously.

If I say that I'm happy, or very satisfied with my life, it is possible that my psychological well-being is quite high. If my happiness and self-satisfaction are related to a self-centered lifestyle of any sort, however, psychological well-being may be at a quite low degree since I suffer the fragility of the person who fails to live with a brotherly or sisterly attitude towards other people. I also may be failing to be attentive to God's plan for my life.

People who tend towards preoccupation with the self, no matter how happy they perceive themselves to be, may eventually suffer from persistent feelings of euphoria. Persons who feel a need for such feelings can easily become addicted to habits that seem to give satisfaction to the self: eating, drinking, preoccupation with the smart phone, buying nice things, hoping for a car with the latest accessories, a big-screen TV that connects to the computer, pornography... in short, anything that smacks of one of the three consumer mentalities, the materialist, the psychosocial and the power mentality.

Psychological well-being has two important facets. The first of these refers to the extent to which people experience positive

emotions and feelings of happiness when they are giving of themselves to other people. Sometimes this aspect of psychological well-being is referred to as subjective well-being (Diener, 2000). Subjective well-being is a necessary part of overall psychological well-being; but on its own it is not enough.

To see why this is so, imagine being somewhere that you really enjoy, perhaps sitting on a sea-going vessel in the sunshine, with your favorite food and drink and some good company or alone if that is how you would prefer it! For most people that would be very enjoyable for a week or two. Now imagine doing it not just for a week but forever. There are very few people who would find that prospect enjoyable. The old saying may be true, you can have too much of a good thing. What this example brings home is that to really feel good we need to experience purpose and meaning, in addition to positive emotions.

We must live according to values. Our life becomes meaningful only insofar as we help those around us to find meaning in their lives. So, the two important ingredients in psychological well-being are the internal harmony we experience when we share what we have with others and the harmony we experience with our vocational identity that what we are doing with our lives has a meaning and a purpose that coincides with who we are in our irreplacability, unrepeatability, irreducibility, indispensability and uniqueness.

2.7.1 Types of psychological well-being

The term hedonic wellbeing is normally used to refer to the subjective feelings of happiness. It is comprised of two components, an affective component (high positive affect and low negative affect) and a cognitive component (satisfaction with life). It is proposed that an individual experiences happiness when positive affect and satisfaction with life are both high (Carruthers & Hood, 2004). This experience couples the tendency to joy when one gives of oneself with the satisfaction one feels with helping others find meaning in their lives. All involved enjoy peace of mind with the conviction that they are harmonizing their lives to God's plan for each person as an individual and for each family and social group.

Eudaimonic well-being, a term that comes to us from Greek philosophers, refers to the purposeful aspect of PWB. In the conceptual model we have presented above, the psychologist Carol Ryff specifies six key types of eudaimonic well-being that become points of focus for psychologists today.

2.7.2 Theory of psychological well-being (PWB)

Theories about psychological well-being generally focus on understanding the structure of psychological well-being or the cause-and-effect dynamics of PWB. The breakdown of psychological well-being into hedonic and eudaimonic components and Carol Ryff's model seem to be widely accepted theories of the structure of PWB.

As far as the dynamics of PWB are concerned, it is important to recognize that, to some extent, PWB is relatively stable and will have been influenced by both previous experiences – including, for example, early upbringing – and the God-given individuality of the human person with her or his constellation of values that configure themselves into an underlying personality. It goes without saying that one's faith life, i.e., his or her relationship with God, is a lifelong determinant of PWB. As Edith Stein described it above, the underlying personality to which we refer is the gift of God to the individual during the entire course of one's life. When a person is true to her or his personality and accepts it as a divinely-given gift, the person becomes who she is. If, on the contrary, the person does not live in harmony with her personality, she may suffer enduring frustration because she is living someone who she is not.

Stressful experiences can predispose people to subsequent mood and anxiety disorders (Gladstone, Parker, Mitchell et al., 2004) if the experiences unsaddle the person from her or his attempts to groom a personal identity that matches her or his constellation of values as a person. Exposure to extremely traumatic events, on the other hand, can help to build resilience and actually protect PWB. For example, children exposed to moderately stressful events seem better able to cope with subsequent stressors (Khoshaba & Maddi, 1999). The same inoculating impact of stressful events has also been observed in working adults (Solomon, Berger and Ginzburg, 2007). When we

as psychologists hear victims of war describe the unimaginably atrocious massacres of their families during the Blood Diamond war of Sierra Leone and then hear these same victims end their narrative with “I thank God”, we know that we are with people who are living with a God-given resilience to traumatic events in the deepest recesses of their souls.³

Although baseline psychological well-being may be fairly stable, day to day events and experiences also exert an impact. For example, even the most resilient person may eventually become very low, or depressed, if his or her daily experiences are constantly troubling and she or he is not opening the soul to divine rays of truth and goodness in the manner spoken of by Archbishop Tutu. There is strong evidence to show that exposure to work-related stressors over long periods of time will have a negative impact on PWB especially if the person is giving exclusive priority to the work.

This means that, although short periods of adversity may be helpful in building resilience, long-term stress that the person fails to manage is not good for PWB. In turn, this lower level of PWB may well lead to serious illness, including cardiovascular disease, problems with blood sugar control, such as diabetes, and immune system malfunctions (Chandola et al, 2008).

PWB theory proposes that early experiences and an identifiable underlying personality create a platform for psychological well-being but everyday experiences can help to maintain a good level of PWB primarily if they are positive, or, if they are negative, reduce levels of PWB, leading in turn, to poor health outcomes. For children and adolescents, parental guidance and recourse to prayer help offset too much preoccupation with everyday experiences.

To summarize what we have been saying, psychological well-being is an umbrella construct that refers to positive mental health and hence can exist in varying degrees. It is no surprise, then, that the constructs for psychological well-being and positive mental health are used interchangeably in many studies.

³ This was the first-hand experience of one of this article’s authors who lived in Sierra Leone in the latter part of the war.

2.7.3 Psychological well-being and young adults

The present investigation concludes its survey of the literature with the perception that hope and optimism may have a substantial effect on the mental health and psychological well-being of young adult students. What engenders this hope and optimism? We suggest that the parents' thoughtful choice of a parenting style can engender the type of hope that not only inspires confidence in the child and young adult at whatever stage of development they happen to be, but also can offer guidelines and parameters that help the child and young adult to become persons of integrity and to live as true, joyful servants and worshippers of our almighty God both in the present and in the future, i.e., even in the afterlife.

Lack of positive psychological attributes like hope and optimism are associated with the poor psychological well-being of young adults and may indeed be the consequence of thoughtless parenting.

3. Research Methodology and Design

Since the aim of this research was to examine the relationship between parenting styles and psychological well-being, a quantitative research design seemed to be the most appropriate. The design assumed that all participants in the study would have information or experiences that would bear upon the research questions that were being investigated and that quantitative method was important for making comparisons.

The research design remained faithful to Wittgenstein's parameters for acknowledging the contextual nature of language. Since the students responding to the questionnaire were from similar cultures and subcultures, since they were more or less of the same age group, and since they were all students who attended the lectures of one of the researchers, it seemed safe to conclude that all would be attributing similar meanings to the vocabulary and terminology particular to the questionnaire.

The target population was university students of young adult age who are enrolled in universities in Tanzania. The sample came from Morogoro Municipality at Jordan University College. The sample size for the present research was composed of 46 subjects between 19-25 years of age. This fit the young adult range as it is

defined by the World Health Organization. The sample consisted of students who had all chosen to pursue the same programme: they were all enrolled as candidates for the B.Sc. in Psychology and Counselling. The homogeneity of demographic variables, therefore, was able to reduce spurious variation.

It was a purposive, not a random, sample because these young adults were specifically chosen as a group of subjects whose demographic data corresponded to what the researcher needed to meet the research objectives and questions.

Having established the objectives and research questions as stated above, the researchers intended to shed some light on the recommendations made by experts in the Literature Review. Hence the researchers undertook the task of generating insights that would help them (a) to specify the strengths and weaknesses of the recommendations for forgiveness training as a critical element of parenting at all stages in order to enhance psychological well-being, (b) to understand the value of recommendations for training in restorative justice for improving psychological well-being, and (c) to find evidence for the parental help necessary to discover God's particular plan for individual children in their uniqueness.

A secondary intention was to uncover at least a modicum of evidence that might support conclusions about the relationship between parenting and psychological well-being already reached by other researchers in settings that are strikingly different from those of Morogoro.

Non-probability purposive sampling seemed preferable because it was the kind of sampling meant to generate insights rather than explore significant differences between groups. For the purpose of applying this technique, respondents were chosen based on their age. The sample size used was very small in number so it remained in the nature of a pilot study.

3.1 Data collection procedure

In this study primary data were collected using questionnaires. The printed questionnaire was composed in a manner to ensure that valid and reliable data would be collected pertinent to the research objectives and questions. Closed-ended questions gave the researcher quantitative data.

Questionnaires consisted of 50 closed-ended questions. The first 25 questions were directly related to the four parenting styles; the last 25 questions were directly concerned with six criteria of psychological well-being. The Parenting Styles inventory, known as the Parental Assessment Questionnaire (PAQ) was taken from Buri (1991) with some modifications. Buri's inventory included three subscales, the Permissive, the Authoritarian and the Authoritative Flexible. Without subtracting any of Buri's items, the researchers framed questions that corresponded to a Neglectful style of parenting as explained by the experts indicated in the Literature Review and added these as a subscale to the questionnaire.

To answer each question respondents were asked to choose one of five options in the manner of the Likert method. Numbers were assigned to each of the five options. Hence 1 = Always true, 2 = usually true, 3 = Sometimes true, 4 = Rarely true, 5 = Never true. The numbers were assigned to options in such a way that each respondent could compile a score that corresponded to a specific parenting style and a score that corresponded to psychological well-being.

What follows are examples of the questions related to parenting:

As I was growing up, once family policy had been established, my parents discussed the reasoning behind the policy with the children in the family. (1) Always. (2) Most of the time. (3) Sometimes. (4) Rarely. (5) Never.

Whenever my parents told me to do something as I was growing up, they expected me to do it immediately without asking any questions. (1) Always. (2) Most of the time. (3) Sometimes. (4) Rarely. (5) Never.
--

My parents have always felt that what their children need is to be free to make up their own minds and to do what they want to do, even if this does not agree with what their parents might want. (1) Always. (2) Most of the time. (3) Sometimes. (4) Rarely. (5) Never.
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What follows are examples of the questions from the PWB segment of the questionnaire:

I have no desire to pray or worship God because my parents never prayed with me when I was a child. (1) Always true. (2) Usually true. (3) Sometimes true. (4) Rarely true. (5) Never true.
I feel very thankful to God for everything that has happened in my life even for the moments of pain and suffering. (1) Always true. (2) Usually true. (3) Sometimes true. (4) Rarely true. (5) Never true.
I do not feel any obligation to take care of my parents. (1) Always true. (2) Usually true. (3) Sometimes true. (4) Rarely true. (5) Never true.

The secondary data utilized by the researchers to assess the validity and reliability of their questionnaire were supplied by the theoreticians and practitioners already indicated as points of reference in the Literature Review. Their insightful contributions helped the researchers to place the interpretation of the questionnaire results within the perspective of what corresponds to a particular parenting style and what is best for the development of psychological well-being.

Ethical principles in conducting this research included acquiring research clearance and requesting consent of the participants as well as maintaining confidentiality. Willingness to participate in the study was a primary concern. No special consideration was offered, no use of force or any conditions were imposed to make subjects respond. Informed consent was a significant condition for participating in the research.

Confidentiality in the process of data collecting and in the manner of reporting the results and conclusions was emphasized and adhered to. No disclosures were made from the data collected from the students. The journal publishing this study is protecting the anonymity of the participants: the respondents' names have not been used or cited and no individuals have been described in a way that they could be identified. All data sheets have been stored safely to protect against future abuses of the information.

Care was taken to ensure the emotional security of all participants: in other words, no tension-provoking questions, or questions that would unnecessarily evoke sentiments of sadness, anger or bitterness were allowed in the course of the research.

3.2 Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics, namely, frequencies and percentages were used to determine how responses were linking to the research questions. The written data obtained through the questionnaires were analysed through a thematic content analysis (TCA).

For accessing the pattern that respondents typically perceived to be the one utilised by their parents, the following interpretation was used for questions 1-25. It must be remembered that the questions that corresponded to this first section of the questionnaire could apply to one of four parenting styles that the respondents were perceiving as characteristic of the parents or caretakers who raised them when they were children and adolescents. These styles were the Authoritarian, the Authoritative, the Permissive and the Neglectful.

Each of the four parenting styles, the Authoritarian, the Authoritative, the Permissive and the Neglectful were measured according to a subset of six questions verbalized according to standard definitions of the style in focus. Each of four sets of six questions, therefore, corresponded to each style. Anyone whose score placed her in the lower portion of the score range (6–15) would not have been raised in the parental style that was the focus of that particular set of questions. Placement in the higher portion of the range, 16-30, warranted a positive conclusion that according to the respondent's perception she or he was raised under the particular parenting style that was the focus of that particular set of questions. An example of the Neglectful style is as follows:

21.	My parents chose not to spend any time with me as I was growing up. (1) Always true. (2) Usually true. (3) Sometimes true. (4) Rarely true. (5) Never true.
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Table 1 Score Ranges for Perceived Parenting Patterns

Score range	Identification with One of Four Styles
6 – 15	Not identify with particular parenting style
16 – 30	Identify with particular parenting style

In analysing the level of the respondents' own perception of their psychological well-being (PWB) in relation to the type of

parenting pattern that the respondents perceived to be the style of their parents, the following scale was used for questions 26-30 of the questionnaire.

Table 2 Score Ranges for Perceived PWB

Score range	Perceived level of PWB
6 – 18	Very low
19 – 36	Low
37 – 54	Moderate
55 – 72	High
73 – 90	Very high

4. Results of the Data Analyses

To secure data that reliably provided insights into the relationship between the two variables that were of primary concern to this research – (1) the patterns to which parents seemed to subscribe according to the perceptions and memories of their children who are now young adults and (2) the level of psychological well-being that these same young adults seem to be enjoying currently – the researchers made use of the scoring methods pertinent to the questionnaires that were supplying their data and examined the frequencies and trends between the two variables. Researchers framed the results within the Literature Review matrix.

Understanding their research to be on the level of a pilot study, the researchers examined the data both in terms of the objectives and in terms of the axiological determinations of the experts mentioned in the Literature Review. It was hoped that the findings of the present study would shed some light on the significance of parental influence not only on children and adolescent behavior but even on the conduct of young adults.

These findings were used in order to properly determine the acceptability of the research hypothesis, which suggests that parenting styles influence the behaviors of children all the way to young adulthood. In other words, an object of interest for the researchers was the permanency of changes, either positive or negative, that occurred on account of parental influence.

4.1 Age and Educational Level

It seemed imperative to choose variables related to demographic data that would be acceptable as constants so that they would not corrupt any possible correlations between parenting styles and psychological well-being. The one demographic variable that in fact was not a constant was that of gender. In a sample of 46 students 24 were female and 22 were male. While it is true that in many cultures, the parenting style for male children may be a bit more authoritarian, gender did not seem to be a factor that was accelerating psychological well-being for any parental style.

As we have indicated, age and the educational class level of the respondents was indeed a constant. This was important in determining the relevance of the respondent's input concerning the research topic.

Since the study focused on young adults, it was necessary for the age of the participants to correspond to a constant range from 18 – 35 years: this indeed was the case in our research. The educational level of the group also served as a reliable constant. All were bachelor degree students attending psychology classes at Jordan University College. The norms for their curriculum were those approved by the Tanzanian Commission of Universities (TCU).

4.2 The parenting styles

The Parental Authority Questionnaire was adapted from Buri (1991). The PAQ has three subscales: (a) permissive, (b) authoritarian and (c) authoritative/flexible. Each subscale consists of six items. A fourth subscale, composed in the same manner as the PAQ, was added to the list: (d) neglectful. This category consisted of seven items. The modification of the inventory was necessary in order to establish its validity and reliability in accord with the parenting style theoretical constructs summarized in the Literature Review.

The score for each item in the subscale score ranged from 1–5. Hence each subscale score ranged from 6–30. To follow Buri's pattern of assessment score, the range of 6–15 served as an indication that this was not the perceived parenting style of the

respondent's parents. The score range of 16-30, on the other hand, was accepted as an indication that the subscale at issue seemed to match the parenting style of the respondent's parents.

4.2.1 Permissive parenting style

Measured by six items, namely, the freedom to make one's own decision even when parents do not agree, the absence of any necessity to obey rules and regulations established by someone in authority, the absence of any expectation or guideline for conduct, the excessive willingness of parents to do what their children want, the parents' unrelenting belief that social problems are solved if parents do not restrict their children's activities, decisions and desires as they grow up, and the parental belief that children should make their own decisions without any parental guidance.

By using the above items twenty-six percent scored high in the permissive subset. This group was classified as those subject to permissive parenting.

Table 3 Permissive parenting result

Score	Frequency	Percentage
6–15	34	71.91
16–30	12	26.09%
Total	46	100%

Source: Field Data, 2021

The table shows the total number of respondent scores for the permissive parenting style where 26.09% of the group scored high, which would identify the perceived style of their parents as permissive. The remaining 71.91% scored low in their perceptions of a permissive parenting household.

4.2.2 Authoritarian parenting style

Authoritarian parenting was assessed by using the following types of items. In a well-run family children should do what the parents want, parents' expectations and decisions are not to be questioned, children should do immediately what their parents want without asking questions, punishment should be meted out when a child disregards the parents, parents may become angry

when children disagree with them, and unmitigated force may be used to get children to behave properly.

In this subscale score forty-three percent scored high, between 16 and 30, and therefore were identified as those who grew up in authoritarian households.

Table 4 Authoritarian parenting style result

Score	Frequency	Percentage
6–15	27	56.7%
16–30	19	43.3%
Total	46	100%

Source: Field Data, 2021

The table shows the total number of respondent scores for the authoritarian parenting style where 46.3% of the group scored high. This identified them as persons hailing from an authoritarian household while the remaining 56.7% scored low in authoritarian parenting.

4.2.3 Authoritative parenting style

The items suitable for this category included the notions that parents offer clear standards of behavior with a willingness to adjust, parents consider children's opinions but their decisions are not based on the children's point of view, parents habitually give clear direction and guidance in rational and objective ways, parents give their expectations while allowing children to discuss whether they are unreasonable, and when a family policy has been finalized parents discuss with children the reasons for the policy.

Thirty-three percent of the respondents scored high, between 16 and 30, in their perceptions that their households were authoritative in character. This means that according to the rationale of the scale, they would be considered to have grown up in an authoritative household.

Table 5 Authoritative parenting style result

Score	Frequency	Percentage
6–15	31	67.37%
16–30	15	32.61%
Total	46	100%

Source: Field Data, 2021

The table above show the total number of respondent scores on authoritative parenting style where 32.61% of the group scored high and hence identified them as having grown up under an authoritative style of parenting. The remaining 67.37 % scored low in authoritative parenting.

4.2.4 Neglectful parenting style

Neglectful parenting has been assessed in terms of the availability and willingness of parents to attend to their children, to set rules or expectations for behavior and to attach themselves emotionally to their children. If any of these qualities were missing, they were considered neglectful in their parenting. All 46 respondents scored low with this subscale: no one considered themselves to have had neglectful parents.




Figure 3 Distribution of Parenting Styles

The graph above shows the distribution of parenting styles among the respondent group according to what they perceived of their upbringing. Forty-one percent perceived their upbringing as authoritarian, thirty-three percent as authoritative, and twenty-six

percent as permissive. No one considered themselves subject to the neglectful style of parenting during their upbringing.

4.4 Psychological well-being

Psychological well-being was measured by considering six factors developed by Carol Ryff where the summation of the scores for each factor designate the perceived total psychological well-being of the respondent. The six factors are autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relationships, purpose in life and self-acceptance. Each of the factors had three questions relating to it. Each factor provided a score that ranged from 3 to 15. Hence the score range for psychological well-being as an aggregate of the six factors ranged from 18–90.

Inventories based on Ryff's model have been screened and tested for validity and reliability during the years. Not only has the inventory – similar to the PAQ – been multivalent in its applications but non-Anglo Saxon cultures have tested its ability to categorize into the six factors that were mentioned above. A team consisting of researchers from Spain and Colombia (hence inter-continental) did exhaustive statistical analyses to determine the value of the PWB inventory for assessing Ryff's six categories and discovered that while there is some overlap of categories, the six-category model remained the optimal model (Von Dierendonck et al., 2008).

The present research took into account the African context. Hence a modest subscale was introduced that assessed the respondent's experience of prayer in the family environment. The wording of these items clearly distinguished between the upbringing in an environment of prayer that enhanced PWB and that which diminished PWB. Hence we remained faithful to Ryff's inventory with these simple but important modifications.

4.4.1 Autonomy

The factor of autonomy according to Ryff's schematization was confidence in one's opinion even when others might disagree, the ability to judge oneself according to one's own values and not those of others, the ability to consider one's ideas as important and the

propensity to feel safe when people with strong opinions are trying to exercise their influence in an intensely persuasive manner.

4.4.2 Mastery of the environment

Environmental mastery corresponded to the capacity to be resilient to the demands of everyday life, to the feeling of being in charge of what happens in life and to the skill of managing one's daily responsibilities.

4.4.3 Personal growth

Personal growth corresponded to items that assessed the ability to view life as a process of learning, changing and growth; the willingness to make big life changes or improvements according to the parameters of truth and goodness; and the refusal to back away from new experiences and unexpected challenges that do not seem to harmonize with one's customary ways of thinking.

4.4.4 Positive relationships

The questionnaire items designed to assess positive relationships stressed the experience of affectionate and trusting relationships with others, the inclination of others to describe the respondent as a giving person and as a person able to maintain close relationships.

4.4.5 Purpose in life

The items related to this subscale reflect the meaning that Ryff gave to this category: to have goals in life and a sense of directedness. A person who scores high in this subscale typically attributes coherent meaning to her or his present and past life. He or she holds beliefs that give life purpose. This person has consciously decided upon aims and objectives for living.

4.4.6 Self-acceptance

This subscale assessed the person's ability to grasp the self in its state of multivalence. The person is adopting a positive attitude towards the self. In other words, the person acknowledges and accepts multiple aspects of the self, including good and bad qualities. The person feels positive about one's past life and


realizes that even the moments worthy of regret have contributed to a sense of wholeness and future possibility.

Table 6 psychological well-being scores

Score	Frequency	Percent (%)	Level of PWB
6 – 18	0	0%	Very low
19 – 36	0	0%	Low
37 - 54	15	32.6%	Moderate
55 – 72	29	63.04%	High
73 – 90	2	4.35%	Very high
Total	46	100%	


The table above reveals the total scores of the psychological well-being of the respondents. Twenty-nine respondents scored between 55 and 72. This means their psychological well-being is high. Only two persons scored between 73 and 90, which is the highest possible range for this questionnaire. Fifteen scored in the moderate range: they made up just about 1/3 of the sample.

**Figure 4 Parenting style and psychological well- being
Permissive**




The graph above shows the correlation between psychological well-being and the individuals identified with permissive parenting because of their high scores in the permissive parenting scale. This graph represents 12 respondents. The correlation score is 0.27, which is a low degree positive correlation where the variables hardly show any relationship at all. The highest score was 72, which falls under the high level of psychological well-being compared to the lowest value, 43, which falls under the intermediate range of psychological well-being.

Figure 5 Parenting style and psychological well-being
Authoritarian



The figure above shows the correlation between psychological well-being and the individual who perceives herself as having grown under authoritarian parenting. This graph represents 19 respondents. The correlation score is -0.12 which is a low degree negative correlation. Hence again there seems to be no relationship at all between the variables. The highest score is 75. Together with the highest score in the authoritative parenting category, this is the highest score on the PWB inventory that we gave to the students.

Figure 6 Parenting style and psychological well-being
Authoritative



The graph above shows the correlation between psychological well-being and the individuals identified as those who perceived their parent(s) as exercising an authoritative parenting style: one dot represents one candidate. This graph represents 15 respondents. The correlation score is -0.28 which is a low degree negative correlation between the PWB variable and the parenting style. The highest score of psychological well-being was 75 which corresponds to a very high range of psychological well-being. This was the highest score among all three parenting styles. Forty-nine was the lowest score which corresponds to an intermediate score of psychological well-being: only two candidates score at this level.

4.5 Responsibility for parents/ Involvement with God

The researchers wanted to know whether young adults feel responsible for taking care of their parents regardless of how parents treated them when they were young. Ninety percent of the participants across all parenting styles feel responsible for helping their parents; ten percent say they do not feel obligated to help or take care of their parents. Since young adulthood is the time when children start exercising their freedom and plan for their own family's future, their involvement with their parents set a tone even

for the grandchildren whom these young adults give to their parents.

The researchers were focused on the African notion of *Ubuntu* when they asked the question about responsibility for parents: *Ubuntu* is directly related to the family network. One other question that concerns the African soul is that of the family's involvement with God. Hence the researchers included four questions about the family's involvement with God in the PWB segment of the questionnaire.

The responses to these four questions were even more eye-opening than the question about responsibility for the care of parents. One hundred percent of the respondents, regardless of the parenting style adopted by parents in the raising of their children, indicated a positive relationship with God, which boosted their PWB. Reflecting upon this result, the researchers realized that parenting style may not be the governing influence of a child's formation; rather, the children's ability to learn that the most influential person in their lives was and is God. It must be added that even though we did not include the religious factor in our research objectives, the sample represented a good number of both Muslim and Christian students. No one was without a religion.

5. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1 Summary

The researchers kept in mind that their sample size was indeed modest. They were also aware that the demographics of the respondents were very similar to each other in terms of the objectives for the study. Finally, they were constantly alert to the fact that the data they were receiving from respondents corresponded to their perceptions of the parental styles operative in their households and to their self-constructs about their own personal psychological well-being.

Given these constraints, their findings were as follows:

Objective: To identify the predominant parenting style among the respondents who participated in the study.

The most common parenting style in the households of the young adults involved in the study was the authoritarian style. Among those who answered the items from the subscales, a scale

composed and standardized by J. R. Buri (1991), 41 percent presented scores from this style subscale. Responding to the subscales, 33 percent revealed that they were raised under an authoritative parenting style, while 26 percent grew up in a household with a permissive parenting style. None of the sample perceived themselves as subject to a neglectful parenting style.

The researchers verified that no one actually received high scores in two or more categories, i.e., as persons who grew up in a household of two or more parenting styles.

Objective: To identify which parenting style is more effective for raising children who have now reached young adulthood and express confidence and a positive attitude about their lives and the milieu in which they are living.

It was clear from the statistical results that there was no significant correlation between the parenting style particular to a respondent's household and her or his psychological well-being. Indeed a close look at the figures provided in this research reveals that all three parenting styles – when we omit the neglectful style since this did not typify anybody – showed a high positive well-being score around the 60-point mark regardless of which parenting style classified them.

Objective: To identify which parenting style is associated with young adults who have negative attitudes toward themselves and life.

In the psychological well-being segment of the inventory no parenting style scored low. All the groups scored between intermediate and very high. Hence no parenting style was associated with negative attitudes that a young adult might adopt towards herself and towards life.

5.2 Conclusion, Observations and Recommendations

Conclusion: According to this study performed at Jordan University College in the Psychology Department, psychological well-being has no observable correlation with parenting style without intervening variables. Because no one perceived themselves to have grown up in an atmosphere where the parents were neglectful, the research provided no data on a possible

correlation between psychological well-being and neglectful parenting.

Observations: Granted that the sample size was small and therefore could only be assessed on the level of a pilot study, the high psychological well-being scores nevertheless could have been associated with three other operative variables that are present particularly in African cultures. They are three variables the dynamism of which seem to saturate the African family and social milieu and so could supply more accurate information for any investigation into parenting in Africa. The third variable seems to be a derivative of the first two:

- (1) The *Ubuntu* gestalt for both interpersonal relationships and the formation of self-concept.
- (2) The relationship with God that Africans cultivate in the depths of their souls irrespective of how they believe they are being treated by the parents who are exercising their authority over them.
- (3) The likelihood that the souls of the persons who live in the milieu of *Ubuntu* practice an ethic of forgiveness and restorative justice (Tutu, 1999). This is not only true at certain stages of personal development but extends to all ages and all stages of development.

Apart from the unique African values that may affect psychological well-being regardless of the parenting style, it may be speculated – and hence require further research – that the result for the permissive style, one that does not typically reflect a strong tendency to parental guidance and exercise of authority, resembles the results for the authoritative and authoritarian style. Because there are other factors that may contribute to the psychological well-being of this group besides the parenting itself, namely, the influence of relatives, siblings, educational personnel and other significant others who actually do not belong to the nuclear family environment, the parenting style by itself may not be a valid indicator of the formation in values that fortify the psychological well-being of young adults. It must be added, however, that this may be true for the psychology department at Jordan University College and not for other groups.

Recommendations: We conclude with a brief but perhaps helpful bit of brainstorming for those who would do further exploring on this topic:

- A. Parents should be highly conscious of their children's growth and development by being aware of their own parenting style. Studies that compare children's perceptions of their parents' style with the parents' own self-perception of their style can help promote not only insight but possibilities of harmony within parent-child relationships that serve the well-being of both. Such studies would promote the sensitivity that children and parents can express towards each other within an atmosphere of respect, truthfulness, and love.
- B. Young adults should be attentive to those who know them and appreciate them for the values that shine through their personality and moral character. Those who know them and appreciate them may be able to communicate valuable and accurate insights that allow them to be aware of their own behaviors and attitudes that either settle them into a stable level of psychological well-being or, in contrast, disturb them and provoke anxiety and disharmony within them and so betray a less than stable level of psychological well-being. Self-knowledge and self-appreciation help a person feel presentable to all in her or his social milieu.
- C. Future studies should look into other factors that affect the behaviour and psychological well-being of children and young adults such as (1) a lifetime of economic poverty; (2) current financial upset; (3) a disturbing social or family environment perhaps marked by divorce and conflicted marriages; (4) romantic relationships gone awry; (5) addictions; (6) peer pressure; (7) quality of education during one's life; and (8) a neglectful attitude towards God.

It will become readily apparent that for parents the state of psychological well-being affects greatly the quality of their parenting, and that the quality of their parenting affects greatly their state of psychological well-being.

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Challenges Facing Small and Medium Enterprises in Accessing the Credit Facilities of Micro-financial Institutions in Tanzania

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Abstract

In Tanzania, 95% of the businesses are Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). According to the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce for Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), they represent about 35% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This study aims at assessing the challenges facing SMEs in their attempts to access credit facilities in Tanzania. We focus on the case of Morogoro Municipality.

Both purposeful and convenient sampling techniques were used to select respondents from both the supply side and the demand side of economic interaction. Multiple regressions were used to find the possible relationships between the dependent variable and explanatory variables. The study findings showed that there was a lack of collaterals and high interest rates charged by micro-financial Institutions (MFIs). The noteworthy challenges hindering access to credit by SMEs in the Morogoro Municipality

were high transaction costs, short repayment periods and long bureaucratic procedures. The results were found statistically significant at the .01, .05 and 1.0 levels of significance. With the observation that perhaps Morogoro typifies what is happening in other Tanzanian localities, it is recommended that financial institutions create more flexible, affordable and attractive requirements in financing SMEs in Tanzania.

Key Words: *Small and Medium Enterprises, Credit facilities, Micro Financial Institutions*

Introduction

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the lifeblood of most economies (International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 2019). As business enterprises, SMEs need financial assistance to commence, expand, diversify and maintain the working capital of the business firms (Peter et al., 2017).

Without finance, no one business enterprise can achieve its objectives. Finance is the backbone of SMEs and any other business enterprise (Mckernan & Chen, 2005). Both in the developing and developed world, small firms have been found to have less access to external financial forms of assistance and to be more constrained in their operation and growth (Galindo et al., 2002).

In today's globalization of world trade activity, the private sector has adopted a substantial role in many developing nations. Accordingly, there has been the emergence of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) sector as a significant element for economic development and employment (Richardson et al., 2004).

It is believed that through SMEs the country is able to solve the problems of unemployment and poverty because many people would have the chance to start their own profitable private or family business and provide themselves with everything they need. It brings into the limelight an observable fact that nowadays SMEs play predominant roles in the economy of most developing countries. Especially in Tanzania, over the years, this sector has played a critical role in developing the economy through creation of employment opportunities, income generation, equitable

methods for the distribution of income and designed contributions towards the nation's desire for poverty alleviation (Hamisi, 2011). In Tanzania, SMEs constitute 12% of rural employment and 34% of urban employment. All in all, SMEs constitute up to 32% of the GDP (Wangwe & Semboja, 1997).


In order to enhance recognition of the importance of financial services to SMEs, in the year 2000 the government of Tanzania developed the National Microfinance Policy as a subsequent to the overall financial reforms initiated in 1991. This policy was intended to support the efforts towards national economic development (*Population and Housing Census*, 2012). The policy aimed at enabling low-income earners including SMEs to access financial services (Chijoriga, 2000).

Several studies conducted worldwide have reviewed SMEs' ability to access credit facilities in micro-financial institutions (Gichuki et al., 2014). None of these studies have been conducted in Tanzania. Nevertheless since the liberalization of its financial market, many micro-finance institutions have mushroomed with the capability of providing a variety of financial services including credit to SMEs. If this problem afflicting SMEs of poor access to credit is not solved, then the development of this sector will be a pipe dream and the process of bringing forth an industrialized Tanzania will come to naught.

Hence the present study aims at investigating the main factors that impede the SMEs in their need to access credit from MFIs in the Morogoro Municipality. The study may prove to be helpful to policy makers in formulating pro-poor policies aimed at helping SMEs to grow throughout the country.

1. Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework for challenges facing Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in accessing credit from micro-financial Institutions as depicted in figure 1 shows that, accessing Credit by SMEs from Financial Institutions is influenced by collateral requirements, transactions costs, interest rates on money borrowed, repayment period and bureaucratic procedures for accessing loans.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the Study

Source: Authors of the Research, 2019

2. Research Methodology

2.1 Description of the Study Area

The study was conducted in Morogoro region specifically in Morogoro Municipality as the site for the research. Morogoro Municipality is one of the six districts of Morogoro region in Tanzania. It covers 260 square kilometres, and it has a total population of more than 315,866 people where males number about 151,700 and females 164,166 (URT *Census*, 2012). Purposive sampling technique was used to obtain optimal data from five wards that would be truly representative of the Municipality population namely: Mji Mkuu, Sultani, Sabasaba, Kingo and Mwembesongo. These five wards were purposefully selected from the 19 wards of the Municipality, based on the prevalence of the business activities at issue.

2.2 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Purposeful sampling technique was used to select respondents corresponding to each micro-finance institution (NMB, CRDB,

Pride, Finca, NBC and Postal Bank) to constitute a sample size of service providers. The SME samples consisted of categories of sellers and distributors of agricultural products from Mji Mkuu, Kingo, Sabasaba, Mwembesongo and Sultani ward of Morogoro Municipality. In order to represent adequately the aggregate of wards and micro-finance institutions, the researchers decided upon a total sample of 120 respondents as acceptable for their research purposes.¹

2.3 Data Analysis

Multiple linear regression was used to find the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables. The main aim of the analysis was to determine the main factors that inhibit SMEs in their ability to apply for and gain access to credit facilities from micro-financial institutions in the study area. The multiple linear regression in this study was specified as:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \mu$$

In this equation, Y = the dependent variable (SMEs' Access to Credit); β_0 = coefficients to be estimated; X_1 = collateral requirements; X_2 = transaction costs; X_3 = interest rate; X_4 = repayment period; X_5 = bureaucratic procedures; μ = error term.

The multiple linear regression model with five (5) explanatory variables are as shown in the equation that follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Collateral}_{Requirements} + \beta_2 \text{Transaction}_{Cost} \\ + \beta_3 \text{Interest}_{Rate} + \beta_4 \text{Repayment}_{Period} \\ + \beta_5 \text{Bureaucratic}_{Procedures} + \mu \dots \dots \dots$$

¹ According to URT (2002), small enterprises are those with a capital investment from Tshs. 5 million to Tshs. 200 million while medium enterprises are those that range from an investment of Tshs. 200 million to Tshs. 800 million.

3. The Results and Discussion

3.1 Demographics of the Respondents

3.1.1 Age of the Respondents

If this study were to offer meaningful answers with regards to challenges facing SMEs in accessing credit facilities in Morogoro Municipality, age would be an important variable. Respondents were grouped into five age groups. In this study we corresponded the age groups of participants to the following ranges: 18-25 years, 26-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-60 years and above 60 years.

Most of the respondents who were active as workers were aged below 45 years. They comprised 81.7% of the participants in the study. The 18-25 year age group numbered 24 respondents: these accounted for 20% of the total group of participants. The 26-35 year age group, totalling 40 respondents, accounted for 33.3%; the 36-45 age group numbered 34, i.e., 28.3% of the respondents. The 46-60 year age group consisted of 19 respondents, that is to say, 15.8% of the group, while those respondents aged above 60 years numbered 3 people, 2.5% of the total.

3.1.2 Gender of the Respondents

Specifying the gender of the respondents is helpful for understanding the socially accepted distribution of activities between males and females and how the credit access challenges affect each group. From among the 120 respondents, 70 were males. This accounted for 58.3% while the 50 females that belonged to the group accounted for 41.7%. It was observed during the data collection that in most SMEs of Morogoro Municipality, the number of males are slightly higher than females.

3.1.3 Education Level of the Respondents

The study determined the distribution of the respondents according to their level of education. The statistics indicated that most of the respondents did not finish secondary school. This accounted for 44 respondents equivalent to 36.7% of the sample. Those who did not finish primary education amounted to 40 respondents, i.e., 33.3%. Those who left higher education before finishing numbered 22 (18.3%). Those with an ordinary level of

secondary education were 11 (9.2%) and 3 respondents had no formal education. They accounted for 2.5% of the sample.

3.1.4 Household Size of the Respondents

The researchers decided to inquire about the number of household members. The study considered a household as composed of one or more people who occupy a housing unit, and are sharing resources held in common – for example, food and accommodation (Fields & Casper, 2001).

When family members participate in the family enterprise, the extra costs for the family business greatly diminish. The researchers categorized household size according to the number of members belonging to the household: below four family members, 4-6 family members and 7-9 family members. The household size seemed to be a meaningful variable in this study because the number of family members seemed to present an indicator for the availability of labour.

The households in this particular study with less than four family members were represented by 23 respondents equivalent to 19.17%; 4-6 family member households by 73 respondents equal to 60.83% while 7-9 family member households were represented by 24 respondents amounting to 20%. Hence, the household size of 4 – 6 family members characterized the greater number of participants in the present research. An examination of the health and age status of the members of each household could provide valuable information to determine whether these households provided the necessary labour pools for SMEs.

3.2 Challenges to credit access faced by SMEs (regression analysis)

Our data provided statistically reliable indications that the challenges hindering SMEs from accessing credit facilities were (a) the high cost of repayment (i.e., high interest rates), (b) strict collateral requirements (house, land business license and other assets like cars and so forth); (c) high transactions costs, (d) short repayment periods; (e) long bureaucratic procedures; and (f) lack of enough collateral. These were included in the MLR model to

determine their relationship with SMEs' access to credit, the dependent variable). Table 1 presents the study results.

Table 1. Multiple Linear Regression Results

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.081	0.032***		64.225	0.000
Lack of collaterals	-0.073	0.025***	-0.064	-2.931	0.004
High transaction costs	-0.063	0.023***	-0.061	-2.734	0.007
High interest rates	-0.024	0.026**	-0.022	-0.923	0.035
Short repayment period	-1.006	0.024***	-0.988	-41.215	0.000
Long bureaucratic procedures	-0.040	0.023*	-0.048	-1.763	0.081
Number of Observations = 120					
Note: ***, **, and * Significance at .01, .05 and 1.0 levels					
F=453.016 at P<0.000					
R square = 0.952, Adjusted R square = 0.950					
Dependent Variable: SMEs Access to Credit					

Source: Field Study, 2020

The study results indicated that SMEs' access to the credit facilities provided by MFIs is highly limited by a number of factors i.e., lack of collateral, high transaction costs, high interest rates, time-consuming complex bureaucratic procedures and short repayment periods. Table 1 presents the estimated study results from linear regression analysis through SPSS 20.

The multiple linear equations results were as follows:

$$Y = 2.081 - 0.073X_1 - 0.063X_2 - 0.024X_3 - 1.006X_4 - 0.040X_5 \dots \dots$$

$$se \quad (0.032) \quad (0.025) \quad (0.023) \quad (0.026) \quad (0.024) \quad (0.023)$$

$$t \quad (64.225) \quad (-2.931) \quad (-2.734) \quad (-0.923) \quad (-41.215) \quad (-1.763)$$

Lack of collateral: The study revealed that lack of collateral had a significant effect at the .01 level of significant ($p=0.004$) on SMEs decisions to seek access to credit facilities. The study findings imply that SMEs' access to credit facilities in Morogoro Municipality has been highly limited by strict collateral requirements. Hence the lack of collateral reduces the number of SMEs who can access credit because borrowers who do not have collateral cannot access credit. This datum is in line with various related studies that discovered that SMEs fail to secure bank loans because of restrictive collateral requirements (Gangata & Matavire, 2013). High collateral requirements by MFIs thereby restrict the growth and development of SMEs because of the behaviour of lending institutions, i.e., MFIs, in terms of hedging against borrowers' risks by demanding collateral, which the SMEs lack (Gichuki et al., 2014). Therefore, we have concluded from our study that lack of assets deemed suitable for purposes of collateral, i.e., land, houses and other assets severely constrained SMEs in their need to access credit facilities.

High Transaction Cost: The study results indicate that the time lost in accessing the credit facilities of (MFIs) increases as the ability to access these facilities decreases. This variable, therefore, carries the weight of an explanatory variable because it had a significant effect on the SMEs ability to access credit at the .01 level of significance ($p = 0.007$). Transaction costs included travelling costs, opportunity costs, paperwork costs, collateral costs, experts and supervision costs. This study was based on time cost, since the respondent indicated the time lost but could not estimate the normal amount of time consumed in securing credit facilities from MFIs.

The transaction cost (time lost) is a risk that financial institutions face when they lack necessary information to distinguish between good and bad borrowers (Martha, 2012). High transaction costs are apparent when credit programs, focusing only on credit provision, may be inadequate for meeting the financial needs of SMEs in Morogoro Municipality in Tanzania (Llanto, 2004).

High Interest Rates: The study findings seem to show that rising interest rates charged by lending institutions – i.e., MFIs – discourage SMEs in their attempts to access credit: this result was statistically significant at the .05 level of significance ($p = 0.035$). Not surprisingly, there is a consequent decrease in the number of SMEs in demanding credit. The study findings found that, interest rates were a major challenge to SMEs in their desire to access the credit facilities of the MFIs in Morogoro Municipality.

It became clear in our research that high interest rates charged by the banks and other lending institutions force SMEs to use their own savings as a major source of initial capital to start new businesses. That's why many, perhaps 95% in Tanzania, are small and medium enterprises since they use their own savings as a major capital (TCCIA, 2020). This result harmonizes with many related studies which found that higher interest rates charged by micro-financial institutions are discouraging SMEs from borrowing and thus impede them in their requests for credit (Ndungu, 2014). Therefore, the present research concluded with the recommendation that the management of lending institutions consider lowering their interest rates as a way of encouraging SMEs to borrow from them.

Short Repayment Period: Another important result that came to light in our research – a result that was significant at the .01 level ($p = 0.000$) – again posed no surprise. The shorter the time period for repayment, the less the SMEs were able to access the credit facilities of the MFIs. This drawback for the SMEs again discouraged them from making requests for access to the credit facilities of the MFIs. Indeed, the repayment period influences SMEs access to credit from MFIs to a noticeably great extent. What exacerbates the problem is the manner of repayment. It is a major challenge to the SMEs in accessing credit facilities from the lending institutions.

This result corresponds with the findings of various related studies which have found that MFIs have failed to serve the SMEs in the matter of repayment periods. They have not provided loans in urban and rural communities immune from the challenges occasioned by short loan repayment periods (Rweyemamu et al.,

(2003). Indeed short repayment periods were found to be the key challenge facing enterprises in accessing credit facilities (Gichuki et al., 2014).

Long Bureaucratic Procedures: The present research brought to light the fact that long bureaucratic procedures can hinder the attempts of SMEs to access the credit facilities of the MFIs. Unlike the other explanatory variables focused upon by our research, however, the effect of these procedures has not seemed as direct in their influence upon access: the level of statistical significance was only that of .10 ($p = 0081$). This implies that long loan application procedures perhaps carry some effect on the SMEs' decisions to request credit. In other words, the desire to request credit seems to diminish.

When the long bureaucratic procedure is integrated as a variable into the constellation of explanatory variables focused upon by our research, it seems rather undeniable that a long bureaucratic procedure in loan acquisition is quite costly both in time and in cash. Some SMEs in Morogoro Municipality face a challenge in accessing the credit facilities of the MFIs due to the drawn out complex bureaucratic procedures and the unnecessarily lengthy list of requirements and criteria issued by the lending institutions. This study harmonizes with the findings of many related studies which have revealed that SMEs find it difficult to obtain access to credit facilities since they do not fully understand the complicated procedural requirements for obtaining access to credit facilities (Gichuki et al., 2014). Consequently it is our proposal that credit-giving institutions come up with programmes for educating the SMEs on how they can go about obtaining access to credit facilities.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As researchers, we sought to establish the extent to which high collateral requirements exacted by MFIs, high interest rates charged by MFIs, high transaction costs (in terms of time lost), long bureaucratic procedures and short repayment periods affect SMEs in their endeavours to access credit facilities in Morogoro Municipality, Tanzania. We concluded that short repayment periods affect the decisions of SME entrepreneurs to request and

gain access to the credit facilities of MFIs to a great extent. Also inhibiting SMEs in their ability to request and gain access to credit facilities were collateral requirements, high transaction costs and high interest rates. Hence we arrived at the observation that SMEs in Tanzania are small because they prefer to get their start-up capital from personal savings, relatives and friends.

Given the data that this research made available to us, we make the following recommendations:

- To make the scenario more lucrative for SMEs, banks should find a way to reduce the time spent in transactions and so make them less costly. The same may be said for lengthy bureaucratic procedures.
- Banks should work to reduce interest rates to SMEs who are borrowing money. This will encourage the SMEs to look for credit opportunities.
- Banks should try to explore the possibility of other credit models that can be used for lending money to SMEs, i.e., credit models that do not require such physical collateral as houses, land and other material assets. We recommend that credit giving institutions specify products for SMEs where collateral requirements are lenient.

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THEOLOGY AND CULTURE

“Teach all Nations” (Matt 28:19): The Original Idea for an Evolving Institution¹

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Introduction

This paper intends to present how the original idea of establishing a major seminary for various religious congregations² featured in the evolution of an institution that today is called Jordan University College. It began operations as the Salvatorian Major Seminary (SMS) on the 16th of August 1993, the date of the beginning of lectures for the students of philosophy. The official inauguration of the Seminary and the matriculation of the first students took place on the 11th of October 1993, the day upon which the Salvatorian feast of the Mother of the Saviour is celebrated.³

After six years of existence, the Salvatorian Major Seminary enjoyed a transformation of vision and of mission into the

¹ This paper is based on the author's article published in Polish “Nauczajcie wszystkie narody: 25 lat apostołatu akademickiego im Ks. Franciszka Jorddana w Tanzanii [Eng.: Teach All Nations: Twenty-five years of the Academic Apostolate of Fr. Francis Jordan in Tanzania]”, *Studia Salvatoriana Polonica* 12 (2018) 243–259. It was adapted for presentation at the JUCo Silver Jubilee, 11-13 March, 2019.

² Cf. *Tanzania SDS Information* 1987/1, 2: J. Bednarz, “Od Salwatoriańskiego Wyższego Seminarium”, 44–45.

³ The principal celebrant of the Eucharist was the Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop Agostino Marchetto, while the *Lectio Magistralis* was delivered by Archbishop Polycarp Pengo. Cf. *Tanzania SDS Information* 1993/3, 1–2.

Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy and Theology (SIPT). The date 21 April 1999 refers to the solemn occasion when the Institute received a letter from the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples granting the conversion of the Seminary into an Institute.

A second transformation took place in 2010 when the Salvatorian Institute affiliated with St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) and so found its current place on the map of Tanzanian higher education as Jordan University College (JUCo). The date of 2nd November 2010 is written on the Certificate of Provisional Registration, no. 31, granted by the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU).

16 Aug 1993 – First lectures were conducted at SMS.

21 Apr 1999 – The change of name from SMS to SIPT was approved.

2 Nov 2010 – TCU granted JUCo the Certificate of Provisional Registration, no. 31.

1. Salvatorian Major Seminary 1993–1999

As already indicated, the first lectures began on 16th August 1993. Twenty-three seminarians made up the student body: they belonged to five religious congregations, namely, Precious Blood (CPPS), Consolata Missionaries (IMC), Augustinians (OSA), Benedictines (OSB) and Salvatorians (SDS). All students were Tanzanians.⁴ Fr. David Ralph Brusky, SDS, was the first Rector of the Seminary (1993-1996), while Fr. Wojciech Kowalski, SDS, was the Dean of Studies.⁵ In the first year there were only five members of the teaching staff: Fr. David Ralph Brusky, SDS; Fr. Wojciech Kowalski, SDS; Fr. Filipe Jose Couto, IMC; Fr. Genifried Nnai, SDS; and Prof. Hermes Donald Kreilkamp.⁶ In the

⁴ Salvatorian Major Seminary, “Annual Report: Academic Year 1993-94” (Archive/Morogoro), 3; “Report of the Student Academic Year 1993/94” (Archive/Morogoro).

⁵ For more details about the staff at the time of the institutional structure as a seminary, see J. Bednarz, “Od Salvatoriańskiego Wyższego Seminarium do Kolegium Uniwersyteckiego im. Jordana [Eng.: From Salvatorian Major Seminary to Jordan University College]”, *Studia Salvatoriana Polonica* 7 (2013) 48-49.

⁶ Cf. “Report of Professors, Academic Year 1993/94” (Archive/Morogoro).

academic year 1994/95 the number of students increased to forty-one with one student from Burundi.⁷ The number of teaching staff increased to 11.⁸ In the academic year 1995/96, the students' population increased to 75 belonging to 9 religious congregations and representing 3 countries.⁹ The international character of the student population was becoming visible. It was a harbinger for the future trend in the institution.

Academic Year	Students	Congregation	Country
1993/94	23	5	All Tanzanians
1994/95	41	5	Tanzanians & 1 from Burundi
1995/96	75	9	From 3 countries

1.1 Number of Students in the Salvatorian Major Seminary

The number of students was steadily increasing with each academic year. In the academic year 1995/96 there was a double influx of students: for the first year of philosophy and for the first year of theology. Therefore, the full circle of the seminary programme that circumscribes seven years (3 years of philosophy and 4 years of theology) was entirely in place after six years.¹⁰

⁷ Cf. Salvatorian Major Seminary, "Annual Report: Academic Year 1994-95" (archive/Morogoro), 5; "Report of Students Academic Year 1994/95" (archive/Morogoro).

⁸ Cf. "Report of Professors Academic Year 1994/95" (archive/Morogoro). The new staff members: Fr. Czesław Cekiera SDS, Fr. Albert De Jong CSSp, Mrs. Emmy Elizabeth Kreilkamp, Mr. Adolf Mihanjo, Fr. Ryszard Sachmata SDS and Fr. Arkadiusz Baron.

⁹ Cf. "Salvatorian Major Seminary, Annual Report: Academic Year 1995-96" (archive/Morogoro), 7; "Report of Students Academic Year 1995/96" (archive/Morogoro).

¹⁰ The statistical data in the following tables for the time of Seminary and the Institute is based on the annual reports (archive/Morogoro) and crosschecked with the database for Urbaniana available at the Reception Office.

Students	1993/ 1994	1994/ 95	1995/ 96	1996/ 97	1997/ 98	1998/ 99
BAPH 1	23	20	18	9	27	47
BAPH 2		21	19	17	11	22
BAPH 3			19	19	16	9
BATH 1			19	20	21	34
BATH 2				18	17	20
BATH 3					18	17
BATH 4						17
Total	23	41	75	83	110	166

1.2 Interreligious Seminary

As mentioned in the introduction, the original ideal was to establish a seminary for various religious congregations working in Tanzania. The following table shows how the religious congregations were joining the Seminary in ever increasing numbers starting with only 5 congregations in the academic year 1993/94 and reaching 12 congregations in the academic year 1998/99.¹¹

Not all congregations continued sending their seminarians to SMS. In the case of the Vincentian Congregation (CV), for example, their only registered student completed his three-year philosophy programme. Once he graduated, the Congregation did not send any more students, neither to the Seminary nor to the subsequent institutions (SIPT & JUCo).¹²

¹¹ Used abbreviations of the congregations: CPPS – Missionaries of the Precious Blood; IMC – Consolata Missionaries; OSA – Augustinians; OSB – Benedictines; SDS – Salvatorians; OFM Cap – Capuchins; MSFS – Missionaries of St. Francis de Sales; OCD – Discalced Carmelites; CV – Vincentian Congregation; CSS – Stigmatines; ALCP/OSS – The Apostolic Life Community of Priests in the Opus Spiritus Sancti; CM – Congregation of the Mission; NWAfr – Ndugu Wadogo wa Africa. The Benedictine students are coming from various abbeys, but they form one formation community. Therefore for the statistical purpose they are treated as one group.

¹² The Vincentian Congregation (CV) should not be confused with the Congregation of the Mission (CM) commonly called Vincentians which

Congregations	1993/ 94	1994/ 95	1995/ 96	1996/ 97	1997/ 98	1998/ 99
CPPS	12	26	34	29	26	32
IMC	6	9	11	7	7	8
OSA	2	3	6	7	12	11
OSB	1	1	1	6	8	12
SDS	2	2	8	8	10	20
OFM Cap			8	16	19	24
MSFS			3	6	9	12
OCD			2	3	8	13
CV			2	1	1	
CSS					10	19
ALCP/OSS						13
CM						1
NWAfr						1
Total no. of Students	23	41	75	83	110	166
Total no. of Congregations	5	5	9	9	10	12

1.3 Internationalization

The international character of the student population was progressively becoming visible. In the academic year 1993/94 there were seminarians from Tanzania only and six years later the student population was representing 8 countries. The internationalization of the student population could be seen as a literal realisation of the Seminary motto: *Teach all nations* (Matt 28:19). Seminarians from Tanzania constituted the most numerous group, while the second group in number consisted of students hailing from India.

joined the Seminary in the academic year 1998/99. The Vincentian Congregation (Lat.: Congregatio Vincentiana) is a Syro-Malabar institute of consecrated life founded in India and since 1979 present also in Tanzania. Cf. the official website of the Congregation http://vincentiancongregation.org_cf. also <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/diocese/dqcv0.html>.

Country	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99
Tanzania	23	40	64	69	81	108
Burundi		1				
DRC			1	1	3	10
India			10	13	19	28
Malawi					3	6
Zambia					2	3
Kenya					2	7
Uganda						3
Zimbabwe						1
Total	23	41	75	83	110	166
Countries	1	2	3	3	6	8

1.4 Universality

The composition of the teaching staff of the Seminary indicates a universal dimension of the Church. Since the beginning of the Seminary, the teaching staff was composed not only of the members of religious congregations but also of lay people and diocesan priests. The teaching staff from religious congregations was the largest group. The number of teaching staff, between 21 and 22, was an optimal and sufficient number for the size of the institution as a major seminary and for the fulfilment of the requirements established for the programme in virtue of its ecclesiastical affiliation with the Pontifical Urbaniana University.

Teaching Staff	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99
Religious	4	7	10	17	20	19
Diocesan		1	1	2		
Lay	1	3	4	2	2	3
Total	5	11	15	21	22	22

1.5 Religious Congregation Involvement

The missionary involvement was quite visible during the time when SMS was in full operation. In the teaching process there were involved more than the members from the congregations that were

directly implicated as a result of having their own students in the Seminary. Some other congregations were helping the newly established institution by providing the Seminary with instructors and lecturers on the teaching staff. Among the assisting congregations were both male and female religious institutes.

The Seminary needed this assistance of the other congregations, because not all congregations registering their seminarians at SMS were able to provide teaching staff for the Seminary. For example, out of five congregations sending their seminarians to SMS in the first two years of its existence only two of them contributed members to the staff of the Seminary. In the academic year 1998/99 there were twelve congregations with seminarians at SMS, but only eight were involved in teaching.¹³

Religious Congregations involved in teaching	1993/ 94	1994/ 95	1995/ 96	1996/ 97	1997/ 98	1998/ 99
Congregations with seminarians	2	2	4	5	5	8
Congregations without seminarians		1	1	2	4	5
Total number of congregations involved in teaching	2	3	5	7	9	13
Congregations with students but not involved in teaching	5	5	9	9	10	12

¹³ Comparison between the first row "Congregations with seminarians [involved in teaching]" and the last row "Congregations with students but not involved in teaching" illustrates the fact that congregations supplying seminarians as students outnumbered the congregations with seminarians that supplied teachers.

1.6 Achievements

The most important achievement in the time of SMS was the ecclesiastical affiliation of the programmes of philosophy and theology with the Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome. The affiliations of both programmes came at the time when both the students of philosophy and those of theology were in their last year of studies (in 1995 for Philosophy and in 1999 for Theology).¹⁴ It gave them an opportunity to sit for the bachelor examination and to obtain the academic degree from the Pontifical Urbaniana University.

During the term of the second Rector of SMS, in 1998, Fr. Stanisław Golus, SDS (1996-1999), with the initiative of Fr. Wojciech Kowalski, SDS, established a publishing enterprise, namely, the *Salvatorianum*.¹⁵ In 1999 the first issue of our journal *Africa Tomorrow* was published.¹⁶

2. Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy & Theology 1999–2010

2.1 Changing the Name and Changing the Character of the Institution

The original master plan of the Seminary carried the provision that all seminarians would live on the same campus in the dormitories located behind the church. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the implementation of the project, congregations started to establish their new formation houses off-campus but still

¹⁴ The affiliation of Philosophy decree, no. 932/95/2 (Archive/Morogoro). This affiliation was renewed a number of times over a period of five years. Most recently in 2017 it was renewed again for five years. The affiliation of Theology decree, no. 164/99 (Archive/Morogoro), was renewed periodically during a five-year period. Most recently it was renewed in 2014 for ten years.

¹⁵ Cf. Certificate of Registration, no. 119558 on 3rd December 1998 (Archive/Morogoro).

¹⁶ In the beginning *Africa Tomorrow* was not registered as a serial publication and improperly the ISBN (International Standard Book Number) was used for it. In 2011 *Africa Tomorrow* was finally registered with the International Standard Serial Number (ISSN 1821-8083).

close to the Seminary. In fact, the Capuchins had their house there even before the construction of the Seminary commenced.

In such a situation, the Seminary was providing primarily the intellectual formation while the existing formation houses were providing the other elements of religious formation. Therefore, in February 1999, the General Superior of the Salvatorians, Fr. Karl Hofmann, SDS, wrote a letter to the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples with a request to change the name of the institution from the Salvatorian Major Seminary to the Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy and Theology. The Congregation gave an affirmative answer, in writing, on 21 April 1999.¹⁷

The inauguration of the academic year 1999/2000 was an important event because of the blessing of the newly built campus church that marked the official completion of the construction of the Seminary that in the meantime had become the Institute. Cardinal Polycarp Pengo presided over the Eucharist, delivered the homily and consecrated the altar. The Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Luigi Pezzutto, was one of the concelebrants. President Benjamin William Mkapa and his wife honoured the celebration with their presence. Newly elected Superior General of the Salvatorians, Fr. Andrzej Urbański, SDS, delivered a speech entitled *From Dream to Reality*.¹⁸

2.2 Academic Programmes

A new programme for the *Diploma in Theological Studies* designed for the intellectual formation of religious Brothers and Sisters was launched in the academic year 1999/2000.¹⁹ The programme consisted of one year of philosophy and three years of theology. The education of religious Brothers and Sisters was in fact another reason of converting the Seminary into an Institute.

¹⁷ Cf. "Morogoro Name Change", *Informationes SDS* 53 (1999) 3; reply 21 Apr 1999 (Archive/Morogoro).

¹⁸ The list of guests is included in *Sauti ya Mwokozi* 1999/9, 36–37. For the speech of Fr. Urbański, see *Sauti ya Mwokozi* 1999/9, 44–47.

¹⁹ The design of the programme was prepared during the term of Fr. Stanisław Golus, SDS.

The number of students in the Institute continued to grow. The academic year 2004/05 was a year with the largest number of students to date in the B.A. programme for Philosophy and for the Diploma programme in Theological Studies. During this same academic year, the overall number of students attending the Institute was at a peak.

We intend shortly to explain why the philosophy programme was growing in numbers. At that point, we will need to look at the composition of the student population. Suffice it to say that both bachelor programmes reached their peak (BA in Philosophy in 2004/05, BA in Theology in 2007/08). After that the number of students started to decline.

The Diploma in Theological Studies did not meet the expectation that interested parties placed in the programme. The total number of thirteen students in the academic year 2004/05 was the highest number for this programme, and it was rather below the expected number. The main reason for low enrolment was lack of any recognition of this programme, and therefore it could not attract more students. Another reason seemed to be linked to the academic difficulties that students without proper preparation were facing because after one year of philosophy, the students were jumping to the theology courses.

All these factors convinced the management of the Institute to phase out this programme and to replace it with a new programme of Diploma in Religious Studies designed to meet the intellectual and formation needs of religious Brothers and Sisters.

In the academic year 2006/7 a one-year Diploma programme in African Studies was created. At the beginning, it was a part-time programme pursued by seminarians, mainly philosophy students. In the academic year 2008/9 there were a fraction of the seminarians enrolled in it on a part-time basis but the first full-time student was also accepted into this programme. Both new programmes received their accreditation by TCU when the Institute converted into a College.

Students	BAPH	BATH	Diploma Theological Studies	Diploma African Studies	Diploma Religious Studies	Total
1999/2000	87	101	1			189
2000/2001	109	97	2			208
2001/2002	121	99	8			228
2002/2003	160	94	7			261
2003/2004	180	103	8			291
2004/2005	190	119	13			322
2005/2006	181	117	7			305
2006/2007	162	127	6			295
2007/2008	138	143	3			284
2008/2009	127	135	2	1	5	270
2009/2010	133	129		4	11	277

2.3 Composition of the Student Population in Ecclesiastical Programmes

In order to better understand the reasons for the increase and decrease of the student population in the Institute, it is important to distinguish the types of students that were enrolled in both ecclesiastical programmes. The student population in both programmes consisted of seminarians, religious Sisters and lay students.

The transformation of the Seminary into the Institute created for the lay students a possibility to study at this newly structured establishment. However, the goal of the conversion of the Seminary into the Institute was to create an opportunity of study for religious Brothers and Sisters. During the time of the Seminary whoever was losing his status as a seminarian (leaving the formation house) could not continue his studies at the Seminary.

When the institution became the Institute losing the status of seminarian was not directly linked to his academic status. In fact, the first lay students at the Institute were those who lost their

seminarian status, but continued pursuing their studies at the Institute in their new status as lay students. Since the first Rector of the Institute, Fr. Julian Bednarz SDS (1999–2005), did not require payment of fees by the lay students, the Institute started to attract other lay students. This was the main reason of a rapid growth of the lay student population, in particular in the philosophy programme.

In 2005 the Board of Directors²⁰ passed a resolution that directed the newly appointed Rector, Fr. Bernard Witek SDS (2005–2010), to introduce the requirement of payment of fees by all students. Consequently the enrolment of lay students dropped to a minimum. Again the lay students were generally limited to those who lost their seminarian status but wanted to complete their studies at the Institute.

Academic Year	Seminarians			Sisters			Lay		
	Ph	Th	Total	Ph	Th	Total	Ph	Th	Total
1999/2000	87	101	188			0			0
2000/2001	103	97	200	2		2	4		4
2001/2002	112	97	209	4		4	5	2	7
2002/2003	127	92	219	4		4	29	2	31
2003/2004	143	99	242	4	1	5	33	3	36
2004/2005	143	108	251	6	3	9	41	8	49
2005/2006	143	109	252	7	3	10	31	5	36
2006/2007	140	122	262	5	3	8	17	2	19
2007/2008	129	136	265	1	6	7	8	1	9
2008/2009	116	130	246		3	3	11	2	13
2009/2010	125	122	247		3	3	8	4	12

²⁰ The Board of Directors was an advisory body to the Generalate of the Salvatorians during the time of SMS.

Apart from those Sisters who were pursuing the Diploma programme in Theological Studies, there were only a few Sisters pursuing the Bachelor degrees of Philosophy and Theology. Since the ecclesiastical programmes were oriented towards preparation of candidates for the ministerial priesthood, they were not attractive for the Sisters.

The number of seminarians for the BA in Philosophy reached a peak of 143 students in three consecutive academic years (2003/4, 2004/5 & 2005/6). The highest number in theology was in the academic year 2007/8. The first significant drop of number of students in philosophy was observed in 2007/8 and two years later, a drop was also visible in theology.

We can compare the number of seminarians with the number of congregations and dioceses that were sending their seminarians to the Institute. There were 11 congregations that continuously had sent their seminarians during the time of SMS (1999–2010).²¹ The Claretian Missionaries join the Institute in the academic year 2000/1. Some other congregations tried to establish their formation in Morogoro, but after some years they left (e.g., the Conventual Franciscans). There was no continuity in the choice of various dioceses to send seminarians.

If we compare the data from the previous table with the following table, we can note a direct link between the number of seminarians and the number of congregations and dioceses sending their seminarians to the Institute. From the academic year 2007/08 the number of congregations started to decrease. Similarly, the number of dioceses was decreasing, diminishing to one diocese since 2007/8.

²¹ They were the following: Missionaries of the Precious Blood; Consolata Missionaries; Augustinians; Benedictines; Salvatorians; Capuchins; Missionaries of St. Francis de Sales; Discalced Carmelites; Stigmatines; the Apostolic Life Community of Priests in the Opus Spiritus Sancti; Congregation of the Mission.

**Philosophy & Theology Seminarians
Comparison between Religious Congregations & Dioceses
(1999–2010)**

Academic Year	Religious Congregations	Dioceses
1999/2000	13	2
2000/2001	14	2
2001/2002	14	3
2002/2003	14	3
2003/2004	17	5
2004/2005	15	4
2005/2006	17	2
2006/2007	17	2
2007/2008	16	1
2008/2009	16	1
2009/2010	13	1

2.4 Teaching Staff

We should keep in mind that an optimal number of teaching staff at the time of SMS was between 21 and 22. In the first six years of SIPT the total number of the teaching staff was increasing. There were 38 members on the staff in the academic years 2003/4 and 2004/5. However, in spite of this appreciable number of staff there was a huge fluidity: people were coming and going. Some of them were just teaching in one semester or one year. The big number of the teaching staff without sure stability could have been evaluated in a negative light by the Pontifical Urbaniana University. The re-affiliations, therefore, were given for a shorter term of five years only.

Since the beginning of my term in the office from October 2005 the focus was to establish more stability among the teaching staff by limiting the number of visiting lecturers and searching for

available and prospective permanent staff from the participating congregations. The Table below shows that the total number of teaching staff started to decrease to 23 in the academic year 2009/10 which was close to the optimal number from the time of SMS. All these efforts had a positive impact on the recent re-affiliations of the theology programme in 2014.²²

Teaching Staff

Academic Year	New Staff	Continuing Staff	Total
1999/2000	7	17	24
2000/2001	11	20	31
2001/2002	8	27	35
2002/2003	9	25	34
2003/2004	8	30	38
2004/2005	10	28	38
2005/2006	8	24	32
2006/2007	3	22	25
2007/2008	7	20	27
2008/2009	5	20	25
2009/2010	3	20	23

²² The theology programme was affiliated in 1999 for 5 years, then re-affiliated for 5 years in 2004 and 2009. In 2014, the theology programme was re-affiliated for 10 years. The philosophy programme was affiliated in 1995 for 5 years and re-affiliated for another 5 years in 2000 and 2005. The re-affiliation of 2005 was extended till 2012 due to the reform of ecclesiastical programmes by the Congregation for Catholic Education. In 2012 it was again re-affiliated for another five years. The most recent re-affiliation of philosophy for 5 years was in 2017. See decrees of affiliation and re-affiliation (Archive/Morogoro).

2.5 Transformation of the Institute into a University College

2.5.1 Principal Reasons for the Transformation

There were two main reasons for the transformation of the Institute into a University College. They were: 1) a decreasing number of seminarians in the programmes of philosophy and theology; and 2) the lack of accreditation of the programmes offered by SMS in Tanzania.

Decreasing Number of Seminarians

The analysis of the student population indicated a negative trend: the number of seminarians started to decrease, first in philosophy from the academic year 2007/8 and later in theology from 2008/9. The decrease was linked to the fact that some congregations moved their students to other similar institutions in other countries (Kenya, Uganda). Apart from that, there were also signs of a decrease of vocations because of the changing situation in Tanzania. The candidates who passed the Form VI exams with high marks had a chance to get a loan for studies and therefore instead of moving from a minor seminary to a major seminary some of them started to opt for a university.

Lack of Accreditation of the Programmes

Thanks to the affiliation with the Pontifical Urbaniana University, the bachelor programmes had ecclesiastical recognition, but this did not guarantee automatically the state recognition in the country of Tanzania. A person with an ecclesiastical degree has to go through a process of recognition of his/her degree by the relevant government institutions like TCU in Tanzania. The lack of such recognition was raised as an issue from time to time. This matter was noted and reported to the Board of Directors and the Generalate by the Official Visitation of the Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy and Theology in February 2009. The report suggested also the possibility of offering programmes that could attract non-seminarians.²³

²³ Cf. “Visitation Report of the Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy and Theology, February 24-27, 2009”, 2–3 (General Archive SDS/Rome).

2.5.2 Process of Transformation

The Generalate took into consideration a possibility of affiliation with St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT). At the beginning of 2009 the General Superior of the Salvatorians, Fr. Andrzej Urbański, SDS, wrote a letter to the Vice Chancellor of SAUT, Rev. Dr. Charles Kitima, and expressed the hope to affiliate the Institute with SAUT. The Vice Chancellor gave a positive answer on 19th March 2009.²⁴ The matter of affiliation was discussed at the Board of Directors meeting held in Rome on 30th-31st March 2009. The Board directed the Rector of the Institute to contact the Vice Chancellor of SAUT for more detailed talks about affiliation.²⁵ As a result Fr. Bernard Witek prepared a *Five-Year Strategic and Financial Plan* with a projection of possible development once the Institute would be affiliated with SAUT.²⁶

This plan was presented to the Board at its meeting on 15th-16th April 2010. The Vice Chancellor of SAUT received an invitation to this meeting. On 16th April in the common session with the designated Member of the Generalate, the Board of Directors recommended the affiliation with SAUT, and Jordan College was proposed as a new name for the Institution. The exchange of communication between the General Superior of the Salvatorians and the Tanzania Episcopal Conference started immediately after the meeting.²⁷ All practical matters of implementation of the decision of affiliation were left with the Rector of the Institute and the Vice Chancellor of SAUT. A Technical Team visited the Institute in August 2010.

Since the process was taking time, the lectures for the programmes of philosophy and theology were already beginning on the 30th August 2010 as stipulated in the academic calendar. We were informed about the positive decision of TCU in October 2010.

²⁴ Cf. "The Vice Chancellor Letter to Fr. A. Urbański, 19 March 2009" (General Archive SDS/Rome).

²⁵ Cf. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors – March 30-31, 2009", 1–2 (General Archive SDS/Rome).

²⁶ Cf. Salvatorian Institute of Philosophy and Theology & Jordan College, *Five-Year Strategic and Financial Plan* (General Archive SDS/Rome).

²⁷ Letter with the Decision of the Generalate, 16 April 2010 and reply on 4 May 2010 (General Archive SDS/Rome).

Preparations for accommodating the first group of students were in order so that on 8th November 2010 the lectures for the first students of the Bachelor of Arts in Education could start. Meanwhile, the Tanzania Commission for Universities granted Jordan University College a Certificate of Provisional Registration dated the 2nd November 2010.

3. Jordan University College (2010 –)

The transformation of the Salvatorian Institute from a seminary-oriented institution into an open higher-learning institution, i.e., JUCo, brought into view two objectives that were stipulated in the *Five-Year Strategic and Financial Plan*. These two objectives were later incorporated into the JUCo prospectus,²⁸ namely:

- To contribute more effectively to the local church. The means for doing this were:
 - Continuing preparation and formation of the candidates for the priestly and religious life;
 - Offering programmes aiming at preparation of lay people for the mission of the Church in the 21st century.
- To contribute to the local society in particular in view of the *Tanzania Development Vision 2025*. This was to be accomplished by:
 - Offering high quality academic programmes that focused on solving social problems and contributing to the development of the country;
 - Imparting general education based on Christian values;
 - Preparing men and women of integrity, dedication, and commitment;
 - Acting as a forum for ecumenical as well as inter-religious dialogue – this could be a means for promoting peace, justice and unity.

²⁸ Cf. *Five Year Strategic and Financial Plan*, 3–4 (General Archive SDS/Rome); Jordan University College, *Prospectus: Academic Year 2016/2017*, 6.

3.1 New Programmes/ Growing Student Population

Realization of the second objective gave internal momentum to the development of the College. In November 2010, the number of students increased to 696 when 425 students were accepted for the Bachelor of Arts with Education. In the following year 8 new programmes were added and the number of students more than doubled reaching to 1,445. This trend continued until the academic year 2016/17 when the student population reached 3,777, all enrolled in 42 academic programmes.

Students	2010/ 2011	2011/ 2012	2012/ 2013	2013/ 2014	2014/ 2015	2015/ 2016	2016/ 2017	2017/ 2018
Master				72	156	228	245	152
Bachelor	678	1,350	2,010	2,428	2,412	2,597	2,637	2,083
Diploma	18	29	210	436	472	491	629	571
Certificate		66	179	203	215	318	266	127
Total	696	1,445	2,399	3,139	3,255	3,634	3,777	2,933

The number of students was growing mainly thanks to some popular programmes like the Bachelor of Arts in Education and the Master of Education. As far as the Certificate and Diploma programmes were concerned, the increase of students was linked to the additional intakes in March/April for the Diploma programmes and June/July for the Certificate programmes.

The number of students decreased in the academic year 2017/18 because of the ban on admission into ten degree programmes (seven at the Bachelor level and three at the Master level). For the Certificate and Diploma programmes the university institutions were not allowed by TCU to organize additional intakes in that academic year. The drop therefore is visible in particular at the certificate level from 266 in the academic year 2016/17 down to 127 students in 2017/18.

Purpose of Enrolment	2010/ 2011	2011/ 2012	2012/ 2013	2013/ 2014	2014/ 2015	2015/ 2016	2016/ 2017	2017/ 2018
Master				3	4	4	5	5
Bachelor	3	6	10	10	11	11	11	11
Diploma	2	3	9	9	11	14	15	13
Certificate		4	6	6	10	12	11	12
Total	5	13	25	28	36	41	42	41

In order to serve more effectively the local church (the first goal of transformation) JUCo created academic programmes at various levels of proficiency in order to include the religious studies component (Certificate in Education with Religious Studies, Diploma in Education with Religious Studies, Bachelor of Arts in Education with Religious Studies and Mater of Religious Studies with Education). In spite of various efforts to publicise them, the enrolment in these programmes continues to be very low.

3.2 Philosophy & Theology Students

During the process of transformation of the seminary-oriented institution (SMS) into an open institution (JUCo), opinions of the concerned religious congregations about the new orientation were divided. Some were in favour: this was reported by the visitation in 2009. Others were against it because of the fear that it would affect negatively the formation of seminarians. In fact, some formators feared that because of the presence of female students the seminarians would start losing their vocations.

During the first years of JUCo's existence as an institution, when I presented the reports to the Bishops about the tenor of the new manner of educational formation, quite often I received a question concerning seminarians. From what I observed, I could frankly answer that there was no visible impact like increasing dropouts among the seminarians because of a new environment.

The following table shows an analysis of the number of students in both ecclesiastical disciplines.²⁹ The decrease of students in both programmes continued in the first year of JUCo. A comparison shows that in the academic year 2008/9 there were 127 students of philosophy while in 2013/13 the number went down to 117.

There was also another reason for the shifting numbers of students, namely, the decision to send Salvatorian philosophy students to the DRC. As far as the theology programme was concerned, the decrease in the first years of JUCo was a consequence of the process that started in the last years of SIPT. In the academic year 2009/10 there were 129 theology students. In the academic year 2012/13 there was a notable decrease to 105. With the onset of the academic year 2014/15 there was a visible improvement of enrolment for both programmes. What accounted for this upward surge in enrolment was that some new congregations joined JUCo and some dioceses started sending their seminarians to JUCo.

The number of students in both programmes has been encouraging. If this trend continues, it presents a positive omen for the future. The total number of 342 students in the ecclesiastical programmes for the academic year 2018/19 was beyond the original expectation, because the Salvatorian Major Seminary was established for a maximum number of 300 seminarians. If we compare the number of students in philosophy for the academic year 2018/2019, 148, with the total number 190 of students in philosophy in 2004/5 we would be tempted to conclude that the philosophy programme was not yet performing. But when keeping in mind that the highest number of seminarians in the philosophy programme during the time of SIPT was 143 (as indicated in the table above for the academic years 2003/4, 2004/5 & 2005/6) and by drawing a comparison with the total number of students of philosophy in the 2018/2019 academic year where more than 90%

²⁹ The author could not get exact data for distinguishing the number of seminarians among the students of philosophy and theology because, on the one hand, the Admission Office did not keep this record well; and, on the other hand, it would be difficult to track it since some who were seminarians continued studies as lay students. In spite of this ambiguity, there were and are only a few lay students pursuing the ecclesiastical programmes.

were seminarians we can conclude from this comparison that the enrolment of seminarians in the BA programme for philosophy in 2018/2019 was almost at a par with the best performance at SIPT. The highest number of all students in the theology at the time of SIPT was 143 in the academic year 2007/8. The number of 194 theology students for the 2018/2019 academic year is an increase of about 35%.

Students	Philosophy	Theology	Total
2010/2011	137	126	263
2011/2012	134	123	257
2012/2013	118	105	223
2013/2014	117	120	237
2014/2015	131	130	261
2015/2016	134	144	278
2016/2017	130	178	308
2017/2018	128	166	294
2018/2019	148	194	342

Conclusion

This research has shown the ups and downs of the seminary component in the evolving institution that we now call Jordan University College. If we were to divide SITP into two equal periods, we would observe that after an initial growth, a negative trend of enrolment appeared in the second period of the functioning of SITP, a trend that seemed to continue into the first year of JUCo.

The increase of enrolment in the most recent year that our research examines proves that the transformation of SIPT into JUCo had and has a positive impact on the revival and continuation of the original idea of forming candidates for the ministerial priesthood. The fear that the new milieu occasioned particularly by a co-ed system would disturb if not entirely disrupt vocations to the diaconate and the priesthood did not find a foothold in what has really happened.

One of the main reasons for the rise in the number of the participating congregations and dioceses that send their seminarians to the JUCo ecclesiastical programmes is the current accreditation status of these programmes in Tanzania. It must be said, on the other hand, that in spite of improved enrolment in the ecclesiastical programmes, these programmes do have their limits. They will always be affected by vocation trends and the number of congregations and dioceses that choose to send their seminarians. This is because of the particular curricula that pertain to seminary-oriented programmes. On JUCo's part, offering applied and blended programmes of philosophy and theology, together with master and doctoral programmes in each department, may increase the number of students in both departments. In this way, God will be served.

Optatus of Milevis and the Sacraments: Controversy between Catholics and Donatists

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Introduction

There has been a long and penetrating discussion concerning the object of our study, that of the *sacramentum* (sacrament). Historically speaking, many theologians have contributed to what we understand today as “sacraments” from the Patristic era to the present time. Some of the definitions offered by those who have contributed to the idea of “sacramentum” are: *sacrum sermentum* (Tertullian); *sacrum signum* (St. Augustine); and *sacrum secretum* (Isidore of Seville, who died approximately in 636).

However, I shall focus on Optatus of Milevis’ notion of sacraments, a notion embedded in the controversy between Catholics and Donatists. The Donatists were of the opinion that the Catholic priests who denied their faith under torture were no longer eligible to confer the sacraments. They were “traditors” (in English we would call them “traitors”) and could not be allowed to confer Sacraments again unless they were re-ordained. In case of non-ordained Christians, they were to be re-baptized.

According to Optatus, the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend on the holiness of the minister who is conferring the sacrament, whether it is an ordained minister, or in the case of matrimony and emergency baptism, a non-ordained minister. Similarly the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend on the holiness of the person receiving the sacrament. The efficacy of the sacrament depends on the Blessed Trinity, God himself, who is really the agent of the sacramental action. The sacraments are not “magic”. The power and the life they convey come from God

through Jesus Christ. Separated from the cross of Jesus Christ and from his grace, the sacraments would be only dry, barren ditches – empty, meaningless rituals. But because they are inseparably linked to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, the sacraments are full of God’s abundant life.¹

1. The notion of the term “sacrament”

1.1 Etymology / Origin of the term “sacramentum”

Etymologically, “sacramentum” comes from the Latin verb “sacrare” plus the suffix “mentum” (sacra-mentum), which means to make something, a person or a thing, sacred, i.e., to make it integral to what belongs to God and his sanctifying activity. This could only be done by a public person, never a private one.² The suffix “mentum” primarily indicates the means to obtain a determined goal. *Alimentum*, for example, means that through which we subsist; *ornamentum*, that by which we render a determined thing beautiful; *argumentum*, the logical artifice we use to demonstrate the foundation of a determined thesis or truth. It can also indicate the very action of consecrating something, the action of consecrating a person who, in his turn, will now be able to consecrate other persons or objects. The word *sacramentum* can also refer to the object itself that is made sacred.³

“Sacramentum” as a term is not scriptural. However, it appears in Latin in the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth century in the writings of Tertullian.

The term “sacrament” was used loosely in the early Church Fathers during the first six centuries. They used the Latin Word *sacramentum* and the synonymous Greek word *mysterion* to speak of many dimensions of Church life. In the Middle Ages, “sacrament” came to have a more precise definition. By the thirteenth century, the bishops had agreed on an official list of the

¹ A. SCHRECK, *Catholic and Christian: An Explanation of Commonly Misunderstood Catholic Beliefs*, 119.

² J. S. MARTINS, *The Sacraments of The New Alliance*, 10.

³ J. S. MARTINS, *The Sacraments of The New Alliance*, 10.

seven sacraments which Catholics and Orthodox Christians recognize today.⁴

It is to be emphasized that *sacramentum* as a word can indicate the means by which something is consecrated, the consecratory action itself, the agent or the person who consecrates; and, finally, the object made sacred. Given the nebulous range of meanings that constitute the etymological notion of sacrament, it is not surprising that there prevailed among the ancient Romans many usages of the word "sacrament".

It was the oath sworn by soldiers, by which they obligated themselves to obey the emperor (*sacramentum militare*). It connoted the money (pledge) deposited by two litigants in the sacred place before the start of a trial, on the condition that, once the trial was completed, the winner would be able to take his deposited sum, while the loser was required to leave his in the temple for the divine cult (*sacramentum civile*). This latter type of sacrament thus acquired a religious dimension of worship, because of the sacred destination of the above-mentioned sum of money.⁵

1.2 "Sacramentum" – quid sit?

A sacrament is a symbolic action that signifies a sacred reality or may make a sacred reality really present. The seven sacraments of the Catholic Church do not simply point to this sacred reality, i.e., grace, salvation; but, in their administration, which is a process of communication between minister and recipient, and ultimately between God and a human being, they simultaneously communicate this saving reality to believers.⁶

A sacrament is a visible reality which reveals the mystery of salvation, because it is its realization.⁷ St. Augustine said that the first sacrament is Jesus Christ. In a way he is the source of all sacraments. Jesus is certainly 'a visible reality'; for is he not God rendered incarnate by the power of the Holy Spirit", the carpenter, the Son of Mary and brother of James and Judas and Simon" (Mk

⁴ A. SCHRECK, *Catholic and Christian: An Explanation of Commonly Misunderstood Catholic Beliefs*, 123.

⁵ J. S. MARTINS, *The Sacraments of The New Alliance*, 11.

⁶ G. KOCH, "Sacraments" in the *Handbook of Catholic Theology*, 605

⁷ P. BÉGUERIE & C. DUCHESNEAU, *How to Understand the Sacraments*, 5.

6:3)? Jesus “reveals the mystery of salvation” because he himself is the Savior. He makes salvation really present by offering himself as a divine self-gift on the cross and so putting into action, by means of his human nature, the greatest love. He alone truly deserves the name Lord.

He is the Author of the sacramental economy. Jesus is the “sacrament of communion with the Father in the Holy Spirit”. In his pursuit of terminology that expresses Jesus’ consubstantial communion with the Father and the Holy Spirit in divinity and his consubstantial communion with us in humanity, the Vlaams theologian Edward Schillebeeckx has ventured to describe him as “the sacrament of the encounter with God”.⁸ Given the hypostatic union, it is not difficult to surmise that one would have to add that Jesus is “the sacrament of the divine encounter with the human”. In any event, a theologically convincing definition of sacrament: *a sacrament is an outward sign of inward grace, ordained by Jesus Christ, by which Jesus gives his grace to our souls.*⁹

1.3 The “Why” of the Sacraments

Sacraments are among the means of attaining righteousness and salvation. But of the many definitions, each of them appropriate, which may serve to explain the nature of a sacrament, there is none more comprehensive, none more perspicuous, than the definition given by St. Augustine and adopted by all scholastic writers. A sacrament, he says, is a sign of a sacred thing; or, as it has been expressed in other words, it is the visible sign of an invisible grace,

⁸ P. BÉGUERIE & C. DUCHESNEAU, *How to Understand the Sacraments*, 5. If one were to suggest that this expression refers to the human being’s encounter with God, a difficulty may ensue, namely, the fact that the word “encounter” cannot adequately carry the weight of the divine Redeemer’s saving action on the human soul. Perhaps a more understandable expression would be that Jesus is the “sacrament of communion with the Father in the Holy Spirit”. The one who sees Jesus, sees the Father. Jesus and the Father are one in the unity of the Holy Spirit. From within this communion Jesus founds His Church as the universal sacrament of salvation.

⁹ CANON FRANCIS RIPLEY, *This is the Faith: A Complete Explanation of the Catholic Faith*, 217.

instituted for our justification.¹⁰ A sacrament is a rite through which God's saving grace is uniquely active.¹¹ Although St. Augustine (354-430 AD) defined a sacrament as a *sacrum signum*, i.e., a sacred sign, and the "visible sign of an invisible reality," which is a definition accepted by both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians, this does not sufficiently distinguish those signs which the Church has believed to be divinely instituted or indicate how one should understand the relation of the visible sign to the invisible reality.¹²

From these definitions, we can deduce that the goal of the sacraments is (a) to make us appealing as purified, holy human persons to the God who justifies us, (b) to be a means of salvation for us, (c) to transform us into a sacred sign for others, and (d) most especially, to make Jesus present within our being so that we may be a sacrament of Christian love to all whom we meet.

2. Biblical Background

2.1 In the Old Testament

In the Greek Septuagint, the word *mysterion* appears twenty times and is used only in the later books from the Hellenistic period.¹³ *It is adopted in general to indicate something that is in some way mysterious, hidden, secret, and ignored by others.* Sometimes it refers to making something hidden; every so often it designates, more particularly, something that is occult, secret and hidden in God and unknown to men because of His complete transcendence, but which nevertheless can be revealed to man. Finally, it signifies the salvific plan of God, His plan to save the human person when the fullness of time arrives; it also indicates the revelation, albeit obscure, of this same plan.¹⁴

¹⁰ J. A. MCHUGH. – CHARLES J. CALLAN, Translators, *Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests*, 143.

¹¹ V.A. HARVEY, *A Handbook of Theological Terms*, 211.

¹² V.A. HARVEY, *A Handbook of Theological Terms*, 212.

¹³ J. S. MARTINS, *The Sacraments of the New Alliance*, 12.

¹⁴ J. S. MARTINS, *The Sacraments of The New Alliance*, 12.

2.2 In the New Testament

In the New Testament all the sign-actions that are later identified by the term “sacrament” occur with greater or lesser clarity. Some would opine, for example, that the sacrament of confirmation is a sign-action that occurs in the New Testament with less clarity. There is no Greek word that applies to the sacraments as a group. It is important to note, however, that the Latin word “sacramentum” is a translation of the Greek “mysterion” and is to be found from the second/third century or at times in the Old Latin versions of the Bible. As a result, meanings of the biblically important term “mysterion” (*mysterium*) may have found their way into the later concept of sacrament.¹⁵

What is the meaning of *mysterium*, a term that occurs twenty-seven times in the New Testament (twenty in Paul alone)? In continuity with the eschatological and apocalyptic thinking of the late Old Testament, the “*mysterium* of the reign of God” in Mk 4:11, the reign of God that God causes suddenly to break into history, is revealed to believers. For Paul and those who follow him the *mysterium* is the reality of God’s eternal, hidden plan of salvation (e.g., 1 Cor 2:1,7). This *mysterium* takes shape in history as salvation for all in Jesus Christ (1 Cor 1:23; 3:7; Col 2:2).¹⁶ Finally, the *mysterium* of God is fulfilled in the Church of Jesus Christ, which is united to him as his body and his bride (cf. Eph 5:32). It can be said, then, that in the New Testament *mysterium* or “sacramentum” has a theological, a Christological, and an ecclesiological dimension, all of which were to come together in the later, more specific concept of sacrament and were to play a normative role in its meaning. The same holds for the universalist dimension of the word sacrament, a dimension that keeps us mindful of the fact that God’s will is that all be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. It is not God’s intention to limit salvation to a few chosen persons (cf. 1Tim 2:4). All of these dimensions, therefore, ally themselves with the concept of *mysterium* in the New Testament.¹⁷

¹⁵ G. KOCH, “Sacraments” in the *Handbook of Catholic Theology*, 605.

¹⁶ G. KOCH, “Sacraments” in the *Handbook of Catholic Theology*, 605.

¹⁷ G. KOCH, “Sacraments” in the *Handbook of Catholic Theology*, 605.

3. Short Biography of Optatus of Milevis (ca. A.D. 320 – ca. A.D. 385)

Optatus of Milevis was born ca. 320 A.D. He was the Bishop of Milevis, Numidia, in North Africa. He was a convert from paganism and was best known for his opposition as a "Catholic champion" to the heretical errors of the Donatists, against whom he composed six treatises.¹⁸ Nevertheless, he is perhaps the least known of all the Fathers of the Church.¹⁹

It is not too much to say that the very name of Optatus is barely known even to many students of theology and ecclesiastical history. Yet his is no mean name; and he cannot be safely ignored, for he has bequeathed to the Church valuable documentation, both to the theologian and to the ecclesiastical historian. The great Augustine held Optatus in high repute. Indeed his influence on Augustine was undoubtedly considerable. Harnack renders an insight worthy of note: 'Even when he entered into the Donatist controversy, Augustine did so as a man of the second or indeed the third generation. He therefore enjoyed the great advantage of having at his disposal a fund of conceptions and ideas already collected. In this sphere Optatus especially had worked before him.'²⁰

His work, today called *Contra Parmenianum Donatism*, was both a doctrinal refutation of Donatist teaching and a conciliatory proposal for the return of those who subscribed to that teaching.²¹ In his *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, P. Monceaux finds evidence in Optatus' work to show that he was "a good man, had an engaging disposition, and was certainly no fool".²² He was,

¹⁸ M. BUNSON, M. BUNSON & S. BUNSON, *Our Sunday Visitor: Encyclopedia of Saints*, 464.

¹⁹ O. R. VASSALL-PHILLIPS, trans., *The Work of St. Optatus against the Donatists*, v.

²⁰ O. R. VASSALL-PHILLIPS, trans., *The Work of St. Optatus against the Donatists*, vii.

²¹ P. K. MEAGHER, T. C. O'BRIEN & C. M. AHERNE, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion*, 2606.

²² W. A. JURGENS, *The Faith of the Early Fathers*, Vol. 2, 140.

moreover, “sincere, honorable, practical, and a man of simple faith”. He probably died in ca. 385 A.D.

4. The Donatist Schism or Controversy Concerning the Sacraments

Donatism rejected the validity of sacraments celebrated by priests and bishops who had formally betrayed their faith. This schism in the Church in Africa began around 311 A.D. when Bishop Caecilian of Carthage was ordained by Bishop Felix of Aptunga, who had been a *traditor* during Diocletian’s persecution.²³

The Donatists rejected the validity of Bishop Caecilian’s ordination because of the sin he committed in behaving as a *traditor*. The heresy gets its name from Donatus, who was a bishop elected in opposition to the legitimate one.²⁴ Moreover, the Donatists claimed that the Church of the saints must remain holy and free from sin and even from those who have committed sins. The Donatists maintained that sinful priests and bishops were incapable of validly celebrating the sacraments. Indeed, the Donatists re-baptized persons who joined them because they did not consider the sacrament valid except in their own circle. The Donatists went so far as to identify the true Church with only themselves.²⁵

St. Augustine was their chief opponent. He developed the Catholic position that *Christ is the true minister of every sacrament*, even if the person celebrating the sacrament is in a state of sin. St. Augustine separated the issue of the worthiness of the priest from the validity and efficacy of the sacrament. The Donatists were finally suppressed by the State in 411 A.D., though they were never fully defeated until Islam destroyed the Church in Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries.²⁶

²³ A traditor was an early Christian who renounced the Christian faith during the Roman persecutions or an early Christian who betrayed other Christians at the time of the Roman persecutions.

²⁴ P. V. ARMENIO, *The History of the Church: A Complete Course*, 160.

²⁵ P. V. ARMENIO, *The History of the Church: A Complete Course*, 160.

²⁶ P. V. ARMENIO, *The History of the Church: A Complete Course*, 160.

5. Optatus' refutation of the Donatist Contentions about the Sacraments

When Parmenian became the successor of Donatus in the primatial see of Carthage, he had already written a work in 363 in defense of the Donatists, entitled *Against the Church of the Apostates* (*Adversus ecclesiam traditorum*). St. Optatus began his refutation of Parmenian's position – labeled simply *Libri Optati* in the manuscripts but called in modern times *Contra Parmenianum* or *De Schismate Donatistarum* – about 367 A.D.

As mentioned, Optatus wrote six books. A seventh book was added, perhaps by Optatus himself or perhaps by a continuator, probably about the year 385 A.D.

The Donatist heresy contributed much to Optatus' discourse on the word "sacrament". We may reiterate the points of emphasis that became the foci of concentration during the debate.

The Donatists declared that the true Church consists *only* of the saved. The Donatists were scandalized by the fact that some of the Catholic priests (the so-called "traditors") had denied Christ under torture. As a result, they claimed that these traitorous priests were unable to confer the sacraments, including baptism. Optatus repeatedly attacked this view: one of the arguments he raised is that *it is the Trinity, not the priest*, who is responsible for the efficacy of the Sacrament. He notes in Chapter 1 of Book V that what is important is not the faith of the priest, but the faithfulness of God.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church in Africa and Numidia, deprived of an effective leader prior to Augustine and Aurelius, sought with varying success to withstand the pressure of the Donatists who, together with their considerably effective proselytizing, were swamping every field.

In the literary camp, prior to the stream of Augustine's anti-Donatist polemics, there was only one other writer worthy of note from the Catholic side against the Donatists, namely, Optatus of Milevis. He wrote the book called *Adversus Donatianae partis calumniam* at the time of Valentinian and Valens. On the basis of the manuscripts that have been transmitted to us, it seems that Optatus wrote the work entitled *Adversus Parmenianum Donatistam*, a seven-book masterpiece that is furnished with an

appendix containing documents relating to the Donatist controversy.²⁷

It has been noted that Optatus conceived his work as a systematic refutation of the pro-Donatist writing of Parmenian. To begin with, Optatus called attention immediately to the five points on the basis of which Parmenian developed his position and to the six points according to which he formulated his own response. Optatus criticized the statement of Parmenian who, when he was extolling baptism, had dared to speak of the purification of the flesh of Christ in his baptism in the Jordan. He then made reference to the condemnation of past heretics, a condemnation that Parmenian had approved (Marcion, Praxeas, Sabellius, Valentinus, and others). It was at this juncture that he introduced a fundamental point of his treatise, namely, the distinction between heretics and scholastics. Scholastics were guilty only on the level of ecclesiastical discipline, while heretics were guilty on the level of doctrine.²⁸

Optatus's first point of refutation concerns the *traditores*, who had provided the spark which ignited the Donatist crisis. Parmenian had maintained the invalidity of Cacilianus' episcopal election. For his part, Optatus relates the entire history: from the beginnings of the schism until the Roman council presided over by Miltiades. In the course of the historical sketch, Optatus places the guilt of the Donatists clearly in relief.²⁹ He alludes above all to the fact, which had been brought to light by the deacon, Nundiniarius, that some of the very Numidian bishops who had accused Felix of Aptungi for being a *traditor* had themselves been *traditores*, as is clear from the first of the documents contained in the appendix.³⁰

The second book discusses Parmenian's statement that only the Donatist church represents the one Catholic Church because it

²⁷ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol. IV, 122.

²⁸ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 123.

²⁹ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 123.

³⁰ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 123.

alone is endowed with the suitable requisites. Optatus refutes this pharisaical presumption of the Donatists on the basis of the fundamental proof that the Donatist church is circumscribed within a tiny part of the world, while the Catholic Church in Africa is in communion with all the other churches.³¹

6. Optatus and the Efficacy of Sacraments

St. Optatus deals with the entire range of the controversy that was causing splits between Catholics and Donatists. He distinguishes between schismatics and heretics. The former have rejected unity, but they have true doctrine and true sacraments. Hence Parmenian should not have threatened them (and consequently his own party) with eternal damnation. This mild doctrine is a great contrast to the severity of many of the Fathers against schism. It seems to be motivated by the notion that all who have faith will be saved, though after long torments, a view which St. Augustine had to combat frequently. The whole schism had arisen through the quarrel about the episcopal succession at Carthage; and it might have been expected that Optatus would claim this property of cathedra by pointing out the legitimacy of the Catholic succession at Carthage.

It was Optatus who first gave clear expression to the principle that the sacraments confer their grace *ex opere operato*, when he wrote in Book 5 chapter 4: *The sacraments are holy of themselves and not on account of men.*³² In the same book and the same chapter, Optatus further affirms with emphasis:

There is no man who is baptizing always and everywhere. Some were engaged in this work in times past, others engage in it now; others still will engage in it in the future. The workers can be changed, but the sacraments cannot be changed. If, then, you can see that all who are baptizing are workers, not lords, and that the sacraments are holy of themselves and not by reason of men (*et sacramenta per se esse sancta, non per homines*), what is it that you claim so urgently for yourselves? What is it that compels you

³¹ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 123.

³² As cited in W. A. JURGENS, *The Faith of the Early Fathers*, Vol. 2, 140.

to insist that God be excluded from His gifts? Admit that it is God who controls what is His own.³³

In Book Four, the shortest of his treatise, Optatus dwells on the *Donatist refusal to accept as valid the Anointing and the Eucharist presided over by Catholic priests* when they are sinners (i.e., sinners from the schismatics' point of view). Optatus relentlessly insists on the radicalism of the Donatists who wish to elaborate upon an argument which does not touch the fundamental points of the profession of faith. He admits that Catholics are sinners; nevertheless he brings forward the truth about God's activity through the sacraments that confutes the rather general scriptural passages which the Donatists advanced in support of their refusal of the sacraments administered by Catholic priests.

The same theme of Book Four is taken up again and developed in Book Five in relation to the doctrinally more important point over which the Donatists and Catholics were divided: the refusal of the Donatists to recognize as valid the Baptism administered by Catholic priests whom they regarded as sinners, and their resulting practice of re-baptizing Catholics who passed over to the ranks of the schismatics.³⁴

In support of such practices the Donatists invoked the authority of Cyprian, who had not considered baptism administered by heretics as valid. Optatus observes that the baptism administered by real heretics, who alter the formula of faith, cannot be considered valid. There are in fact three components (species) of baptism: *prima, in Trinitate*; *secunda, in credente*; *tertia, in operate*. However, only the first two components require the exactness of the baptismal formula intended as a summary of the rule of faith and a declaration of the faith of the candidate: these are indispensable elements. The sanctity of the minister, on the contrary, is not a requirement for the validity of the sacrament: *operarii mutari possunt, sacramenta mutari non possunt*.³⁵

³³ As cited in W. A. JURGENS, *The Faith of the Early Fathers*, Vol. 2, 141.

³⁴ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 125.

³⁵ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 125.

Optatus, therefore, held that if the validity of baptism were to depend on the sanctity of the minister, it would be tantamount to admitting that the will of man could present an impediment to the saving will of God, which takes on concrete form precisely in the gift of baptism. It is not the minister who infuses the divine spirit into the one baptized, but rather God himself. There is contained herein the Augustinian doctrine according to which a sacrament is effective *ex opere operato* and *ex opere operantis*.³⁶

In the works of St. Optatus we can observe his doctrinal stance:

- ❖ he affirms explicitly the truth of baptismal regeneration
- ❖ he makes reference to the Sacrifice of the Altar,
- ❖ he states the doctrine of the Real Presence in words that are incapable of any misunderstanding,
- ❖ he insists on the sacredness of the Holy Chrism,
- ❖ he describes the rites of the adornment of altars for the offering of the Sacrifice,
- ❖ he refers to the ceremony of exorcism before Baptism,
- ❖ he appeals to the deuterocanonical books as to authentic Scripture,
- ❖ he takes the continuance of miracles in the Church for granted, and
- ❖ he is quite expressive in his references to cloistered virginity and the difference between the commandments of God and the counsels of perfection.³⁷

Sometimes indeed he is so contemporary in his expressions (or at least his words are so directly applicable to our contemporary circumstances) that when we first read them we rub our eyes and ask ourselves, "Can it be a Catholic writer of the fourth century whom we are reading, and not one of the twenty-first?" Instances of this may be found in the famous description of the origin of the Donatist schism, which, as Cardinal Wiseman has pointed out, can be paralleled with startling exactness to the schism under Henry; or again in such isolated expressions as *cathedra ducit ad se*

³⁶ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 125.

³⁷ O. R. VASSALL-PHILLIPS, trans., *The Work of St. Optatus against the Donatists*, xi.

angelum, which is all that we need should it be urged that it is safe to remain in Anglicanism because of the (supposed) validity of Anglican Orders. If these Orders were ever identifiably valid, they could not be more valid than were those of the Donatists. St. Optatus, however, teaches us that by themselves valid Orders are of no avail. It is useless to have a bishop (*angelus*) who is out of communion with the one Chair of Peter. Orders he may have; still he remains visibly in schism. *Cathedra ducit ad se Angelum*; or, similarly, ‘per Cathedram Petri, quae nostra est, *per ipsam et ceteras dotes apud nos esse probatum est.*’³⁸

It is *through* the Chair of Peter and hence through our union with that Chair which itself ‘is ours,’ that we derive and can prove our security with the other endowments God has given to the Church, amongst which is reckoned lawful episcopacy. In discussion with any Christian denominations that historically have been considered Protestant, what need do we have to say more than those three words of St. Optatus, *Catholica prior est*? Before any Protestant body saw the light of day, before Luther began to trouble the peace of Christendom with his turbulent spirit, before the ecclesiastical provinces of Canterbury and York were torn away by the State from their union with the Apostolic See, before the ambition of Photius separated Byzantium from the elder Rome, before Donatism arose, there was the Catholic Church and the Chair of Peter: *Catholica prior est.*³⁹

Conclusion

The sixth book of Optatus is dedicated to the illustration of the excesses of the Donatists and pays critical attention to the Donatist notion that the Catholic sacraments are invalid including ordinations, a notion that compelled them to destroy the altars and chalices of the Catholic Churches, to wash and sprinkle with salt

³⁸ O. R. VASSALL-PHILLIPS, trans., *The Work of St. Optatus against the Donatists*,

³⁹ O. R. VASSALL-PHILLIPS, Trans., *The Work of St. Optatus against the Donatists*, xiv.

the churches themselves in order to purify them, and to force the consecrated virgins to change their woolen garments.⁴⁰

The style of St. Optatus is vigorous and animated. He writes tersely and effectively. Rather than expressing himself in a gentle, flowing prose, he writes with emphatic feeling, and this in spite of the gentleness and charity which is so admirable in his polemics against his "brethren", as he insists on calling the Donatist bishops. He expresses his theological communion with Saint Cyprian, even though he refutes Cyprian's mistaken opinion about baptism, and does not copy Cyprian's easy style. His descriptions of events are admirable and vivid. His fidelity is unassailable. He supported the papal primacy. He rightfully understood the Catholic Church to be the subsisting reality of the Church of Christ, *Catholica prior est*. He insightfully grasped the salvific activity of God inherent within the Sacraments and hence their *ex opere operato* nature. He manifested himself as someone who lived within the vibrantly beating heart of the Church by his wholehearted advocacy of the Holy Mass as the Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Real Presence of the One who offers that Sacrifice, Jesus Christ, our Lord and our God.

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⁴⁰ A. DI BERARDINO, ed., *Patrology: The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature*, Vol IV, 125.

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